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ABSTRACT
"DISCONTENTED BUT NOT INEVITABLY REACTIONARY"-
ORGANIZED LABOR IN THE NIXON YEARS
SEPTEMBER 2001
MARIA GRACIELA ABARCA, B.A., INSTITUTO NACIONAL SUPERIOR DEL
PROFESORADO EN LENGUAS VIVAS '"JUAN RAMON FERNANDEZ"
ARGENTINA
M.A., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Kevin Boyle
The present study examines organized labor's role in American political and
economic life during the Nixon years. In the 1960s, most observers regarded American
workers as economically secure and content. Events at the close of the decade, however,
undermined the image of the affluent worker. Workers' support for conservative
candidates George Wallace and Richard Nixon during the 1968 presidential campaign
convinced many observers that blue-collar Americans had swung to the right. In the
election's aftermath, analysts of various political persuasions tried to explain "the blue-
collar blues." According to the mainstream press, white workers had become more
concerned with social issues
—
ghetto rioting, campus unrest, widespread anti-war protest,
the breakdown of law and order— than about "traditional" economic issues.
Richard Nixon hoped to capitalize on the Social Issue to woo white workers and
fashion a new Republican majority. But the relationship between the Nixon
Administration, a traditionally Democratic labor leadership, a radicalized student
vii
movement, and a volatile rank and file proved to be highly complex. Large-scale strikes
against the General Electric and General Motors corporations in 1969 and 1970 showed
that workers still considered economic issues to be of paramount concern. Workers and
their unions did not uniformly support U.S. policy in Vietnam; indeed, during the Nixon
years, unionists became more outspoken in their opposition to the war. Some unions
even attempted a rapprochement with segments of the New Left. Organized labor
denounced Nixon's attempts to combat the inflationary spiral the Vietnam War had
triggered.
Nixon nevertheless won substantial blue-collar support during his 1972 re-
election campaign. He did so not by playing the social issues but by neutralizing the
Vietnam War and economic concerns. Nixon's victory proved to be short lived,
however. The economic recession of 1 973 took its toll on the workers and their unions.
The energy crisis launched a devastating round of de-industrialization. By 1974. Nixon's
blue-collar support had collapsed. For all their discontent, white workers had not become
members of the new Republican majority. They were displeased with their position in
American society, however, and their votes were available for courting.
viii
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IIN I KODIK liOIN
In h>71, (iary Brynor had been pivsiclcnl of Knal 1 1 1 2 i>r the I liiilcd Aiilomobilc
Workers (I IAW) lor over Iweiily inoiUhs. Us iiieinhers were employees at the (Jeneral
Motors (OM) assembly plani in i oulslown, Ohio. ^Mt^s (he most aulomalecl, fastest line
in the worUi;^ Hryner asserted. The yonlhful loeal president had been throuj.»h the widely
publiei/ed h)7() strike against (IM and a number ofstoppa^^-es over speednps. In
Bryner^s view, the General Motors Assembly Division aimed at efHeieney as well aseost
rediietion, and totally disregariled the loll that sneh an approaeh took on the workers. \ ov
that reason, rank and filers had labeled the (iMAI), ^Xlottta Make Another Dollar."
Rellecting on his role as nnion leader, hryner eonehuled: \..l feel good aioinul when Km
able to stand up aiul speak up lor another guy s rights. I hat s how I got mvolved m tins
whole stinking mess, l ighting everyday of my life. And I en)t>y it/'
Although he admitted that imlustrial unionism was a '\slinking mess/' Uryner
prided himselfon what he as a union leader eould do for ^Mhe guys.'"* In the post-WWll
period, however, the itiealism thai tingetl Uryner's words was seklom assoeiated with
organized labor. In the turbulent l%()s, the ei)neerns ol" organized labor and working
people rarely hekl eenler stage. The eivil rights erusade, liie esealating antiwar
tiemonslrations. and the women s liberation mo\emenl oeeiipied the lorelront ol social
ehange and political controversy. "In a lime ol lh)wci cinldrcn burning ghettocs, ami
open contempt lor traditional American values and aspirations," historian Robert /ieger
claims, "no womler the world of the wage worker and the trade unionist seeme<l remote
'studs Terkel, Workins^: People Talk About Whal Tlnr Do AH Ihiy Ami How Tiny hWI
Ahoul W hal T/uy /)o(New York: Pantheon Hooks, \')7?l IK7-hM.
1
and even irrelevant." American workers had come to be regarded as affluent and
content members of consumer society. It was widely believed that, despite the
dissatisfaction associated with factory work itself, high wages enabled workers to enjoy a
lifestyle once reserved for the middle class. American society had presumably become a
"middle-class society" in which the vast majority of the population participated as equals.
At the close of the decade, however, the picture of the prosperous, suburban,
middle-class worker grew blurred. Unemployment rose appreciably and wages failed to
keep pace with soaring prices. Contrary to widespread belief, the relative prosperity of
the 195()s and 1960s had not turned workers into fully integrated members of the
American social and political system, 'in 1968," S. M. Miller states, "a new group in
3
America was identified first with horror, increasingly with compassion."' At the onset of
the 1968 presidential election, George Wallace, a racist demagogue, attracted a large
number of union members to his cause. Such a rightward political turn among workers
shocked many Americans. Although most of the early Wallace supporters switched to
Democratic Party candidate Hubert 11. Humphrey before the balloting, the presidential
election was crucial in bringing working-class concerns to the forefronl of public
controversy, i he "blue-collar blues" caused a lluriy of working-class studies that tried to
determine the economic and social problems of workers. The debate centered on the
alleged "middle-class" status, hawkishncss, and political conservatism of the American
worker.
^Robert /ac^ct, American Workers, American Unions, /920-/y(V5(Baltimore and London;
The .lohns I lopkins University, 1986), 169.
^S. M. Miller, "Sharing the Burden of Change," Ncm' Generation 51, no. 2 (Spring 1969):
2.
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Conservative, reactionary, hawkish, or authoritarian were not the worst names
that the American working class was called. As Michael Harrington expressed it in 1972,
"the unkindest cut of all" was "nonexistent."'* In 1969, however, there were 77.902
million working men and women in the non-agricultural labor force; 20.21 million were
unionized and concentrated mainly in machinery, transportation equipment, contract
construction, and transportation services.^ The strike wave of 1969-1970 increased
organized labor's visibility and reminded distinguished scholars at disparate points in the
political spectrum that unionized workers still shared "a common situation and common
interests." Fortune anticipated that 1969 could turn out to be ''a time of epic battle
between management and labor" as unionists were in an "angry, aggressive and
acquisitive" mood. While the mainstream press played up working-class conservatism
and economic well being, some liberals were trying to fashion a new version of the New
Deal Liberal coalition. New leftists, for their part, were re-evaluating the role of the
working class and turning out on picket lines to support striking workers.
This study evaluates the role that labor unions played in electoral politics, the
economic arena and the anti-war movement in the 1968-1974 period. To a large number
of labor historians, a discussion of organized labor in the late 1960s and early 1970s may
sound irrelevant. To some scholars, the American labor movement collapsed with the
''Michael Harrington, "Old Working Class, New Working Class," in Irving Howe, ed.,
The World oj the Blue-Collar Worker {Ney\ York; Quadrangle Books, 1972), 135.
^Ibid., 137.
^Richard Amstrong, "Labor 1970: Angry, Aggressive, and Acquisitive," For/wwe,
October 1969, 95.
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rise of the "New Deal order" which contained the revitaUzed woricer mihtancy of the
1 930s. To others, unions lost all political leverage in the immediate postwar period
when labor leaders failed to create industrial democracy;^ few historians would argue that
labor unions could still make a difference in America's socio-political and economic life
by the 1 960s. In their evaluation of American trade unionism, labor scholars inevitably
reflect their own set of assumptions about the way political systems work and about the
best strategies for reform.
My evaluation of the 1968-1974 period will also be based on a number of
premises. First, American workingmen and women have used varied forms of resistance
and voiced their demands through styles of organization that have best fitted their needs
and work cultures at different historical moments. "Class" -in a Thompsonian sense, as
both economic and cultural creation- has informed human conflict in the United States
and intersected with racial, ethnic and gender issues in crucial ways. Workers have
multiple identities that they combine in different ways. This, in turn, defines the type of
On the incorporation of labor unions into the corporate-liberal state, see Mike Davis,
Prisoners ofthe American Dream: Politics and Economy in the History ofthe U.S.
Working Class (London: Verso, 1986); for a legal examination of the New Deal Order,
see Christopher Tomlins, The State and The Unions: Labor Relations, Law. and the
Organized Labor Movement in America, 1880-1960 (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1986).
g
For an overview of labor in postwar America, see David Brody, Workers in Industrial
America: Essays on the Twentieth Century Struggle (New York: Knoft, 1969); see also
Nelson Lichtenstein, "From Corporatism to Collective Bargaining,'T40-145, in Fraser
and Gerstle, eds., The Rise and Fall ofthe New Deal Order, 1930-1980 (Princeton;
Princeton University Press, 1989).
^See Kevin Boyle, The UAW and the Heyday ofAmerican Liberalism, 1945-1968. (Ithaca
and London: Cornell University Press, 1995).
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collective action that they take. Second, the state is neither an all-powerful and
autonomous entity nor a mere capitalist tool. Protective legislation that facilitates
unionization does not inevitably mean co-optation. Third, any assessment of the
workers' failures and achievements cannot be isolated from either structural constraints,
such as the nature of the American political system, or historical developments, such as
the Cold War.
In the 1960s, American blue-collar workers did not form the homogeneous and
militant constituency that some student radicals still dreamed of. The blue-collar
workforce was in fact a diverse occupational group -factory workers, skilled workers,
transportation workers and non-farm laborers- further divided along racial, ethnic and
gender lines. Consequently, the role that their unions played in the national scene of the
1968-1974 period was extremely complex. When contemporary observers dismissed
labor as irrelevant, they missed this complexity. In 1971, Brendan and Patricia Cayo
Sexton stated:
We think the obituaries for workers and their unions have been premature, based
principally on superficial reading of available materials and distorted inferences
drawn from short-term trends.
The purpose of this work is to revisit the period and thus go beyond "premature
obituaries" and rushed conclusions about organized labor. My analysis will be further
restricted to unionized workers in the auto and electrical industries; more specifically, to
the United Automobile Workers (UAW), the International Union of Electrical Workers
(lUE), and the independent United Electrical, Radio, and Machine Workers of America
Brendan and Patricia Cayo, "Labor's Decade - Maybe," in Irving Howe and Michael
Harrington, eds.. The Seventies: Problems and Proposals (New York, Evanston, San
Francisco, London: Harper Colophon Books, 1972), 283.
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(UE). Due to their large membership and involvement in the economic and political life
of the country, I believe that a study of these unions will be representative of the
divisions, successes, failures, aspirations and contradictions within the organized blue-
collar working class. In 1968, the UAW, the largest union in the country, withdrew from
the American Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial Organization (AFL-CIO). This
was the culmination of a long feud between UAW President Walter Reuther and AFL-
CIO President George Meany, who had fundamental differences over principles, policies
and programs. The lUE, for its part, was the third largest union within the AFL-CIO. It
had been chartered in 1949, after the purge of the left-leaning UE. Moreover, I will
explore the relationship between the AFL-CIO top echelons and the rank and file, the
student movement and the Nixon Administration.
To illuminate the relationship between labor leaders" initiatives and rank and
file's responses, I will examine the way in which blue-collar workers' multiple identities
combined and influenced their stand on different issues throughout the period. In his
book America 's Working Man (1984), sociologist David Halle argues that the 'Mmage that
[workers] have of their position in the class structure is based on three distinct identities."
First, blue-collar workers forge an identity on the shop floor; as an occupational group
they have experiences that set them apart from other sectors of society. Blue-collar
workers build a second identity outside work; this identity is directly related to income
level and standard of living. Workers' third identity derives from living in the United
1
1
States; it stresses "a common bond between all Americans."
''David Halle, America 's Working Man: Work. Home and Politics among Blue Collar
Property Owners (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1984), 203.
6
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As the 1960s came to a close, the U.S. was not a "post-industrial" society i
which the "old" blue-collar working class was a thing oftlie past. Most unionized blue-
collar workers were employed in manufacturing, construction and transportation: most of
them did jobs that bore little intrinsic interest or reward; many of those who worked on
assembly lines in auto plants endured a dehumanizing routine. As the president ofUAW
local 1112 put it: "They [auto workers] don't come home thinking. Boy. 1 did a great job
12
today and 1 caif t wait to get back toinorrow/' Blue-collar work is physical, dangerous
or/and dirty, routine and closely supervised. I'hese elenients defuic the bluc^coliar
worker^s identity on the shop lloor. Moreover, as Michael 1 larrington states: " They are
not paid as individuals, but as members of a class."*^ Blue collars are subjected to a
common discipline in the work process and build collective institutions in defense ot^
their immediate interests. By the late 1960s, howeven workers did not necessarily return
to neighborhoods that were "a hundred percent'^ blue collar. The movement of workers
to the suburbs contributed to its participation in ^^classless" consumer society. The
material Iramework outside work -income level, life style, consumer goods- at times
blurred the differences between white-collar and blue-collar workers, hi view of this,
how did workers define ''job satisfaction'"? Did unions help blue collars to achic\ e such
satisfaction? These were thoroughly debated issues in the early 1970s.
Blue-collar workers, as Halle says, also develop an identity as Americans, i.e. as
those born in the territory of the nation-state or admitted to citizenship by the federal
government. Nationalism revolves around a number of symbols and terms- such as the
'Verkek 193
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Harrington, 138
flag, the national anthem, the "people"- that can conjure up different meanings at
different times. In the Vietnam War years, political commentators often conflated
working-class hostility to radical students' tactics such as flag-burning with working-
class feelings about the war itself, and thus portrayed American labor as out-and-out
hawkish. Among blue-collar workers terms such as "the American people" and "the
American public" have also been used in a populist sense. In labor publications, it is not
uncommon to find articles that presented the plight of the worker as a conflict between
the power structure of America -big business, politicians- and the rest of the population.
In 1969 and 1970, for instance, electrical workers and autoworkers rallied support for
their strikes against General Electric (GE) and GM, respectively, by focusing on these
companies" "profiteering at the expense of their employees and the public" Thus,
unionists tried to show that labor militancy had the "general benefit" of Americans at
heart. The blue-collar worker, however, was then more often viewed as the symbol of the
new reactionary politics, rather than the symbol of the old radicalism.
Historically, the American working class has been deeply divided along racial,
ethnic and gender lines. The self-conception of the worker, however, changes over time.
In other words, self-definition is not static; h varies. The crucial question is how these
various outlooks coexist in the workers' minds at various times in history. By 1968, the
Vietnam War as well as the impending economic crisis eclipsed race as a national
dominant issue. By discussing the blue-collar blues, workers were described as members
of a "class" that suffered specific problems due to their position in the American socio-
economic structure. For those of us who have believed in the "creative potential of the
workers" for social change, there is nothing more challenging than examining organized
8
labor in the United States, "the nation where labor seems most integrated into the
prevailing order and utterly lacking in any kind of revolutionary consciousness.""* This is
precisely the task I have undertaken: unravel labor's participation at a time when the
nation was experiencing a social political and economic crisis, a period in which liberals,
trade unionists, insurgent students and aroused minority groups found it increasingly
difficult to consolidate a major political coalition.
I start in chapter one by discussing union mobilization for Hubert H. Humphrey,
the 1968 presidential election outcome and its aftermath. The weakening of the labor-
liberal alliance and the subsequent defeat of the Democratic Party contributed to the
rediscovery of the American worker. In many cases, fear led liberal politicians to take
blue-collar workers' grievances seriously. Following my analysis of the 1968 campaign,
I examine a selection of politically diverse literature that reveals a clear concern with the
role that "the middle American" could play in American politics. Mainstream magazines
reinforced the view of the U.S. as a "middle-class society," while politicians coined
catchy phrases such as "the troubled American," "the forgotten American," "the little
man," or "the silent majority."
By using the term "Middle America," commentators lumped blue-collar workers
together with the middle class. Black Power and the counterculture were presented as
paramount concerns among workers, totally effacing "the class issue." Political analysts
Richard M. Scammon and Ben J. Wattenberg started a debate with the publication of The
Real Majority in 1970. Scammon and Wattenberg argued that, to the majority of
'^Michael Harrington, "American Society: Burdens, Problems, Solutions," in Howe and
Harrington, eds.. The Seventies, 37.
9
American voters, the Social Issue
-i.e. concerns about law and order, youth violence and
black power- superseded "old" economic issues, such as unemployment, labor union
prerogatives or broad-based welfare proposals such as Social Security.'^
Andrew Levison took issue with Scammon and Wattenberg. The Working Class
Majority is his attempt to prove that the U.S. was not a middle-class society. In 1970, the
"typical" American worker earned $ 9,500. This figure actually placed blue collars
closer to the working poor than to the affluent middle class. After debunking the myth
of working-class economic well being, Levison turned to workers' alleged apathy and
acquiescence. Throughout the 1 960s, he pointed out, a rising discontent with working
and living conditions was evident in the growth of rank-and-file militancy. The
increasing number of strikes, Levison concluded, was an indication that the Social Issue
had not yet superseded the Economic Issue. Rank and filers were particularly restless in
the 1969-1970 period. Beginning with electrical manufacturers in October 1969, and
followed by trucking, meatpacking, rubber and automobiles, five great industries had to
reach new three-year contracts.
The strike wave of the 1969-1970 period provides the context to assess unionized
blue-collar workers' affluence and acquiescence. Although industrial workers staged
several large-scale walkouts, two captured national attention: the 102-day strike against
GE in the winter of 1969-1970 and the 400.000 autoworkers' walkout against GM in
1970. In chapters three and four, I probe these two strikes in order to assess blue-collar
""^Richard M. Scammon and Ben J. Wattenberg, The Real Majority (New York: Coward
McCann and Geoghegan, Inc., 1970), 35-43.
*^Andrew Levison, The Working Class Majority (New York: Coward, McCann and
Geoghegan, Inc., 1974), 229.
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economic issues
workers" demands as well as labor unions' role in working-class life. The GE strike
reflected not only rank-and-file dissatisfaction over "the old fashioned'
but also the workers' determination to reject unnegotiated contracts and to strike for
longer periods of time. This labor campaign was also a valuable opportunity for radical
students to build an alliance with workers. I assess the student-worker collaboration
during the campaign as well as the achievements of the thirteen-union coalition -led by
lUE and UE- that staged the strike.
The 1970 walkout against GM also brought the issue of labor militancy and
industrial unionism to the forefront of political debate. To some observers, the GM strike
had been an expensive triumph. The conflict had cost the UAW about $ 160 million and
almost bankrupted the union. The powerful multinational corporation also lost millions
17
of dollars in its attempt to resist the unions' demands. To more cynical analysts,
however, the company had allowed itself to be struck in order to protect union leaders,
1
8
who in turn had sold the members a cheap settlement. Were strikes and unions still
necessary to humanize the shopfloor and improve the workers' living standards? Or were
walkouts little more than "'a blue-collar catharsis''? My analysis aims at determining
whether companies and unions had become "sweethearts," as critics implied, or whether
they remained adversaries.
'^B. J. Widick, ^^Sweethearts or Adversaries?" Nation 216, no. 25, 18 June 1973, 792.
1
8
In The Company and the Union (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1973), William Serrin
presents a scornful view of the "civilized relationship" between the auto companies and
the UAW leaders.
'Villiam R. Droemer, "Blue-Collar Catharsis," Time, 19 March 1973, 18.
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In chapter five, I explore the most divisive issue within the ranks of organized
labor: the Vietnam War. Labor unions' support for U.S. involvement in Southeast Asia
fed into the view of the American worker as politically conservative or even reactionary.
The AFL-CIO"s unconditional backing of the Vietnam War gave substance to the charges
of labor's "hawkishness." The hard-hat demonstrations of May 1970 apparently
confirmed the view of the white blue-collar worker as reactionary. The media
transformed the hard-hats into symbols of authoritarianism and patriotism. The "hard-hat
phenomenon," however, was not representative of working class sentiment towards the
conflict. The number of dissenting unions and rank and filers had been increasing
considerably since 1968.
As historian Christian Appy has thoroughly documented, the Vietnam War was a
working-class war, a fact that was not acknowledged at the time. About 80 percent of
those who fought in Southeast Asia came from working class and poor backgrounds.
Consequently, the feelings that the soldiers and their families had about the American
military intervention in Indochina and the largely middle-class anti-war movement were
very complex. Workers might oppose an escalation of the war owe/ the student radicals'
"anti-American" demonstrations. In a 1973 essay on patriotism, John H. Shaar asserted,
"The radicals of the 1960s did not persuade their fellow-Americans, high or low, that
they genuinely cared for and shared a country with them. And no one who has contempt
20
for others can hope to teach those others.'
In the Vietnam years, the issue of nationalism became a dilemma to the American
public. Was opposition to the conflict in Indochina un-American? Were American boys
20
John H. Shaar, 'The Case for Patriotism," ^wtr/cc/w Review 4, no. 17 (May 1973): 62,
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enough. More than enough."'^ The Watergate scandal along with the economic
recession of 1973-74 heightened the national feeling of exhaustion that had been
prevalent since the late 1960s. The events of the early 1970s seriously shook citizens'
confidence in American institutions. In the last chapter, 1 assess Nixon's political and
economic collapse as well as its impact on labor-capital relations in the years to come, the
years of the conservative ascendancy.
In October 1996, leading American intellectuals and labor movement activists
held a 'Teach-in with the Labor Movement at Columbia University. They addressed the
same issues that some liberals, new leftists and trade unionists were discussing almost
twenty years earlier: how could a revitalized labor movement challenge the
disproportionate power of corporations in American society and fight for social justice
22
and economic security? The answers are as difficult today as they were thirty years ago.
It was hard to predict in 1996 that less than four years later, a new coalition of
unions, human rights groups and environmentalists would voice their concerns about
global economic injustice in demonstrations that made the headlines all over the world.
November 30, 1999, was the day that the World Trade Organization was battled head-on
in Seattle. The mass media soon drew parallels between the 1968 Battle of Chicago and
the 1999 Battle of Seattle. The confrontations with the police and the "street theater"
may have looked similar. There were, however, many differences. In Chicago, labor
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leaders and student demonstrators were on different sides of the barricades. In Seattle,
the students and the workers were unequivocally on the same side. During a Pier 62 rally
in Seattle, Steelworkers' President George Becker referred to this newly forged alliance:
"I want to say a word to the young people. I want to welcome you. This is where you
23
belong, with the labor movement." It remains to be seen whether the Battle of Seattle
was an isolated moment of militancy or a real turning point in the history of the American
labor movement.
^"^David Sarasohn, ''New Alliances forged in Seattle," Stalen Island Advance, Internet,
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In British journalists l ewis (Micstcr, (unllVcy 1 locigson, and Bruce Page
proclucecl a thoroughly researched account of the I<)68 presidential campaign in the
United States. They entitled it. An American Mchnhatna. By dellnition, ''melodrama" is
''a dramatic piece characteri/ed by sensational incident and \ iolent appeals to the
emotions, but with a happy ending."' I he events that Wwk place in 1968 were
unprecedented: an ambitious president's withdrawal from the presidential race; the
assassination of his most bitter rival; the murder of the most ranu)us Ali ican-American of
the time; the successes of an overtly racist thircl party candidate; the split of the
Democratic Parly over the Vietnam War; the rupture of the American labor movement.
Did 1968 then come to a "happy ending," as melodramas do? Or is it more appropriate to
2
simply call it "the year of the barricades"? The events of 1968 were not just .sensational.
The year's deveU)pments signaled a turning point in the history of the United Stales; Ihey
.shook the foundations of the labor-liberal alliance that had sustained the New Deal order
for over thirty years.
The New Deal managed to accommodate in ils coalition such varied constituents
as .southerners, ethnic Catholics in the northeast and midwest, African-Americans, lower
Vewis Chester, et. al.. An American Mchnirama: Tlw Prcsiiicnlial ( 'ampaii^n of 196H
(New York; Viking Press, 1969), iii.
^In The Year ofthe Barricades: A Journey Tlironi^h l^fnS (New York: Harper and Row,
1988), David Caute describes 1968 as "the most turbulent since the end of WWII." Yet,
he concludes that the legacy of the New Left has been entirely "cultural" as ils challenges
to the .state, the political .system and corporate capitalism were defeated.
16
nikldlc-class Jews, union mcnibcrs and blue-collar workers. Since Ihe nuil-i9 M)s, ihe
alliance of liberal Democrats and progressive labor leaders had provided American
workers with higher real incomes, greater economic security, increased protection against
sickness and accident, and broadened educational opportunities. In a l*)6S message to
the United Automobile Workers, union president Walter Reuther summed up the crucial
intersection between polities and trade unionism in the following way:
Over the years we have learned through the hanl les.sons ol histi^ry that collective
bargaining does not lake |>lace in a vacuum and there is, in Tact, a direct
relationship between the bread box and the ballot box.'
The 1968 presidential election campaign posed a serious challenge lo organi/ed
labt)r. I he war in Southeast Asia created deep rills among both labor leaders and rank-
and-lllers. I he debacle at the Democratic Tarty convention in Chicago galvanized the
ililTerenecs between the anti-war pri)lesters and the president of the American bederation
ofKabor-Congress of Industrial Organizations (Al b-CIO) (leorge Meany, who as.sailed
them as 'dirty-necked, dirty-mouthed demonstrators."' Moreover, Cieorge Wallace, the
racist former Alabama governor, and Richard Nixon, the conservative Republican
candidate, were trying \o capture the blue-collar \i>te and apparentb succeeding. lU>lh
politicians made "law ami oi tlcr" Ihe focal point of their campaigns. I he phrase hail
come to mean many things from opposing crime in Ihe streets and ghetto rioting to unrest
over unfuHllled promi.ses, slums, .school desegregation and Ihe war on poverty. American
workers, some observers contended, were drawn to Wallace's and Nixon's law and order
appeals beeau.se they were more concerned about social i.ssues than about economic ones.
'"A Mes.sage l-rom Walter Reuther," LJAll' Solidnrilw No\ember 1%8, 5.
blames A. Wechsler, " The Scars of diicago," The Proi^rcssivc, November l%S, 27,
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To stop a possible conservative ascendancy, union leaders worked vigorously to promote
the election of vice-president Hubert H. Humphrey and thus to preserve the alliance that
had substantially increased organized labor's economic and political power for over three
decades.
The alignment of the labor movement with the Democratic Party both empowered
and limited its room to maneuver. In the early 1930s, the New Deal protective legislation
allowed the newly-formed Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO) -which rivaled the
long-standing American Federation of Labor (AFL> to channel working-class activism
into permanent labor unions in mass-production industries. American employers lost the
enormous power advantages that they had enjoyed in the struggle over collective
bargaining, but in exchange the labor movement conceded its independence from the
state. Under the landmark National Labor Relations Act, collective bargaining remained
free-the state did not mandate the terms of the capital-labor agreements- but the
framework of the negotiations came under the aegis of state regulation. Industrial
unionism also forged institutional ties of representation, influence and negotiation with
the state, which considerably increased its political leverage.
In the early 1 940s, as the country prepared for war, the federal government
devised a system of labor-management relations. Public officials, labor leaders and
corporate executives worked side by side in agencies such as the National War Labor
Board, the Office of Production Management, and the War Production Board. In 1945-
46, some observers believed trade unions could build on their wartime experience to
fashion industrial democracy. The CIO's leadership aimed at tripartite governance of
industry, which would give organized labor decision-making powers in corporations'
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production, investment and employment. The CIO's project, however, never
materialized. Corporate leaders who presided over key manufacturing industries
emerged from the war with renewed self-confidence.' The rising tide of conservatism
resulted in the 1947 Taft-Hartley Act, which curbed solidarity among unions. Policy-
makers' revived faith in capitalism led to the triumph of the "Keynesian" or fiscal state
over the "regulatory" state. The state would stimulate the economy through its fiscal and
monetary powers rather than tighten its control over capitalist institutions.^ Economic
growth, most policy-makers came to believe in the war's aftermath, was the surest path
towards a more egalitarian society. By the end of World War II, liberals rejected the
class analysis that permeated the political rhetoric of the 1930s and promoted the notion
of a pluralist society made up of special-interest groups.
The coalition that labor unions forged with the Democratic Party also led to
unconditional support of the party's foreign policy. At the onset of the Cold War, the
labor movement was gripped by an internal crisis over Communist participation. In
1949, Communist-dominated unions were expelled from the CIO. Six years later, the
AFL and the CIO settled their major differences and merged into a single organization
under the leadership of George Meany. Postwar labor leaders, as well as organized
workers, shared in the fruits of a political economy of growth and accommodated easily
Steve Fraser, Labor Will Rule: Sidney Hillman and the Rise ofAmerican Labor (New
York: The Free Press, 1991); Nelson Lichtenstein, "From Corporatism to Collective
Bargaining: Organized Labor and the Eclipse of Social Democracy in the United States,"
in Steve Fraser and Gary Gerstle, eds.. The Rise and Fall ofthe New Deal Order, 1930-
1980 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989), 122-152.
^Alan Brinkley, "The New Deal and the Idea of the State," in Fraser and Gerstle, eds..
The Rise and Fall ofthe New Deal Order, 85-121.
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to the New Deal formula. Labor unions negotiated the best possible contracts for their
members and rallied support for Democratic candidates. The combination of consensus
politics at home and containment of communism abroad thus seriously compromised
organized labor's attempts to fundamentally alter power relations in American society.
Despite the political and structural limitations, the more progressive unions such
as Reuther's UAW continued to promote a larger agenda which included the repeal of the
Taft-Hartley Act, the passage of civil rights legislation and the expansion of the welfare
state. When President Lyndon B. Johnson launched his administration's attack on
poverty in 1964, the UAW leadership became fully involved in the Great Society
programs. The federal government thus committed itself to providing "better schools and
better health and better homes and better training.. .to help more Americans.. .escape from
squalor and misery and unemployment..."^ The War on Poverty, however, was flawed
from the beginning. The Great Society's programs were largely aimed at urban African-
Americans and thus linked race and poverty. The expansion of the Great Society into the
ghettoes in 1 965 and 1 966 led to a clash between the UAW and black grassroots
organizations. The growing African-American militancy, coupled with the rising cost of
federal social programs, weakened the reform coalition that had gathered around the
8
Great Society. The UAW leadership, though initially pleased by the LBJ
Administration's programs, grew frustrated as it became clear that they were too
narrowly defined.
7
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As Kevin Boyle states, 'The Johnson Administration never moved beyond its
concern for the underclass to confront the problems of the working class as a whole."^
By the late 1960s, a faltering economy was revealing the shaky foundations of the
economic security blue collars had won the in postwar era. An increasing number of
white workers thought that the Great Society programs were costing them money, but not
benefiting them. Many felt that liberals were unconcerned with their needs and interests.
Political debate seemed to center either on racial issues or on the demands of middle-
class led movements, such as women's rights, gay rights, and environmental protection.
Dissatisfied blue collars appeared to be turning their backs on LBJ and his social
programs and thus seriously weakening the New Deal coalition. Nixon and Wallace
would base their campaigns for the presidency in 1968 on the conviction that the
American electorate had shifted to the right. Workers, however, had not undergone an
ideological conversion. But because the New Deal formula did not seem to be working
for them, their vote was in 1968 available for courting.
The escalation of the Vietnam War further fractured the labor-liberal alliance. In
particular, it highlighted the deep strains within the AFL-CIO. Since the merger of the
AFL-CIO in 1955, Meany and Reuther, the last CIO's president, had worked together to
shape the labor movement's relationship with the Democratic Party. The two men were
dramatically different. In the 1940s and 1950s, Meany had moved up the AFL's
bureaucratic ladder, becoming the president of the merged AFL-CIO in 1955. Meany
was the quintessential labor bureaucrat who could act as a negotiator at a bargaining
table, an administrator of the organization, and a labor lobbyist in Congress. The AFL-
^Boyle, "Little More than Ashes," 230.
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CIO president was proud to have never walked a picket line, organized a local or led a
strike. Meany believed that organized labor could advance its interests through collective
bargaining as well as political and legislative action.'" In foreign policy issues, Meany
was fully committed to the Cold War. He was a staunch anti-communist who regarded
any attempt at detente with the Soviet Union as a sign of appeasement.
Reuther, for his part, had organized thousands of automobile workers in the mid-
1930s and led the UAW in a number of postwar strikes. As an advocate of social
unionism, the UAW leader expected the AFL-CIO merger to spark a massive organizing
drive, an interest that Meany did not share.' ' A former Socialist Party member, Reuther
voted for Franklin D. Roosevelt in 1940 and 1944. Other militant UAW leaders such as
Emil Mazey and Victor Reuther preferred organized labor to remain independent from
the Democratic Party and were committed to the creation of a labor party. By the time of
the 1948 presidential election, Reuther had abandoned any such hopes and embraced the
Democratic Party as a vehicle for labor and liberal causes. In that year, the UAW leader
repudiated the Progressive Party candidate Henry Wallace and supported the Democratic
Party ticket. Although Reuther did not share Meany' s virulent anticommunism, the
13UAW leader accepted the emerging Cold War foreign policy consensus. This did not
^Vobert Zieger, "George Meany: Labor's Organization Man/' in Melvyn Dubovsky and
Warren Van Tine, eds.. Labor Leaders in America (Urbana and Chicago: University of
Illinois Press, 1987), 324.
'^Nelson Lichtenstein, "Walter Reuther and the Rise of Labor-Liberalism," in Labor
Leaders in America, 295-296.
'^Ibid., 296.
"The impact of the Cold War on the labor movement is further discussed in Chapter 5.
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prevent Reuther from becoming, in Nelson Lichtenstein's words, '^one ofthe founders of
mid-twentieth century liberalism and an architect ofthe American welfare state."'" In the
mid-1960s, Reuther not only set the parameters of collective bargaining but also defined
the most liberal wing of organized labor's political agenda.
The relationship between Meany and Reuther was never amicable: the two leaders
started feuding as soon as the AFL-CIO merger was completed in 1955. By 1962,
Reuther had become increasingly frustrated with the state ofthe labor movement. In his
view, the AFL-CIO was neither organizing the unorganized nor vigorously fighting
corruption or racial discrimination among affiliates. Reuther grew more outspoken in his
criticism of Meany "s conservatism and even blamed the AFL-CIO president for the
movement's stagnation. In 1962, Meany and Reuther clashed over the nomination of
Ralph Ilelstein as a member ofthe federation's Executive Board. Ilelstein was the
president ofthe Packinghouse Workers and a widely recognized liberal leader. Meany
regarded the nomination as an act of defiance on the part of Reuther, and consequently
rejected it. Reuther then considered pulling the UAW out ofthe AFL-CIO, but President
John F. Kennedy persuaded him to remain in the federation until after the 1964
15
election.
Johnson's escalation ofthe Vietnam War exacerbated tensions between the AFL-
CIO and the UAW. Throughout 1966 and 1967, American military and political leaders
had been extolling U.S. progress in the war: the National Liberation Front (NLF) and its
14
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North Vietnamese allies, they claimed, were on the verge of collapse. Despite the
optimistic government reports, organized protest against the Vietnam War had grown
dramatically, in the process straining the Democratic Party. Doves pictured LBJ as too
quick to resort to force, denounced the destructiveness of his military actions, and
insisted that the president greatly exaggerated Chinese influence in Vietnam and North
Vietnamese and Communist control of the National Liberation Front (NFL). Some doves
called for a reduction of or end to the fighting; others called for peace talks, including
negotiations with the NLF. Although the president insisted that the country could afford
both the war in Southeast Asia and the Great Society programs, his critics argued that the
country could not pay for both "guns'" and "butter." One indication of growing dissent
within the Democratic Party was Eugene McCarthy's decision to leave Congress and
enter the presidential campaign as an antiwar candidate. The Minnesota Senator sought
the 1968 Democratic Presidential nomination only after popular antiwar politicians, such
as Robert F. Kennedy, had declined to run. On November 30, 1967, McCarthy
announced that he would enter the race as the voice of the movement for a negotiated
settlement to the war in Vietnam. His announcement kindled the hopes of anti-war
college students who would campaign for McCarthy by the thousands.
Profound changes had been taking place in liberal and labor circles as the war in
Vietnam and the anti-war movement grew. In November 1 967, the National Labor
Leadership Assembly for Peace convened in Chicago to express unionists' uneasiness
over the Vietnamese conflict. The Assembly put Walter Reuther in an awkward position.
'^David Wright, America in the 20'^ Century 1960-1969 (New York, Marshall Cavendish,
1995), 907.
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Though he was uncomfortable with the escalation, he continued to support Johnson's
Vietnam policy. However, Emil Mazey, the UAW's Secretary Treasurer, and Victor
Reuther, Walter's brother and the Director of the UAW International Affairs Department,
spoke at the Labor Leadership Assembly for Peace in Chicago. Reuther and Mazey
-
along with UAW officials Milfred Jeffrey, Nat Weinberg, Martin Gerber and Paul
Schrade- were members of the union's old socialist wing. They had first voiced their
opposition to the Vietnam War in 1965, when Johnson escalated American involvement
in Southeast Asia. During the 1967 assembly, the UAW leaders shared the dais with
leading anti-war figures such as Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., economist John Kenneth
Galbraith and Senator Eugene McCarthy (D-MN).'^
After two days of meetings, 523 union leaders from fifty international unions
unanimously adopted a policy statement condemning the war as immoral. ''We believe,"
the unionists said, "there can be no justificafion for expending the precious lives of our
American youth and destroying ever larger numbers ofVietnamese men, women and
children." The Chicago Labor Leadership Assembly for Peace sought "to express the
underlying and deeply felt peace sentiment of American workers" and exhorted labor to
play its part in bringing the war to "swift and just conclusion." I he statement fiew in the
face of the pronouncements made by the leading officials of the AFL-CIO, who affirmed
18
that labor's rank-and-file wholeheartedly supported the war.
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A month later at the AFL-CIO convention in Bal Harbor, Florida, George Meany
counterattacked. There were no UAW delegates at the meeting since the autoworkers'
officers had resigned from all posts in the council and its sub-committees due to sharp
disagreements with the AFL-CIO's leadership. Commenting on the Labor Leadership
Assembly for Peace in Chicago, Meany stated:
That meeting was planned in Hanoi by a special committee that went there. I read
the Sunday Worker and I will tell you that I have seen that resolution, every term
of it, every line of it in the Sunday Worker two weeks before the meeting was
held in Chicago.
Emil Mazey responded to Meany's charges in a scathing letter accusing the AFL^
CIO's president of having "equated dissent with disloyalty" and of "twisting the facts."
Mazey was outraged at Meany *s "fancy arithmetic" that made him conclude that union
members approved of the Vietnam War by a margin of six hundred to one. Mazey
demanded that Meany apologize to the millions of union members who thought that the
American involvement in Vietnam was wrong.^" Mazey 's letter was additional evidence
of the sharpening tensions between the Meany administration and the UAW leadership.
By the end of 1967, the American labor movement was at a crossroads. As head of one
of the most progressive unions in the United States, Reuther had repeatedly accused the
AFL-CIO leadership of immobility, indifference, complacency and rigid
21
anticommunism. The organization was undoubtedly far from Reuther' s ideal of a vital
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and socially progressive labor movement. Yet faced with a deep political crisis and
escalating antiwar sentiment, Reuther himself was unsure how to respond.
The Democrats and their labor allies thus entered the 1968 campaign in disarray.
"As the architect of one of the least popular wars in U.S. history," Newsweek said,
"Lyndon Johnson faces the year as one of the least popular incumbents in memory.'^^
After four years, the grand promises of the Great Society programs remained largely
unfulfilled. Political observers said that the president would probably seek a middle-of-
the-road formula. His economic program would be "more modestly priced than earlier
23
administration offerings." " Johnson, the quintessential Cold War liberal, intended to
stick to his promise of building a Great Society while pursuing the war in Vietnam.
The Republicans, meanwhile, entered the 1968 presidential race with the
smoothest-running and best-funded campaign machine in years. As the political year
opened, Richard Nixon appeared to be the front-runner. After his defeats in the 1960
presidential elections and in his 1962 California gubernatorial bid, he had gained a
reputation as a political loser. In 1968, his strategy was to present himself as the GOP's
great unifier, an experienced politician who was acceptable to all factions of the party. In
his congressional days, Nixon was a fierce anti-Communist but since the early 196()s he
had worked to create a more fair-minded image for himself. In preparation for the
presidential race, he underwent a public re-engineering that the media called "the New
Nixon." The Republican candidate's prospects for victory in New Hampshire, the first
1968 primary, were so favorable that Governor George Romney of Michigan withdrew
^^"Politics '68," Newsweek, 8 January 1968, 17,
^^Ibid., 18,
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from the race. Governors Nelson Rockefeller ofNew York and Ronald Reagan of
California were Nixon's major opponents. Yet Nixon easily won most of the primaries.
When opinion surveys showed that Nixon had at least as good a chance as any other
candidate to win the presidential election, his nomination at the Republican convention
24
was secured. Nixon's was, as Hodgson and his co-authors pointed out, "a laborious
25
enterprise of resurrection."
Throughout his campaign, Nixon skillfully appealed to the "Middle Americans,"
who he claimed were angry at the excesses of antiwar protest and ghetto violence, tired of
the Vietnam War, disappointed at the results of the Great Society programs and
discontented with the deteriorating economy. In his acceptance speech at the Republican
Party convention, Nixon stated:
In a time when the national focus is concentrated upon the unemployed, the
impoverished and the dispossessed, the working Americans have become
forgotten Americans. In a time when the national rostrums and forums are given
over to shouters, and protesters and demonstrators, they have become the silent
Americans. Yet, they have a legitimate grievance that should be rectified and a
26
just cause that should prevail.
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As an AFL-CIO News editor pointed out, 'iaw and order" became a staple in the
Republican candidate's campaign because it offered "a sizable segment of the voting
public. .a convenient hook on which to hang its discontent."^^
In 1968, George Wallace also tried to cater to the "forgotten Americans;' but
through a third party run. The former Democratic Alabama governor became the focus
of national attention in 1963. Three decisive acts enshrined him as a symbol of
unspeakable racial hatred. In January, Wallace delivered his "Segregation for Ever!"
speech. In June, he blocked the enrollment of the first two African-American students at
the last legally segregated state university. In September, Wallace belittled the bombing
death of four black girls during church hours. To the shock of many Americans, the
Alabama governor ran successfully in a number of Democratic Party primaries in 1964.
Those experiences convinced Wallace that there was a wellspring of resentment against
28
the federal government that he could tap.
Wallace's strategy was less sophisticated than Nixon's. Critics regarded
Wallace's American Independent Party campaign as "a black-humor caricature" and
Wallace as an old-time Dixie demagogue. In his speeches, the former Alabama governor
repeatedly used catch phrases such as "law and order," "state rights," "property rights,"
29
and "support for the police" that appealed to his white constituents* frustrations.
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Wallace's campaign, some politicians claimed, could become a rallying cry for a vote of
bigotry, fear and protest, especially among Southern whites. His key message was that
neither the Democrats nor the Republicans offered the voters a real choice. The Alabama
candidate's speeches went like this, according to columnist Jules Witcover:
You take that Lyndon Baines Johnson, and that Hubert Horatio Alger Humphrey,
and that Gene McCarthy, and you put them in a sack. And then you take that
Richard Milhous Nixon, and that Earl Warren.. .And then you put in that Socialist,
Nelson Rockyfeller, and that left-winger George Romney and that Clifford Case
'
ofNew Jersey and that Wild Bill Scranton of Pennsylvania and that radical Jacob
Javits ofNoo Yawk, and you shake "em all up. And you turn that sack up side
down, and the first one that falls out, you pick him up by the back of the neck and
drop him right back in again, because there's not a dime's worth of difference in
any of 'em.
Although most of his political opponents dismissed Wallace's crude simplifications, they
drew from the audiences not only amused chuckles but also knowing nods. There was no
doubt that the American Independent Party could draw significant support from the Deep
South. Wallace, however, was also intent on eroding the Democratic vote in the white
working class wards of the industrial north.
Both Meany and Reuther believed that supporting LBJ's bid for re-election in
1968 would be the best strategy for organized labor to follow. Johnson was a safe choice.
If conservative forces took over the presidency, the Senate and the House, anti-labor
legislation could undermine the workers' hard won gains. Despite Reuther's frustration
with the limited nature of the Great Society programs, he still believed that a Republican
ascendancy would deal a hard blow to the American working class. The AFL-CIO had a
close relationship with the liberal wing of the Democratic Party and since the New Deal
Jules Witcover, "George Wallace's Potential for Mischief," The Progressive, July 1968,
19.
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years had treated Democratic candidates as labor's own. Reuther thus did not want to
disturb organized labor unity, even if it meant supporting LBJ's Vietnam policy.
Trade-union anti-war groups faced a similar dilemma: were they prepared to
translate their opposition to Johnson's Vietnam policy into opposition to the president's
re-election? One alternative was to sit out the national election and channel labor anti-war
efforts into electing "peace and pro-labor" congressmen. The United Electrical Workers
(UE) would eventually adopt this position. UE's representatives had participated in the
Labor Leadership Assembly for Peace on equal footing with other delegates, a dramatic
step for a union that had been purged from the CIO twenty years earlier. UE's
unwavering anti-war position was reflected in its convention's resolution not to
recommend a choice of presidential candidates: "Our union must make a major
contribution to the nation by campaigning vigorously for congressional candidates with a
record of devotion to peace and domestic progress..."^' The UE considered neither of the
major parties' presidential nominees to be "peace candidates."
The Tet Offensive heightened the tensions within organized labor. Eighty five
thousand NLF guerrillas and their North Vietnamese allies launched their devastating
offensive on January 30, 1968. They attacked thirty-six of forty-four provincial capitals,
five of six major cities and the U.S. embassy in Saigon. The Tet festival celebrates the
lunar New Year. The Vietnamese believe that the first week of the New Year will
determine family fortunes for the rest of the year. In 1 968, it did just that: not only did it
'"The 1968 Elecfions Resolution," UENews, 23 September 1968, 5.
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determine Vietnamese fortunes, but Americans' fortunes as well.'' By exposing the
vitality of the NLF and the North Vietnamese, the Tet Offensive demoralized many
Americans. Within a week of the attack, the enemy had suffered a serious tactical defeat.
Yet they had scored an overwhelming psychological and political victory. Support for
Johnson's handling of the war plummeted, the doves' challenge to the administration
grew stronger, and divisions within the labor movement deepened. ' A few weeks before
Tet, George Gallup had noted: "The solid support given President Johnson and his
Vietnam politics demonstrated by the heads of organized labor at the AFL-CIO
convention in Miami is not in line with the views of rank-and-file union members."
Forty three percent of union families thought that the United States" decision to get
34
mvolvcd in Vietnam had been a mistake. The Tet Offensive confirmed many workers'
fears that Americans were hopelessly trapped in Indochina and that the president was
unable to break the stalemate.
Eugene McCarthy's surprisingly strong showing in the nation's first presidential
primary, on March 1 2 in New Hampshire, seemed to prove the depth of anti-war
sentiment. By winning 20 of the 24 New Hampshire delegates to the national
Democratic convention, the Minnesota senator revealed that there was widespread
^'james Olson, ed., Dictionary ofthe Vietnam War (New York: Peter Bcdrick Books,
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concern over Johnson's Vietnam policy. Despite the efforts of the AFL-CIO's
Committee on PoHtical Education (COPE) on the president's behalf, McCarthy received
one fourth of the vote in labor districts.^^ As historian George Herring says, the New
Hampshire primary "transformed what had seemed a quixotic crusade into a major
36
political challenge." In fact, McCarthy's New Hampshire performance started the swift
rush of 1968 politics.
On March 16, New York Senator Robert F. Kennedy abandoned his reluctance to
challenge President Johnson for the nomination and decided to enter the race. Kennedy's
unexpected political move sent a shock wave through the ranks of organized labor, and in
particular through the UAW leadership. With huge name recognition, RFK was a viable
candidate who had the potential to actually win the nomination in a way McCarthy did
not. After the Tet Offensive, the union's doves had grown increasingly outspoken in
their condemnation of both LBJ's Vietnam policy and Walter Reuther's unwillingness to
criticize the administration. Kennedy's candidacy heightened the tensions within the
union as it offered a new opportunity for the UAW's doves to challenge the president.
Thus those who supported RFK were really challenging LBJ in a very direct and
powerful way, which put Reuther, an ally of the president, in a very awkward position.
Jack Conway, Reuther's long-time administrative assistant and Executive Director of the
AFL-CIO Industrial Union Department, and Paul Schrade, West Coast Director, were the
first UAW leaders to join the Kennedy camp. Conway served as a campaign aide,
Schrade as a member of the Kennedy slate in the California primary. Conway's decision
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infuriated Walter Reuther. After intense debate, however, the UAW Executive Board
decided that union officials could support any candidate they wanted. The UAW
International would not endorse any candidate until after the Democratic convention."
LBJ"s unexpected decision to withdraw from the race on March 3 1 further
complicated political alignment within the UAW's ranks. Reuther was torn between his
friendliness with RFK and his long-standing political sympathy for Hubert H. Humphrey,
who joined the presidential race a few days later. Humphrey was one of the foremost
liberals of the postwar era. He had been a leading Democrat in the U.S. Senate for
sixteen years and enjoyed a reputation as an abrasive "do-gooder." As vice-president, he
served as coordinator of the antipoverty program and chairman of the Civil Rights
Council. Humphrey also worked with Congress to pass the Voting Rights Act and
Medicare. Although well known as a progressive politician, due to his defense of
American participation in the Vietnamese conflict, antiwar activists vilified him as much
as they did LB J. While Reuther was doubtful of Humphrey's candidacy, Meany
immediately threw the full support of his organization behind the vice-president. The
AFL-CIO president regarded Humphrey "as a staunch friend of the worker throughout his
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public life and a supporter of the unions in good times and bad/'
Peace activists, for their part, were thrilled by the turn in the campaign: in less
than a month, LBJ had been toppled from power. As Todd Gitlin put it, "No sooner had
the euphoria settled than the political fever soared again/' Only four days after Johnson's
decision not to seek reelection, Martin Luther King Jr. was assassinated. The civil rights'
"^^Boyle, The UAW and the Heyday ofAmerican Liberalism, 238-239.
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leader was in Memphis, Tennessee, supporting a strike of sanitation workers for union
recognition, decent wages and better working conditions. The night of the murder, eighty
riots broke out across the nation and federal troops were sent to Baltimore, Chicago,
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Washington, and Wilmington.
RFK joined in the march that carried Martin Luther King Jr.'s body from
Atlanta's Ebenezer Baptist Church to the cemetery. The black community received him
warmly. Kennedy would need their support. To stand a change of winning the
Democratic nomination, Kennedy had to win the upcoming primaries in Indiana,
Nebraska, Oregon and California. Once Kennedy entered the Indiana primary, the
Democratic senator was careful to denounce violence when speaking to white audiences:
the ghetto rioting that followed King's assassination had generated white fears that could
not be ignored. Kennedy's major difficulty in Indiana was not his relationship with
American racial minorities, however, but his lack of solid labor union backing. The
senator could not count on the traditional AFL-CIO machinery to consolidate the blue-
collar vote or to raise funds. Kennedy nevertheless scored two clear victories in May. In
Indiana, RFK took 42 percent of the Democratic vote, against 31 percent for Governor
Roger Branigin, a stand-in for Humphrey, and 27 percent for Eugene McCarthy. In
Nebraska, Kennedy took 52 percent and McCarthy 31 percent. In Oregon, however,
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The Democratic race thus came to a turning point in the June CaUfomia primary.
RFK depended largely on the support of the state's Mexican-American community and of
Cesar Chavez, the militant leader of the United Farm Workers Association (UFWA).
Since 1965, the UFWA had been fighting for workers' most basic right, union
recognition. RFK had repeatedly voiced his support of Chavez's fight for farm workers'
bargaining rights. In 1966, his Senate Subcommittee on Migratory Labor held hearings
in Delano, a town of 14,000 that was at the center of the UFWA's struggle with
California's agro-business. "The simple act of coming to the Mexican-Americans' aid
when they needed it," the elections British reporters explained, 'iit a durable flame of
loyalty in the people of the Valley, and Kennedy returned the affection."^' RFK
rekindled that flame during the California primary.
Early in 1968, Kennedy traveled to Delano to attend an ecumenical Mass in
Delano's city park, during which Chavez broke a twenty-five-day fast. RFK hailed the
grape pickers' leader as "one of the heroic figures of our time" and congratulated those
who were "locked with Cesar in the struggle for justice for the farm worker and the
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struggle for justice for Spanish-speaking Americans." Now Kennedy turned to Chavez
for support. Paul Schrade, who had been committed to the farm workers' organization
since 1965, asked Chavez to serve on the list of delegates pledged to Kennedy. Though
doing so would risk losing the support of the AFL-CIO, Chavez agreed to Schrade'
s
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request. Schrade, for his part, had also jeopardized his position by openly defying the
43UAW leadership.
By the California campaign, the Kennedy and McCarthy forces had become bitter
foes. The candidates' positions on the Vietnam War differed only slightly. Neither
contender proposed an immediate withdrawal of American troops from Southeast Asia.
McCarthy emphasized the need for de-escalation and the creation of "a new government
of some kind" in Saigon. The Minnesota senator also argued that the NLF had to be
invited to participate in a new South Vietnamese government: "this [was] a prerequisite
to any kind of negotiations," he insisted. Kennedy accused McCarthy "of forcing a
coalition on the government of Saigon, a coalition with the Communists even before we
begin negotiations." The National Liberation Front. Kennedy said, would play "some
role'* in the political future of South Vietnam, "but that would be determined by the
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negotiators." Kennedy won the California primary by the closest of margins, taking 46
percent of the vote to 42 percent for McCarthy. He would not be able to celebrate his last
victory, however. Kennedy's assassination on June 6 came as a shock to a nation that
had not yet recovered from the slaying of Martin Luther King, Jr. In the midst of the
political confusion that Kennedy's murder caused, one thing became clear: Humphrey
was now sure to win the Democratic nomination.
Throughout the primary season, Humphrey had been securing pledges of support
from the host of party regulars whose states did not hold primaries. After Kennedy had
lost the Oregon primary to McCarthy, the vice-president's chances of being nominated
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dramatically increased. By the time of Kennedy's murder. I lumphrey was already close
to having the commitments he needed lor nomination. After RIX's death, organized
labor was lel t with just one option: to back a candidate that was the epitome of Cold War
liberalism. I lumphrey had a perfect record of support for labor and had been an advocate
for federal aid to education, urban development and Social Security throughout his
political career. As for the war in Vietnam, I lumphrey simply skewed the issue by
pledging to seek a ''swift, honorable and lasting peace" in Southeast Asia.^^
As the turmoil within the Democratic Party seemed to end, the AI L-CIO
leadership broke into open conflict. On .luly 1, the long exchange of accusations between
Meany and Reuther came to an end when the DAW l<xecutive Board decided to leave the
AI L-CIO. A few months earlier, Reuther had petitioned the AFL-CIO Council for a
special convention "to create an opportunity so that | labor leaders] could have a serious, a
frank, a meaningful discussion about the internal weaknesses in the American Labor
46
Movement, and the things [they | ought to be doing." The I )AW leadership declared the
AFL-CIO to have failed in organizing the unorganized, in developing an eflective
bargaining program, and in fighting for equal opportunity and equal rights for all
workers.
The defection of the HAW, with its 1 ,600,000 members, was a severe blow to the
AFL-CIO. Unions as diverse as the United Steelworkers of America, the American
Federation of State, County and Municipal l-mployees, and the American Bakery and
"^^"Thc Issues and the Candidates," 11AW Solidarity, October 1968, II.
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Confectionery Workers, urged the two organizations to resolve the differences that had
brought about "the tragic split."'' A few weeks after the UAW's disaffiliation, however,
Reuther announced a new labor venture: the Alliance for Labor Action (ALA). The new
association would bring together America's two largest unions, the UAW and the
International Brotherhood of Teamsters, representing four million workers.
"The American labor movement has a New Left wing today," declared Scripps-
Howard journalist Stanley Levey in his appraisal of the ALA. The new organization was
1 48
certamly "committed to a massive drive at home and peace abroad." Yet, the alliance
between such disparate partners as the UAW and the Teamsters did not merit the name
"leftist." The ALA was not a merger and did not intend to rival the AFL-CIO. Reuther
was simply looking for a new forum to organize the unorganized and carry out social
programs. The organizing drive was supposed to reach 36 million white-collar workers,
migratory workers, working poor and southern industrial workers.
In contrast to Reuther's "messianic" projects for a revitalized labor movement,
Frank Fitzsimmons, the Teamsters' acting president, was seeking some respectability for
his union. The Teamsters had been expelled from the AFL-CIO in 1957 for corruption
and its president, Jimmy Hoffa, was serving an eight-year prison term for jury tampering.
The Teamsters were among the most conservative of American unions: their leaders
seldom made pronouncements on foreign policy and confined themselves to bread-and-
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butter issues. Hoping to broaden the base of support for the ALA, Reuther and
Fitzsimmons stated that "any autonomous national or international union [could]
obviously choose to associate itself with this voluntary cooperative effort to help build
and strengthen the labor movement."'*^ Reuther tried to woo the most progressive AFL-
CIO unions: District 65 of the Retail Workers, the Oil and Chemical Workers, the
Meatcutters, the United Farm Workers, the American Federation of State, County, and
Municipal Employees and the American Federation of Teachers. Two clearly left-
leaning unions, the International Longshoremen and the Electrical Workers (UE), were
also on Reuther's list of possible affiliates.
The UE News triumphantly asserted that, Reuther, "the CIO architect of the AFL-
CIO," was making the same indictments of the federation that they had made in 1955:
"At the time UE declared that the merger did not represent real unity that would advance
the interests of the workers" since it was based on "the continuation of the red-baiting
policy which had already reduced the CIO to impotence."^° As the labor-liberal coalition
was teetering on the brink of collapse, Cold War ideology was becoming less compelling
to Reuther than it had in 1955. Many political analysts wondered whether the ALA could
become the rallying point for a socially conscious labor movement or whether it was
bound to be Reuther's greatest blunder. The odds were against the ALA's success. It
was Reuther's initiative; the UAW staff or local activists were not involved in the
organization. The unions that Reuther approached, moreover, were not interested in
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becoming affiliates of the new organization. They had little to gain from joining, while
doing so risked almost certain expulsion from the AFL-CIO. It seems clear that in the
thirteen years of the merger of the AFL and the CIO, American trade unions had been
drifting inexorably towards the consolation of business unionism. By 1968, Reuther's
UAW was one of the few voices opposing "the pursuit of institutional security" as
unionism's main objective. Reuther's hopes for the ALA were unrealistic, however,
since the New Deal alliance was on the verge of collapse and the Democratic Party was
entangled in internal warfare over the Vietnam War.
The August Democratic convention in Chicago exacerbated the conflicts within
the AFL-CIO. Newsweek' s report of 'The Battle in Chicago" stated that the Democratic
Party convention had "held up a mirror to America." The city became the stage for a
brutal encounter between anti-war demonstrators and the defenders of "law and order."
Mayor Richard Daley's police charged against hippies, yippies, peace demonstrators and
onlookers in the parks and on the streets. The demonstrators, who clearly outnumbered
the small groups of extremists, were no more than 10,000, less than half the number of
Chicago police officers.^
^
A pre-convention Gallup Poll revealed that Eugene McCarthy trailed Nixon by
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five points, while Humphrey was sixteen points behind the Republican candidate.
These grim numbers had no effect on the course of the convention, however. Humphrey
came to Chicago with 1,450 delegates committed to his nomination, enough to secure his
victory on the first ballot. Meany's role in the triumph of the New Deal coalition -the
^'"The Battle of Chicago," Newsweek, 9 September 1968, 24,
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white South, labor, northern blacks, and the big city machines- was crucial. The AFL-
CIO president commissioned Al Barkan, head of the Committee on Political Education
(COPE), to attend policy-planning sessions of Humphrey's inner circle. The Federation
had 22
1 delegates and alternates spread throughout forty-four state delegations. This
allowed Meany to keep an eye on every major state caucus and to make the necessary
• ' 53
political moves to secure Humphrey's nomination.
The UAW leadership was as divided as the Democratic Party itself The rift
between those who supported McCarthy and those who were for Humphrey seemed
impossible to bridge. Ramparts reproduced a statement by Paul Schrade which, whether
real or fictional, summarizes the conflict within the ranks of the United Automobile
Workers: "Don't give us that bullshit about a possible compromise. Humphrey will be a
hawk all the way." The Ramparts reporter added that, although one could expect a
conversation between two union leaders to be "earthy and frank," this was Paul Schrade,
West Coast director of the UAW, talking to his boss, Walter Reuther. The UAW
president had promised his people that he would work out a more "dovish" Vietnam
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position with his candidate, Humphrey.
As one of the first major UAW leaders to speak against the war, Schrade was
outraged at the role that Meany 's hard liners were playing at the convention. To rival a
Humphrey luncheon that Meany had hosted, Schrade offered a McCarthy luncheon at the
Essex Motor Inn. Schrade had been seriously injured during Robert Kennedy's
assassination and this was his first public appearance after leaving the hospital. The
^^"The Decline and Fall of the Democratic Party," Ramparts, 28 September 1968, 35
'''ibid., 34.
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event brought together important members of labor's Hberal wing: the UAWs Victor
Reuther and Jack Conway; the Amalgamated Clothing Workers' Association president,
Frank Rosenbaum; the Teamsters' Harold Gibbons; and Dave Livingston, head ofNew
York District # 65 of the Retail, Wholesale and Department Store Union. Most of these
liberal union leaders had participated in the National Labor Leadership for Peace in
Chicago the year before. Dolores Huerta of California's Farm Workers' Organizing
Committee was also at the luncheon. She sounded particularly disappointed at the tenor
of the convention: "We have had some high hopes for the farm workers. But then I came
into Chicago, and I ask myself, how can we expect anything for the brown people of
America when we find ourselves in an armed camp in the city of Chicago.""
Meany, for his part, had gathered the biggest single block of delegates to the
Democratic convention. At the Humphrey luncheon, the AFL-CIO president spoke to a
cheering crowd and exhorted them to vote for Humphrey, the man who "sympathized"
with labor. Al Barkan counted on the support of twenty of the most influential labor
leaders to analyze convention delegations and discuss floor strategies.''^ Barkan was the
AFL-CIO hard liners* "political captain" who would guarantee the nomination of
Humphrey, "the labor candidate." To Eugene McCarthy's young supporters, he was
"Meany's number one man" who "cracked labor's whip from the front-line command
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post on the convention floor."
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The crux of the convention was the Vietnam War, as Humphrey was well aware.
In less than three days, the vice-president met with twenty-three delegations in a
desperate attempt to keep them in line by preaching unity against Republicans. By the
time of the Democratic convention, Humphrey's line on Vietnam had hardened from
earlier in the year; he now completely supported Johnson's approach to the conflict.
Although he tried to sidestep the most contentious issues, Humphrey could not avoid
Vietnam in his meeting with California's uncommitted 174-vote delegation. When asked
to describe the specific ways in which he disagreed with President Johnson's position on
the Vietnam War, Humphrey retorted: "Would you mind if I just stated my own position
on Vietnam? Because the President of the U.S. is not a candidate and I did not come here
to repudiate the President. I want that made clear." The vice-president eventually
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received only fourteen votes from California.
Newsw eek referred to the debate over the platform plank on the Vietnam War as
59
the convention's ''one interlude of impressive reason/' Before the platform debate, the
party's various factions honed their positions. Humphrey and his supporters had to
determine whether or not the candidate would cut himself loose from the Johnson
Administration. The peace forces had to work hard on their differences in order to reach
a compromise. Eugene McCarthy's proposal was for the U.S. to urge its South
Vietnamese allies to accept a coalition government that included elements of the National
Liberation Front. Senator George McGovem and most of the late Robert Kennedy's
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supporters were adamant that the NLF not be included in a coalition government; they
viewed McCarthy's position as a dictated settlement.
The dissidents agreed to demand an end to the bombing of North Vietnam but
promised to continue full support for U.S. troops. The peace delegates also committed
themselves to an immediate de-escalation of the war that might involve an early
withdrawal of a significant number of American troops. The hawkish majority offered a
conditional halt of the bombing of North Vietnam. The U.S. would reduce its military
involvement in Southeast Asia as South Vietnamese forces were able to assume larger
responsibilities for the war effort. The convention discussed the opposing planks for
hours. As the debate drew to a close, McCarthy concluded: "Now, the lines are clearly
drawn between those who want more of the same and those who think it necessary to
change our course in Vietnam- the convention as a whole will decide."^^
The convention decided by ratifying a plank on which LBJ could have run. The
doves, however, managed to roll up 1,042 Va votes for their proposals to 1,567 Va for the
majority. Texas' solid bloc of 104 hawk votes finally killed the minority plank. The
New York and California delegations responded by standing up, flashing "V" signs and
singing, "We Shall Overcome." The Vietnam War had split the party in half, and
Humphrey picked up the pieces with "a little help from his friends." The vice-president
won his party's nomination with 1,761 % votes, to 601 for McCarthy, 146 Vi for
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Tliroughoiit Ihc convciilion, 1 liimphicy tried lo play the role of the peaceniakor,
but the divisions within tlic Democratic Party ran too deep, lie appeased northern
liberals by snpporting the seating of integrated Southern delegations, but he did not give
the doves what they wanted, an open repudiation ofl.H.rs Vietnam policy. During his
acceptance speech, I lumphrey made an attempt to please every faction within the
FXMiiocratic Party. The vice-president expres.sed synjpathy lor the mjured dcnu)nslralors,
made a jilcdgc lo uphokl law and order, promi.sed social justice, and talked ol
di.sarmament and of building bridges to the Communist world. Most importantly,
Humphrey concluded: "Iftherc is any one lesson that we should have learned is that the
policies of tomorrow neeil not be limited by the policies of yesterday."''^
By the time I lumphrey accepted the nomination, newspaper headlines proclaimci!
that his campaign was "in a shambles." By the end of the convenliiMi, the vice-presiilcnt
hail won the support of doves like McOovern and Oregon Senator Wayne Morse but
McCarthy and most Kennedy men were conspicuously absent in the show of party unity
on the podium. I hc future was not bright for the Democratic nominee; Wallace and
Ni.xon were challenging the Democrats" hokl on the Dccfi South; his ticket a|)pcared in
trouble in the large industrial states, except for New \o\k\ aiul the Midwest looked like
Republican territory. Only in the Northeast could I lumphrey count on a sure win. I he
Democratic hopes to win the presidency in l')68 .seemeil to have died in the streets of
Chicago. 1 lumphrey had little more than two months to revive the party.
Despite the complaints of those who believeil that I lumphrey coukl only offer a
continuation t)f the Johnson Administration's policies, both the AI'l,-CiO and the UAW
Ibid.. 20,
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worked strenuously for the Humphrey-Muskie ticket and campaigned against both
Wallace and Nixon. After ail his talk of new understandings, Reuther remained the
quintessential "practical liberal."" He would not sit out a presidential election because of
political feuds. Moreover, UAW delegates met in fifteen regional and state conferences
and committed the union to support the Democratic ticket. The results are not surprising.
Humphrey and Muskie received 2,319 votes in the UAW conferences, 87.8 percent of the
total; Richard Nixon and Spiro Agnew won 27 votes, one percent of the total ballots.
Wallace, the candidate of the American Independent Party, received 271 votes, 10.2
percent of the votes. Humphrey was, after all, the labor-friendly candidate. He had
supported President John F. Kennedy's decision to extend unemployment compensation
payments by sixteen weeks, voted against a bill to cut minimum wages and against an
attempt to deny workers protection of federal law. The Democratic platform proposed to
build upon the successful existing programs to expand educational opportunities, supply
needed housing and achieve full employment. On the thorny "law and order" issue,
Humphrey proposed massive aid for local police forces but also programs to fight
64
poverty and attack the drug problem.
The unions' all-out effort for Humphrey revolved around bread-and-butter issues.
In a pre-election message to the UAW membership, Reuther insisted:
Members of the UAW should be under no illusion: what we do at the ballot box in
1968 will have a tremendous impact upon what we will be able to do at the
Humphrey referred to Reuther as a "practical liberal," quoted in Nelson Lichtenstein's
"Walter Reuther and the Rise of Labor Liberalism," 297.
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bargaining table in 1970 and 1971 when our major contracts are up for re-
negotiation.
The UAW Community Action Department's campaign for Humphrey had none of
the "crusading tone" usually associated with Reuther's progressive agenda. The UAW
reminded its members how important Supplemental Unemployment Benefits (SUB) were
and how Republicans in Ohio and Indiana ''kept thousands of laid-off workers from
getting SUB at all.^' Organized labor made consumer issues a central element in its
campaign for the Democratic candidate. Pamphlets highlighted the Democrats'
sponsorship of strong legislation for adequate meat inspection, fair auto insurance, and
protection against garnishment and against high prices of the drug industry .^^ The
UAW's campaign literature rarely mentioned Vietnam.
Labor leaders were certainly concerned about Nixon's possible "come-back" in
1968, but they were shocked at the substantial response accorded to the Wallace-LeMay
ticket. Both Reuther and Meany agreed that Wallace was a real menace to labor. The
Alabama candidate was the "spoiler" who could not be elected but hoped to carry enough
states to prevent either party from capturing a majority of Electoral College votes.
Having accomplished that, Wallace would be in a position to strike a deal with one
candidate over federal policies and appointments. Wallace had identified the discontents
UAW Solidarity, November 1968, 5.
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President's Office, WSUA.
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of a political minority and could deal the fatal blow to whatever was left of the old labor-
liberal coalition.
In May 1968, the former Alabama governor had the support of only 7 percent of
the voters outside the South. According to a Gallup survey, Wallace had the vote of 30
percent of the electorate in the thirteen states of the South and the vote of 53 percent of
the electorate in the five states of Deep South. According to polls, he was winning his
largest support outside the South from the same groups as in the South: manual workers,
farmers, and those who described themselves as independents in politics.^'" To the
Democrats' shock, by the end of July, the Wallace vote had reached 16 percent nation-
wide, and the percent of union families that supported the Alabama presidential candidate
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had jumped from 9 to 17 percent. Wallace, it seemed, was cutting deeply into
I lumphrey's core support.
Meeting in New York on September 18, the general board of the AFL-CIO issued
its olficial statement on the 1968 campaign. The board regarded Wallace as a candidate
who had ^^no platform, no policies and no program for America - save racism and
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hatred/' I'he AFL-CIO leadership had reason to be concerned. On September 10, Flint,
Michigan's UAW local 326 wholeheartedly supported Wallace for president. Two weeks
later, a group of Wallace backers interrupted a meeting at UAW Local 25 in St. Louis,
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Missouri, when Walter Reuther mentioned presidential candidate Humphrey and referred
to "a handful of local Wallace supporters who packed a local meeting in Detroit..."
About fifty unionists left the hall shouting and waited for Reuther outside. The UAW
president had to leave through the back door to avoid a confrontation. In mid-October,
Local 25 staged a straw poll to gauge the workers' support for Wallace: 76 percent
backed the Alabama candidate. To the UAW leadership's relief, only 10 percent of the
local members had voted in the straw poll.^' Yet, the "Wallace sickness," as the New
York Times called it, clearly required a strong counterattack if the labor vote for
72
Humphrey were to be preserved.
George Meany counted on the ability of COPE's Al Barkan to "cure" the Wallace
sickness, but Barkan was not alone in rallying the labor vote for the Democrats. As labor
columnist Victor Riesel put it, "feuds are feuds, but politics is politics."^^ AFL-CIO's
COPE, the Teamsters* Democratic-Republican Independent Voters" Education (DRIVE)
and the lIAW's Community Action Program (CAP) set common goals and blanketed
industrial districts with flyers highlighting the anti-labor records of both Wallace and
Nixon. As union publications in thirty-three key states reached 20 million unionists and
their families almost every week, organized labor hoped it could still turn the tables.
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In times of heightened racial tensions, the former Alabama governor simply
articulated some Americans' deepest fears, frustrations and prejudices. Political analyst
Jules Witcover, who covered Wallace extensively in the South and on his national trips,
explained: "If there's any politician who can make hay while the cities bum, that
politician is George Wallace, self-styled champion of the iittle people.'"^^ The issue that
seemed to attract blue-collar workers to his ranks was "law and order," a combination of
anti-black, anti-youth and anti-dissident feelings. Labor leaders responded by
sidestepping a direct argument with Wallace on social issues and appealing to workers'
economic self-interest. In a number of publications, the UAW Community Action
Department ridiculed the man who claimed to speak for "the little man." Alabama's per
capita personal income rated 48"' among the states and was $900 below the national
average; 39.1 percent of Alabama's families earned below $3,000 a year; Alabama's
unemployment rates were among the highest in the nation, 4.3 percent, compared with
the national rate of 3.5 percent; forty states had higher workinen's compensation benefits
than did Alabama. Finally, the man who promised "law and order" governed a state
whose rate for both murder and aggravated assault was fourth highest among the fifty
states and the District of Columbia.^^
The UAW also poured funds into the Southern Committee on Political Ethics
(SCOPE). Fonner Arkansas Congressman Brooks Hays headed the organization whose
membership included prominent Southern editors and professional men and businessmen,
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In a personal letter. Hays thanked Walter Reuther for "the United Auto Workers'
generous contribution" that had enabled them to launch "a very effective program."
SCOPE did not define itself as an "anti-Wallace" group but as an organization that sought
to elevate the tone of politics and ensure full participation in the political process by
racial minorities. However, SCOPE documents such as "The Wallace Labor Record and
"A White Paper on George C. Wallace" provided unions with valuable data that could be
used to dissuade workers from voting for the Alabaman.
Although his speeches were implicitly racist, Wallace did not speak openly
against African-Americans. Rather he targeted for attack the federal government, the
bureaucrats, the "pointed-head pseudo-intellectuals," the media and the Communists.
According to a September 1968 Gallup survey, when asked who they considered to be
the biggest threat to the country, 46 percent of Americans answered "big government,"
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26 percent ^^big labof ^ and 12 percent, ^^big business/' In his American Independent
Party platform, Wallace called for limited government and lower taxes. In Alabama,
however, he had accepted federal funds for a variety of programs and increased taxes on
beer, tobacco, drivers' licenses and auto tags, all of which bore heavily on the 'iittle
people'' he claimed to champion. The steady stream of mailings from union headquarters
slowly tumed many blue-collar workers away from Wallace.
It is hard to determine when the presidential campaign tumed and Humphrey
became revitalized as a candidate. Most political observers agree that the pivotal point
76
Elections 1968, Folder 3, Box 436, Walter Reuther Files, UAW President's Office,
WSUA.
''''The Gallup Poll Cumulative Index, Report N° 39, September 1968, 19-20.
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came with the speech that Humphrey dehvercd in SaU Lake City on September 30. The
address outlined the candidate's position on one of the hottest issues, the Vietnam War.
Humphrey said:
As President, I would be willing to stop the bombing of North Vietnam as an
acceptable risk for peace, because I believe that it could lead io success in the
negotiations and a shorter war. This would be the best protection for our troops.
However, he concluded, ^'ifthe Government ofNorth Vietnam were to show bad faith, I
would reserve the right to resume the bombing."^** Ilumphrey\s pledge did not depart
radically from President Johnson's position. Yet his promise was strong enough to gain
the support o\' some of the peace people, who sent the candidate contributions amounting
to a hundred and fifty thousand dollars. The Democratic candidate's vote began to rise.''^
As for Nixon, organized labor found it easy to prove that he was not "labor-
friendly:" the Republican candidate had supported the postwar era's major anti-union
legislation, the laft-ilartley and Landrum-Grillith Acts. The General Board of the AFL-
CIO noted that the Republican platform attacked "crippling economic strikes" and
"government intervention" that resulted in wage increases. During a Republican
administration, the AI L-CIO charged, workers could expect the destruction of industry-
wide bargaining and the adoption of "right-to-work" legislation. The AFL-CIO executive
council also emphasized the fact that Republicans said nothing about unemployment,
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workmen s compensation, occupational safely or situs picketing.
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During his low-key campaign, Nixon adopted two main issues: small government
and law and order. The Repuhlican candidate thus expected to exploit the "middle
Americans'" dissatisfaction with the Great Society programs as well as their concerns
about widespread social unrest. Nixon stated that in order to reduce federal spending,
"Welfare and poverty programs [would] be drastically revised to liberate the poor from
the debilitating dependence that erodes self-respect and discourages family unity and
.
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responsibility; Nixon's program offered little hope to those who looked for vigorous
federal action on behalf of the disadvantaged. At the same time Nixon said that the
solution to civil disorder was "decisive action," by which he meant existing police power
needed to be applied with a heavier hand. Nixon avoided the Vietnam War issue by
arguing that he did not want to "jeopardi/e" the Paris Peace talks then under way. I'hus,
the American electorate was unable to measure his intentions toward the conllict in
Southeast Asia.
In October 1968, Business Week stated that "the labor movement [had] never
campaigned as hard or on as many fronts on a presidential election." It was clear to most
labor leaders that if Humphrey lost the race for the presidency, organized labor's future
was uncertain. George Meany, however, also admitted that a Wallace victory was more
"disastrous" than a Nixon's victory: "We could live with President Nixon," said the AFL-
CIO president, "We lived through eight years of President Fi.senhower, and we could live
with Nixon. We'll be able to deal with him if he's elected- and I'm sure he'll deal with
us." Organized labor's aim in the closing days of the campaign was therefore threefold:
R
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rally support for Humphrey, discredit Wallace as a viable presidential candidate and elect
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labor-friendly candidates to the 91'* Congress.
A key element of organized labor's campaign for Humphrey was "the get-out-the-
vote-drive", what Joseph C. Goulden called "the time-honored labor stratagem."^^ Both
the AFL-CIO's COPE and the UAW's Community Action Department urged workers to
register their friends, discuss the key issues, and get them to the polls. Pamphlets
emphasized the importance of getting labor members to vote: "It's crucial that
Humphrey-Muskie organizations get out the Democratic vote among traditional voters,
and that we mine the electoral gold among 43 million who wouldn't normally vote.'"*"*
Organized labor's campaign was a crucial factor in Humphrey's almost miraculous
comeback in October. A November Gallup report indicated that "organized labor was a
major shift group in this year's election, with many labor union members leaving Wallace
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to vote for Humphrey near the end of the campaign." Unionists' efforts, however, were
not enough to get the Democratic candidate elected.
The 1968 election retums offered political analysts a wealth of material for study.
Nixon's margin of victory was extremely slim: 43.4 percent of voters supported the
Republican to 43 percent for Humphrey. Wallace received the vote of 13.6 percent of the
electorate, his support having faded considerably from his high-water mark of almost 20
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percent. According to nationwide data, 50 percent of blue-collar workers voted for the
Democratic Party ticket, compared to 41 percent of white collars, 34 percent of
professionals and businessmen and 39 percent of farmers.'' The steam that Wallace had
built up during the turbulent 1968 presidential campaign had evaporated by election day.
The third party candidate nevertheless claimed: ^"fhis movement has already won. Both
national parties have changed direction because of our movement."'^ Before dismissing
Wallace's statement as merely the reaction of a defeated politician, one should reconsider
whether or not the former Alabaman governor was "the most influential loser in
88
twentieth-century American politics."
It is important to note that, despite the mounting social unrest that characterized
the politics of 1968, both majority parties nominated men of the center with a strong grip
on the political system and its bureaucracy. Nixon had the luxury of a $20 million
campaign treasury for TV and radio propaganda and counted on the support of 85 percent
of company presidents who had shares in the New York stock exchange. In the aftermath
of the Chicago convention, few political analysts believed that Humphrey would make
the presidential race as close as it turned out to be. The Democratic candidate made a
tremendous effort to reassemble the pieces of the Democratic coalition. Humphrey
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56
counted on the support of the big-city political machines and labor leaders who were
determined to keep Nixon away from the White House.^'^
If organized labor contributed to Humphrey's almost miraculous comeback, it
was because unions fed into their members' fears of what a Nixon or Wallace
administration could mean to the ordinary worker. In its evaluation of why Humphrey
had suddenly picked up strength in the industrial districts, Newsweek concluded: "Some
of this support came from the disaffected Democratic left while much of the rest of it
came from blue-collar workers who finally decided to vote their pocketbooks instead of
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their prejudices." Whatever the reasons, working-class voters had helped to transform a
sure Democratic defeat into a very narrow loss.
Nixon was the first new president since Zachary Taylor in 1848 to win the
presidency while the opposition party retained control of both houses of Congress. "A
shift of less than 75,000 votes in Illinois and Missouri," a labor columnist claimed,
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"would have destroyed the Republican's electoral vote majority." Humphrey captured
twelve states in the industrial east plus the District of Columbia. Of the eight largest
states, the vice-president took four -Michigan, Texas, New York and Pennsylvania- and
came close in the other four, New Jersey, Ohio, Illinois and California. Nixon carried all
the other regions, even the South, where Humphrey ran third to Wallace. In 1960,
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Leonard Hall, the Republican campaign manager, had told Nixon: "You know, Dick, a
shift of only fourteen thousand votes, and we would have been the heroes and they would
92
have been the bums." In 1 968, there were no heroes.
As UAW Solidarity reminded its readership, "the greatest tragedy in American
politics" remained "the low voter turnout."'" Out of the 120 million American citizens of
voting age living in the United States, 48 million did not vote. According to a Gallup
poll, '^25 million could have voted if they had made an extra effort:" they were simply
disinterested, did not like the candidates or did not bother to register. Nineteen million
voters said that at .some point during the campaign that they intended to vote for a
candidate other than the one they supported on the election day. None ol the parties had
94
managed to overcome apathy among voters.
In broad terms, the political struggles of 1968 can be described as a contest
between the "pragmatic professionals" and the "ideologues." The "ideologues," whether
liberal or radical, lo.st their battle on the Democratic convention floor and in the streets of
Chicago. They had viewed politics as a vehicle for causes, such as peace in Vietnam.
Once the presidential race started, the "pragmatic professionals" in both majority parties
dominated the struggle and avoided the causes to look as moderate as possible.
Organized labor joined the "pragmatists" and fought Humphrey's opponents by exposing
their records on "bread-and-butter" issues. Their efforts almost paid off.
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It was the
-tactical approach of business unionism," rather than a "revitaHzed
labor movement" that almost took Humbert Humphrey to the White House. In the
aftermath of the presidential election, the high aspirations of the Alliance tbr Labor
Action (ALA) seemed increasingly difficult to fulfill. Could the labor movement
"acquire a new sense of renewal and rededication to social programs," as the ALA's
statement of purpose proposed? Now that the labor-liberal coalition had been seriously
weakened, how would organized labor ^respond to the realities of a swiftly changing
95
world?" By the end ol~ the "year of the barricades," the future of American politics was,
at best, uncertain. As Jonathan Rieder put it, "Millions of voters, pried loose from the
habitual loyalty to the Democratic Party, were now a volatile force, surging through the
electoral system without the channeling restraints of party attachment.""^^' In November
1968, it was not yet clear whether the presidential election had been an "American
melodrama" or an "American tragedy."
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C HAPTER 2
THE BLUE-COLLAR BLUES
The 1968 presidential eampaign was crueial in bringing working-class issues lo
the forclront of public concern. George Wallace's success in attracting a considerable
number of union members to his cause at the onset of the campaign shocked many
Americans. I he press then labeled trade unionists "snobs," "bigots", "reactionaries" and
usually assigned them to the alHuent middle-class. Unioni/ed workers had supposedly
"made it" and were bent on just one thing: the defense of their hard-won economic gains.
When George Wallace cried before working-class audiences, "Don't let them take it
away!" the "them" he had in mind were African-Americans, the poor minority who, due
to the sweeping social legislation of the .lohnson years, now allegedly threatened white
workers' standard of living and economic security. The average blue-collar worker was
undoubtedly anxious about his job, income and commitments and often felt ignored by
his government. Both Wallace and Nixon reminded the American worker that he had
been "forgotten." Although most of the early Wallace supporters switched to Hubert
1 lumphrey before the November balloting, the "blue-collar blues" caused a Hurry of
working-class studies in the elections' aftermath, .lournalists, intellectuals and activists
from across the political spectrum tried to determine the economic and social problems of
the workers.
Voting analysts grappling with the 1968 election returns provided a number of
explanations for the apparent rightward turn in American politics. During the
presidential campaign, analysts "re-discovered" blue-collar workers as a volatile segment
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of society whose vote might be crucial in determining the next president of the United
States. Workers could either support a populist conservative such as Wallace or follow
their unions- advice and turn an anticipated Nixon landslide into a very close election.
Conservatives viewed the "affluenf blue-collar workers as potential members of a new
Republican majority. Democrats
-both conservative and liberal- analyzed their Party's
electoral defeat and proposed ways to revive the crumbling New Deal coalition. Finally,
the New Left took a renewed interest in the rank-and file as potential agents for social
change. As the 1960s came to a close, the blue-collar worker stood at the center of an
ongoing political and intellectual debate.
In The Emerging Republican Majority {\969\ Kevin Phillips, a former Nixon
campaign aide, claimed that the Great Society had provoked an angry reaction among
large segments of the white working and middle classes. Issues of race -affirmative
action, school busing, residential integration, and racial preferences in job selection and
government contracting
— along with a reaction against the antiwar movement, cultural
permissiveness and crime had fractured the New Deal coalition. Phillips argued that
voting power was shifting from the Democratic stronghold of the northeast to the
southern and western states of the Sun Belt; top growth states such as California,
Arizona, Texas and Florida would play a crucial role in future elections. In this new
cycle in American politics, Phillips said, populist conservative Republicans would
replace an entrenched liberal Democratic elite.
«
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'The long-range meaning of the poHtieal upheaval of 1968," Phillips argued,
"rests on the Republiean opportunity to fashion a majority among the 57 pereent ofthe
Ameriean eleetorate whieh voted to ejeet the Demoeratie Parly from national power."^
Due to the poor Demoeratie and liberal reeord in Indoehina, in domestie eeonomies, in
welfare poliey and in law enforeement, Phillips argued, Nixon had been able to usher in a
rightward politieal swing in 1 968. Phillips admitted that the 1968 presidential eleetion
had beeome a elose raee, "as onee-dissident liberals rallietl behind 1 lumphrey and
Demoeratie umon leaders whipped their pro-Wallace rank and lile back to the party
line/' In sum, Wallaee's baeking among blue-eollar workers and poor whites was highly
unstable. Many working-elass voters remained loyal to the Demoeratie candidate, as they
feared that a Republican president might undcrnune Social Security, Medicare, and
collective bargaining.
Richard M. Scammon and Ren .1. Wattenbcrg's The Real Majorily {1970} offered
a Democratic response to Phillips" book. I hcse analysts contended that the ''middle
voters" were no longer worried about economic issues such as unemployment, labor
union rights, or broad based welfare proposals; such concerns had been superseded by
"the Social Issue." According to Scammon and Wattenberg, Americans were "beginning
to array themselves politically along the axes of certain social situations." I hese
situations became potent politieal issues becau.se the great majority of voters in America
^ibid., 461
"^bid.. 35.
''lbid.,464
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were "middle-aged, middle-class, middle-minded."' The "Social Issue," a term coined
by the authors, pivoted on the electorate's increasing fears of crime, racial militance,
campus disruption, drug use and the apparent decline of moral values.
There were more similarities than differences between Phillips' The Emerging
Republican Majority and Scammon and Wattenberg's The Real Majority. Yet Phillips"
analysis was much more deterministic than was Scammon and Wattenberg's. The latter
believed that the political realignment was not yet complete and that all was not lost for
the Democrats. The authors of The Real Majority argued that the Democratic Party could
win the allegiance of "Middle America" by co-opting the law-and-order issue and
avoiding measures that exacerbated racial conflict. The "middle voter," Scammon and
Wattenberg said, "is a forty-seven-year old housewife from the outskirts of Dayton, Ohio,
whose husband is a machinist." This prototypical "middle American" was afraid to walk
the streets alone at night, had mixed views about blacks and civil rights, and was deeply
distressed because LSD was found on his son's school campus.^ Blue-collar families
thus resembled the "middle class" in that the Social Issue had eclipsed economic
concerns.
The mainstream press likewise asserted the "middle-class" status of the American
worker. "Labor Day 1969: Affluence and Quiet," read The New York Times headlines on
September 1 of that year. A photograph portrayed workers' cars "streaming out" of an
automobile plant in Flint, Michigan. The city that in the 1930's epitomized the strength
Richard M. Scammon and Ben J. Wattenberg, The Real Majority (New York: Coward,
McCann and Geoghegan, Inc., 1970), 20-21.
^Ibid., 70.
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were
and militance of organized labor had become complacent and "middle class." There
no Labor Day parades or Labor Day speeches, as workers preferred to spend the weekend
"playing golf or vacationing at the lake resorts in the cool pine forests to the north."
Younger workers did not care about the union because they had the benefits that they
wanted. Their primary concerns were no longer workmen's compensation or the union
shop but "suburban school taxes and the sanctity of the neighborhood."^
Mainstream magazines reinforced the view of American workers as "middle
class," "generous" and "optimistic." In a special report entitled "The Troubled
American," Newsweek thoroughly examined the "white middle-class majority" that
included white-collar and blue-collar workers. The magazine's reporters claimed that, in
a malignant racial atmosphere, middle-class whites felt victimized and thus were
increasingly willing to voice their prejudices and hostility against blacks.^ Middle
Americans were troubled by the squeeze of taxes and inOation, Newsweek contended, but
these were not their paramount concerns. Above everything else, the report claimed,
these Americans cherished "order" and wanted "everybody to just quiet down and quit
threatening to destroy what they [had] worked so hard to build and preserve." Middle
9
Americans resented the poor for being on welfare and the rich for not paying taxes.
Newsweek' s "troubled American" was Richard Nixon's "forgotten American," his "great
silent majority." The middle American was also George Wallace's and Spiro Agnew's
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'iittle man". To many political analysts, the Middle American was simply "the reacting
American."
Journalist Richard Lemon expanded the Newsweek article into The Troubled
American, a book whose conclusions were based on 2,165 interviews of white adults
carried out by the Gallup Organization. The author admitted that the middle Americans
were not "a monolithic group" since they were divided by income, age, occupation,
education and ethnicity.'" Yet the core of his analysis lay in the disturbing fact that the
"great American middle class," which formed the backbone of the country, was now
described as "alienated," "frightened," "uneasy," "forlorn," "angry," "resentful,"
"confused."'
'
By appealing to "the silent majority," Lemon argued, Nixon had
apparently offered the reassurance that the decade's conflicts had been exaggerated: "He
would seek out these forgotten, orderly men and women, and the squabbles of the past
would fall into perspective, because the people had had enough of them."' ^ Lemon's
study attempted to prove just the opposite: the silent majority was not satisfied.
Similarly, in The Middle Americans: Proud and Uncertain (1971), Harvard
psychiatrist Robert Coles attempted to identify the common political and cultural
attitudes of the "forgotten Americans." Based on interviews with a handful of
workingmen -a steam fitter, a policeman, a filling-station operator, a machinist, a
fireman, a welder, a druggist and a bank-loan officer- Coles offered a vindication of the
Richard Lemon, The Troubled American (New York: A Clarion Book published by
Simon and Schuster, 1969), 24-25.
"ibid. 19.
'^Ibid.
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"Silent Majority." The middle Americans that Coles interviewed showed varying
degrees of hostility towards blacks, hippies, and the educated. They needed to believe
that American involvement in Vietnam was justified and feared going into debt. Despite
some bleak aspects that the book presented. Time magazine found Coles' portrait
"encouraging:" "Middle Americans still possess[edJ a wisdom (or virtue) that now
seem[ed] rare...They believe[d] in reticence, especially about their private lives." The
study implied that middle Americans were more often than not unwilling to talk about the
issues that concerned them. In his conclusion. Coles highlighted a woman interviewee's
words: "I make things worse when I talk about them; and I make myself seem lonelier."'^
In a time of burning ghettoes, escalating antiwar demonstrations and explosive university
campuses, many analysts cherished the middle Americans' alleged "reticence."''*
By calling white workers "middle Americans," sociologists, political analysts and
journalists alike reinforced the perception of the United States as a middle-class nation.
Studies of self-classification showed that a majority of workers did not use the term
"working class" to describe their position in society. If asked to locate themselves on a
scale of upper, middle or lower class, the overwhelming majority called themselves
"middle class." On a five-class scale, however, on which the working class was placed
between the poor and the middle-class, many more identified themselves as working
class. "Middle class," then, did not necessarily refer to a majority of affiuent and secure
individuals but simply to the social class between the rich and the poor. The use of terms
' Robert Coles, The Middle American: Proud and Uncertain (Boston and Toronto: Little,
Brown and Company, 1971), 180.
"*"Kitchen Matches in the Dark," Time, 28 June 1971, 78.
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such as "middle class" or "middle American" to describe white and blue-collar workers
was misleading in the sense that a wide disparity of life styles passed for '^middle
15
class."
There is no doubt that the American working class has never fit into the Marxist
model of class structure as contending groups organized and mobilized for struggle over
clashing economic interests. American sociologists, for their part, have largely favored a
non-economic definition of social classes as "aggregates of persons or families differing
in values and behavior and forming a rank order of status levels." Social classes
therefore have often been presented as "ranked subcultures."'^ Richard Lemon's The
Troubled American, with its emphasis on values and behavior, conforms to this definition
of class.
Studies such as Kevin Phillips" The Emerging Republican Majority, Scammon
and Wattenberg's The Real Majority, Lemon's The Troubled American, or Coles' The
Middle Americans stressed the existence of an American "Silent Majority" as well as the
validity of a non-economic conception of social class. This perception led analysts to
underestimate the role that economic inequalities play in determining working people's
aspirations and views. In fact, as sociologist Dennis Wrong states, "classes are groups
whose members' aspirations and opportunities, beliefs, and life-styles - far from
reflecting a coherent self-sustaining culture or subculture- are basically shaped by their
Michael Harrignton, 'X^ld Working Class, New Working Class/' in Irving Howe, ed..
The World ofthe Bhw-Collar Worker (New York: Quadrangle Books, A New York
Times Company, 1972), 142; Richard Parker, The Myth ofthe Middle Class (New York:
Liveright, 1972), xx.
'^Dennis H. Wrong, "How Important is Social ClassT" in Irving Howe, ed., The World of
the Blue-Collar Worker, 303,
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market position in the national economy, and [...] by their differential "life-chances'
the commodity, credit, and labor markets."' The phrase "Middle America" reduced
vast group of Americans to a neatly labeled lowest common denominator of status and
concerns. The classification obviated the variations in the nature of blue-collar work. In
1969, the nonagricultural labor force in the United States numbered 77.902 million: out
of these, 48.993 million Americans were employed in production and non-supervisory
jobs. The "old" working class, which was primarily blue collar and did physical work
in the country's industrial economy, was still a great force in America's political scene in
the late 1960s.
As conservative and liberal analysts critiqued workers as middle Americans, new
leftists increasingly discovered the workers' revolutionary potential. This was a
surprising turn. Since its 1962 convention at a labor camp in Port Huron, Michigan, the
Students for a Democratic Society (SDS)-at the time the student department of League
for Industrial Democracy- had a stormy relationship with the social-democratic left and
the liberal-labor coalition. Tom Hayden, a twenty-two year old student and a rising
reporter on the University of Michigan newspaper, presented on that occasion a
manifesto that attempted to summarize the position of the new student radicals. During
the Convention, the document exacerbated the political differences between two leftist
students' camps, one led by SDS president Al Haber, Tom Hayden, Steve Max and their
followers, and the other by New York socialists Rachelle Horowitz, Tom Kahn and
17
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Richard Roman, whose mentor was Michael Harrington, a leader of the Student League
for Industrial Democracy (SLID).
Those student radicals who followed the lead of Hayden believed that the
fundamental problem of American society stemmed from the glaring contradictions that
existed between Americans' democratic ideals and its national experience. Hayden
proposed to bridge the gap between theory and practice by fostering "participatory
democracy," a political system through which the people could take more control over
their own lives. As historian Allen Matusow has put it, "participatory democracy" was
"obviously similar to the anarchist dream of inherently good men and women liberated
from hierarchic institutions and living in decentralized communities where the individual
19
counted." Accordmg to the Port Huron Statement, one of the most widely read radical
documents in American history, students would be the agents of social change.
The students" elders had more faith in organized labor. The SLID's old leftists,
such as Michael Harrington and Irving Howe, were loyal to the ideas of Max Shachtman,
the one-time Bolshevik and secretary of Leon Trotsky who broke with his mentor in 1939
to produce his own analysis of Stalinism. Shachtman rejected Trotsky's view of the
Stalinist bureaucracy as a degenerate caste temporarily ruling in the name of the
proletariat. In Shachtman's view, Stalin's bureaucrats formed a new permanent and
totalitarian clique. By the time the student radicals convened in Port Huron, the
Shachtmanites had dropped their revolutionary rhetoric, joined the Socialist Party and
discarded the possibility of building an American version of the Labor Party.
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Shachtmanites hoped to advance their social democratic ideals within the two-party
system: the aim was to turn the Democratic Party into a coalition of left-liberals and
socialists. The labor movement was to play a crucial role in such a political
,.
20
realignment.
Harrington vehemently objected to Hayden's Port Huron Statement draft. The
clash epitomized the differences between the Shactmanites and the infant New Left. In
his analysis of the birth of the New Left, Todd Gitlin claims that ''Harrington was pivotal,
for he was the one person who might have mediated across the generational divide."^'
The veteran Shachtmanite, however, judged the new radicals' manifesto more harshly
than the students had expected. Two issues started the rift between the old and the new
leftists: the young activists" rejection of anticommunism and their disregard of the
workers and their unions as agents for social change.
Anticommunism was a defining feature of the postwar liberals" and social
democrats' identity. In the new leftists' view, "an unreasoning anticommunism [had]
become a major social problem for those who want[ed] to construct a more democratic
America." To the SDS founders, communism was not monolithic and the Soviet Union
was not a military threat to the United States. Furthermore, Cold War rhetoric only
damaged American political life as "the demands of "unity" and "oneness" in the face of
the declared danger" restricted any kind of debates. To Harrington and to all those
James Miller, "Democracy is in the Streets: " From Port Huron to the Siege ofChicago
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political activists with vivid memories of Stalin's crimes and the Hungarian Revolution,
the SDS theorists were simply "soft" on communism.^^
The second issue dividing the Old and the New Left was the new radicals'
evaluation of the labor movement. The Port Huron Statement was contemptuous of
organized labor, "the historic institutional representative of the exploited, the presumed
[my emphasis]"countervailing power" against the excesses of Big Business."^^ Industrial
unions were in a serious crisis, SDS argued: automation was causing a decrease in blue-
collar jobs, the unorganized were not being organized, and labor leaders were turning
increasingly bureaucratic, materialistic and self-interested. Rank-and-filers were not that
different: many were "indifferent unionists, uninterested in meetings, alienated from the
complexities of the labor-management negotiating apparatus, lulled to comfort by the
24
accessibility of luxury and the opportunity of long-term contracts." In 1 962, the young
radicals who adhered to the Port Huron Statement shared the mainstream view of
organized labor as economically affluent and politically conservative.
From the draft of its pivotal document in 1962 to the organization's collapse in the
summer of 1969, SDS leaders remained obsessed with the debate over the agents of
social change. Although well meaning, the student radicals found it increasingly hard to
formulate a definite ideology. Who would lead the revolution that they deemed
necessary to make American society truly democratic? College students alone, as the
22
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Port Huron Statement seemed to imply? The poor living in the American eities' slums?
The
-internal colony" of oppressed blacks? Third-World peasants? The "new working
class" of salaried professionals and highly trained technical employees? In its short
history, SDS embraced strategies that aimed to promote each of these groups as the
vanguard of political change.
In its early years, SDS leaders found in the work of CJerman philosopher 1 lerbcrt
Marcuse an ideological foundation in which to root its radicalism. Marcuse's most
important bot)ks, Eros and Civilization and One-Dimensional Man^ went to great lengths
to explain why the beneficiaries of (he Aflluent Society felt so oppressed and alienated.
To Marcuse, and to many new leftists, "a comfortable, smooth, reasonable, democratic
unfreedom prevail|ed| in advanced industrial civili/ation..." f urthermore, in a post-
scarcity society, 'Mndependence of thought, autonomy, and the right to political
• • „ , . - , 25
opposition were things ol the past. The Marcusean ''Great ReliisaP" to conform to
"oppression and domination" legitimated the youth movement's confrontational
approach.
In 1%4, SDS tried and failed to organize the poor in the slums through its
Fxonomic Research and Action Projects. On campus, Mario Savio's Free-Speech
Movement revitalized the SDS chapter at the University of California, Berkeley. Savio's
denunciation of the depersonalized and unresponsive university bureaucracy echoed the
Port Huron Statement. In 1965, the escalation of the Vietnam War further radicalized the
New Fefl and offered SDS president Carl Oglesby the chance to link corporate liberalism
2"^
I lerbert Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man: Studies in the Ideology of Advanced
Industrial Society (Boslon: Beacon Press, 1991/1964), 1.
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to U.S. imperialism. In 1966 and 1967, as the anti-draft movement grew, radical students
not only denounced American imperialism but also increasingly identified with Third
World guerrillas and their Marxist leaders. Ho Chi Minh, Mao Tse Tung, Che Guevara
and Fidel Castro became heroes to emulate.
By June 1968, Allen Matusow writes, "like the old left before it, the new
splintered into Marxist sects that often hated each other more than they hated their
... .26
capitalist enemies." At that year's SDS convention in East Lansing, Michigan, radical
students divided into two camps. On the one side were the SDSers whose analysis and
tactics were guided by Third World Marxism. On the other side were the Marxist-
Leninist members of the Progressive Labor Party, who believed that the American
industrial working class, not Third World guerrillas, would topple the capitalist system.
Despite the division, SDS still appeared to be "in good health" in 1968. A year later,
however, the organization cracked when SDS expelled the Progressive Labor Party and
its Worker Student Alliance caucus. As historian Peter Levy says, "SDS ultimately
27
collapsed in the process of debating the correct line on the working class."
Early in 1969, there were clear indications that the various new left factions and
SDS chapters were seriously revising their stand towards the American working class. In
January 1 969, new leftist John Spritzler triumphantly announced that "Dartmouth SDS
[had] been building a student-worker alliance and learning to apply a pro-working class
strategy to student struggles." The Dartmouth decision to build an alliance with the
26
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workers had grown out of an anti-Reserve Officers' Training Corps (ROTC)
demonstration. Initially, the Dartmouth anti-ROTC petition simply stated that ROTC
was 'incompatible with a liberal arts education." The university's SDS members
denounced the document as an "ivory-tower" students" demand that someone else fight
28
the Vietnam War: the working-class youth.
Despite the introduction of a "worker friendly" strategy, the activism of
Dartmouth SDS chapter still centered not on the grievances of American workers but on
the connections between U.S. imperialism in Southeast Asia and the consequent
oppression of the Vietnamese revolution. SDS' task was to show American workers that
the same power that subjected the peoples of Vietnam could be used to break their strikes
at home. SDS members' ultimate aim was, however, to win the workers" support in their
anti-ROTC struggle. New leftists argued that a student-worker alliance, especially
leafleting and support of local strikes, had increased both on-campus and off-campus
29
support tor SDS. In sum, it had diminished the isolation of the student movement.
SDS" determination to build a student-worker alliance increased in the spring of
1969. This was reflected in the numerous articles that the New Left Notes published on
the issue. For instance, the leaders of the San Diego Workers for a Democratic Society
explained why they, university drop-outs, had decided to do factory work and join the
working class: "We organize workers because they are the only sector of the population
with the potential power to defeat the American ruling class. Students can annoy the
28
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rulers; workers can seize the means of production and shut down the country ."^^ The
activists' uhimate goal was to transform the workers' trade union struggles into
revolutionary battles. The strategy to follow, they admitted, was not yet clear. It was
essential, however, that workers became aware of the connections between the Vietnam
War, racism and the international class interests of the workers. The organizers of the
San Diego Workers for a Democratic Society had apparently abandoned the belief that
the students could lead a revolution and had placed all their hopes on the revolutionary
potential of blue-collar workers.
By 1969, then, a growing number of new leftists had traveled the long distance
from Marcuse's pessimistic appraisal of industrial workers as affluent, passive and easily
manipulated, to the "optimistic" Marxist-Leninist view of blue collars as the only group
capable of overturning the capitalist system. In his analysis of the Old Left and the New
Left, Paul Mattick Jr. provides an interesting summary of the metamorphosis of SDS
between 1962 and 1969: "It has moved, in the terms of its slogans, from protest to
resistance, from dialogue to confrontation, from organizing pressure groups to base-
building, from peace to anti-imperialism, from civil rights to black liberation; perhaps
from participatory democracy to socialism."^'
In January 1969, PLP leaders made a Work-in pamphlet available to all SDS
members. In the document, radical students admitted that they had isolated themselves
by neglecting the largest section of the population, the working class. The increasing
^^San Diego Workers for a Democratic Society, "Why Organize Workers?" 1 5 January
1969.
^Vaul Mattick Jr., "The old left and the new left," New Left Notes, 15 January 1969, 7.
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suininer
level of strikes, SDS acknowledged, debunked the myth of working-class apathy
^^Workers ARI{ on the move;^ the SDS members concluded. They proposed a
work-in aimed at breaking down the barriers between students and workers, talking about
political issues with blue collars and changing the image of the youth movement from
that which the press had presented, riic pamphlet stressed the fact that the Summer
Work-in was ^^an opporlunily for students lo learnfrom workers [my emphasis]."
l^irthermore, the document warned students against patronizing the rank and filers:
'Don^t talk lo workers like you know everything and they know nothing, l-irst ol alK it^s
32
not true (probably the reverse)."
Tlie 1969 SDS work-in program indicates that, while most student radicals saw
the need to forge some kind of student-worker alliance, many were reluctant to adopt the
highly doctrinaire position of the Progressive Labor Party and its Worker-Student
Alliance caucus, 'fhese staunch Marxist-Leninists maintained that the working class, by
its own effort, could develop trade union consciousness but not revolutionary
consciousness; the latter could only be brought to the labor movement by revolutionary
intellectuals from without. The SDS sununer work-in pamphlet, in contrast, was
grounded on the assumption that students could prollt from the workers' own experiences
of class struggle. 't)ne important result of your job may just be," the SDS pamphlet
concluded, ''an appreciation of what workers are up against in their fight against the boss,
33
the government and sellout union leadership."
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This student drive brought alarmed responses from business associations, the
news media, and union leaders. The business community feared that SDS's infiltration of
manufacturing plants might agitate rank and filers. Business associations held briefings
and sent out thousands of letters informing executives about the SDS work-in plan and
recommending screening procedures to keep activists off payrolls. The Commerce and
Industry Association ofNew York sponsored a meeting of businessmen to ''plan strategy
against a Students for a Democratic Society project to forge a worker-student alliance."^"*
The Illinois Manufacturers Association published the student summer work-in plan
35
verbatim, describing it as 'Tood for serious thought.'' "Troublemakers^^ were expected
to flood into the plants.
Time denounced the radical students who, "having alienated themselves from
most of society's cherished institutions/^ were now abandoning their summer vacation to
create a revolutionary student-worker alliance. The workers' attitude. Time contended,
ranged from coolness to hostility; blue collars had '^no patience with revolutionary jargon
and little sympathy for comparatively privileged college students.'* A cartoon
summarized what the magazine considered to be the workers' reaction towards the SDS
summer work-in. The drawing showed a stout blue-collar worker, in overalls and hard
hat, leaving behind a small barking dog wearing sunglasses and waiving an SDS flag.
In a similar vein, The Wall Street Journal viewed any form of student-worker
alliance as highly unlikely. The newspaper based its argument on the mainstream
^^New York Times, 24 July 1969, 1.
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a.s.s,Mnp(u>n of A.nmcan labor's well hen,.. StalT rcporlo. Alan Adoison contc.ulal that,
i"cl)"iii}> liom Iho "politically conservative mooil" of Iho worU.i},. class, the stiulciils-
revolutionary approach would strike most Americans as nonsensical. Workers had joined
students in the l%8 "May Revolt" in !• ranee because iMcnch workers were poorly paid,
hi the I Inileil States, the situation was very dil lereut; the vast majority of workers had
been integrated into the nuddle class. They were "well-paid, insulated Irom the nupacl ol
the recessions." Having moved hom economic insecurity to econonuc Neciiniv, workers
had adopted "the political philosophy that traditi(Mially goes with security."''
I Inion leaders' responses to the SDS summer plan were varied. 1 abor reporter
Victor r^iesel, a close friend ofAFI -(MO president Cleorge Meany's and a staunch
deleniler of the organization, alerted the unions to the SDS summer program. In his
"Insiile I abor" colunm, Riesel claimctl that labor leailers wouki be sure to give "the
provocateur work-in summer rebels a thorough workout. I Inion leailers such as .loe
lieirne, president of the C'onnnunicalions Workers ol America, aiul ( "harlcs I uiias, head
ol the I Inited Transportation I Inion, took preventive mea.sures. I Imon chiefs, acconling
to RiescI, would not allow unioni/cil shops to be taken o\er bv new leftists. To labor
leaders, the SDS summer work-in was much more than "a youthlul rehearsal lor summer
soKliers of a playful revolution." Student radicals were working on even more "violent
and e\|ilosive documents" lor the coming SDS national convention.
^Vlan Adelson, "Unlikely Alliance," Wall Street .loiinuiL U) .luly 1060, I.
"victor Riesel, "llnii>ns Alert to SDS Plan," N^A("K, N.Y., I ^ .lune I0(,^), Special
Collections and Archives, W.li.B. Du Bois l ibrary. University ol Massaclursctts,
Amherst.
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Gus Tyler, assistant president of the International Ladies Garment Workers Union
(ILGWU), had a much more welcoming attitude towards the radical students' attempt to
bridge the differences between the American working class and the New Left. Like
several other Democrats at the time, Tyler was calling for collaboration between unions,
liberals and radicals; consequently, the ILGWU leader applauded the New York Labor
Committee of SDS for its critique of student insularity. This Committee advocated the
creation of "a movement of students, working people, and unemployed...fighting together
for what we all need...Campaigns which turn black and white against each other or
students against working people are absolutely wrong. They are doomed to failure."
Tyler celebrated the committee's rediscovery of the working class as a crucial agent of
historical development. Nevertheless, Tyler questioned the SDS Summer Work-in that
38
was supposed to ''sow the seeds of revolution * among workers.
In Tyler^s view, the SDS's ^infiltration ' of manufacturing plants was not
necessary for labor to become an agent of social change. Labor unions, Tyler argued, had
the capacity to go beyond the purely economic concerns of their members and become
more sensitive to other dilemmas in society such as housing, education, taxation, civil
rights, foreign affairs, full employment and poverty. Tyler regarded unions as "inveterate
income re-distributors." Yet for effective redistribution to be achieved and for the
working class to become politically constructive, programs had to be pursued "in tandem
with other progressive elements in society: blacks, youths, and intellectuals." If ignored,
workers who harbored resentment against not only the rich but also against politicians.
Gus Tyler, "The Working Class Rediscovered " The New Leader, 31 July 1969, 11-12.
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militant blacks, radical students, liberals and insensitive union leaders might turn into a
negative force in American society/^
Labor reporter Riesel was right in predicting that the SDS national convention
would be more "explosive and violent" than the 1969 SDS summer work-in program.
When SDS convened in Chicago on June 18, the key question was which road the
country ^s largest radical organization would take. After heated disputes over the best
revolutionary strategy, SDS split into various factions. Paul Mattick Jr., aNew Left Notes
contributor, explained: 'The American New Left.. .has produced veiy little in the way of
theory of itself and its goals. What kind of revolution are we aiming for? What styles of
organization are appropriate to the work we want to do? What are or ought to be our
relations to other tendentially or potentially oppositional groups in society like blacks and
40
workers?' By the time of the 1969 national convention, radical students had produced
no clear answers to these crucial questions. Rather, SDS had divided into three major
factions, each seeking to organize radical activity in its own direction.
During the national convention, SDS expelled the Progressive Labor Party, a self-
styled cadre of Marxist-Leninists that had been infiltrating the organization for over a
year. The Worker-Student Alliance (WSA), a faction that the PLP had built into SDS,
was also purged. In its trade union program, the PLP claimed that "since the effects of
the wars of aggression spread by the U.S. ruling class throughout the world [fell] ever
more heavily on the workers here at home, any force rebelling against that ruling class
policy [was] fighting in the direct class interest of the workers." The PLP argued that
39
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there was a clear identity between the interests of workers and students. Whether young
radicals demonstrated against the Vietnam War, resisted the draft or walked picket lines
along with the workers, they were fighting "against the same ruling class that
misdirect[cd] both of them." Hence the importance of a worker-student alliance."
Other SDS factions resented the PLP for presenting itself as the "vanguard of the
proletarian revolution." They condemned the PLP's disregard of women's, blacks' and
students' own organizational expressions within the revolutionary movement, fhe PLP,
opponents asserted, embraced a vulgar Marxism that reduced racism and male
chauvinism to mere devices to split and divide the working class. The WSA was based
on the misconception that only PLP qualified cadres were capable of "organizing"
working people. SDS' decision to put an end to PLP-WSA politics within the
organization was largely based on two fundamental differences in principles between the
PLP and SDS. First, most radical students supported the struggle for liberation launched
by black and Latin "colonies" within the U.S. and even recognized those "nations' rights"
to secession. The PLP, in contrast, deemed these revolutionary movements as racist.
Second, mainstream SDS members supported the national liberation movement of the
people of Vietnam as well as all similar movements around the world that fought U.S.
imperialism. To the PLP, however, all forms of nationalism were to be condemned as
reactionary. A virtual ultimatum from the Black Panther Party and the Mcxican-
42
American Brown Berets finally forced the purge ot the PLP from SDS.
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liroadly speaking, the SDS members who pushed for the expulsion ofthe PM>
agreed on the need to build a Revolutionary Youth Movement (RYM). After the national
convention, however, this larger faction split in two: the Weathermen and the
Revolutionary Youth Movement 2(RYM 2). Although these groups shared some
ideologieal foundations, they differed on issues such as black liberation, nationalism, the
white working class and direct action tactics."*^
The Weathermen described themselves as "not part-time students, but full-time
revolutionaries." I his faction believed that white radicals must link with black guerrillas
and Third World insurgents on tactical as well as on ideological grounds. These young
revolutionaries were charged not only with absolute indifference towards the white
working class but also with indiscriminate violence. Third World revolution coupled
with white youth revolution at home, the Weathermen contended, would bring about
11
socialism. Many years after the Weathermen had disbanded, Tom I layden remembered
that "they had started, characteristically, as idealist and benign people. ..|but then| it
became a matter of whether or not you were a man, which was measured by how
45
outrageously subversive you were willing to be."
The RYM 2, meanwhile, viewed the proletariat as the main force in the socialist
revolution. Blacks, women and students were the agents who, through their struggles,
raised the consciousness ofthe white working class. RYM 2 viewed African-Americans
4}
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as comprising a nation onto themselves, oppressed as blacks and exploited as workers.
Because of this dual position, blacks' liberation was a precondition to any kind of
socialist revolution in the United States. Women would contribute to the development of
"proletarian unity" and revolution by liberating themselves from male supremacy.
Revolutionary students would be the catalysts of change."*^
The divisions at SDS Chicago national convention and the subsequent split into
warring factions turned a worker-student alliance into mere wishful thinking. The radical
students* "rediscovery of the American working class'" failed to materialize. To old
leftists such as Howe and Harrington, as Maurice Isserman has said, the New Left "must
have seemed sometimes a surrealistic parody of the worst ideological excesses of the Old
Left." SDS, as the nation's largest radical organization, had collapsed, but new leftists
continued to debate the labor question. Young radicals, as individuals, would adopt
varied positions on the working-class struggles that were to come in the Nixon years.
If trade unionists chastised the student radicals for their revolutionary dreams,
they were equally angered by the mainstream media misrepresentation of blue-collar life.
Steel Labor, the United Steel Workers" publication, took issue with the Newsweek report
and argued that "the troubled American" was in fact "the exploited American." The very
existence of "Middle America" was a myth: the majority of people who worked for a
living were not part of "'affluent America.'" Blue-collar family income was below the
modest but adequate standard defined by the government. To be above the poverty line
did not necessarily mean that workers enjoyed economic and social well being.
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Moreover, Steel Labor claimed, workers were "angry at being exploited by the Wallaces,
the Agnews, and the Nixons who cater[ed] to their fears and anxieties yet offer[ed]
nothing in the way of positive programs." White workers were tired of being stereotyped
as affluent and racist when, in fact, they themselves were victims of class prejudice.^'
In a similar way, Frank Rosen, the International Representative of the United
Electrical Workers (UE), bitterly complained about the media's distorted portrayals of
blue-collar workers. As the American ideal was "white collar in the suburbs," Rosen
claimed, in movies or on TV the blue-collar worker was presented as either "the funny
nice guy" or as a racist, ignorant and vicious individual. "People who work in the plant,"
Rosen added, "work in the heat, they work in the cold, they work in the dirt and get hurt.
All good reasons for factory work not having the greatest status in the world." The
differences between the middle class and the working class had not vanished by the late
1960s. If the United Automobile Workers made the New York Times headlines on Labor
Day, it was because they 'iooked ' middle class, not because they were middle class.
Bayard Rustin, the cochairman of the A. Phillip Randolph InstituteJoined trade
unionists in their criticism of both conservatives and radicals for their view of workers as
affluent and acquiescent members of "Middle America.'' Rustin saw this portrayal as an
attempt to portray the United States as a ''classless'" society. In 1971, Rustin argued:
The prominent racial and ethnic loyalties that divide American society have,
together with our democratic creed, obscured a fundamental reality -that we are a
class society and, though we do not often talk about such things, that we are
engaged in a class struggle.
Steel Labor, September 1970, 9.
UENews,! A^n\ 1969, 9.
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Because of Rustin's steadfast commitment to the labor movement
-and to hawkish AFL-
CIO leaders such as George Meany- many argued that he was out of touch with the
black community. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, his defense of organized labor as
the most progressive force in American might have sounded exaggerated; yet Rustin was
right in arguing that it was unfair to paint the trade union movement as reactionary.
"Many of the sophisticated right-wing attacks on labor," Rustin claimed, "are frequently
couched in left-wing rhetoric." There was a certain convergence of the left and the right
on their view of unions as anti-black institutions that selfishly defended the economic
mterests of their members. Irving Howe, the founder of the quintessential Old Left
journal Dissent, agreed with Rustin. He summed up the media's attitude towards blue-
collar workers in the following way: "You had better pay attention to these guys,
otherwise they might raise a lot of hell, and many might even go over to the racism and
reaction of George Wallace." Rather than representing a genuine interest in the
American blue-collar experience, they were "a prudential admonition as to the
consequences of neglecting them."^'
In the late 1 960s and early 1 970s, Dissent offered a forum to those old left
intellectuals and trade unionists who appraised America from an anti-communist but
social democratic stand. Even if there were significant differences in the political
analysis of the various contributors to the journal, most agreed on the importance of the
American working class as an agent of social change and on the need to refashion a
'^Bayard Rustin, "The Blacks and the Unions,'" Harper 's Magazine, May 1 97 1 . 8 1
.
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labor-liberal coalition. As Maurice Isserman has described it,
-/)/.s.sc77/ prided itself on its
IVeedoni from illusion, its ability to face what 1 (owe later called "the sheer terribleness oi'
„52
our tuTie. Durnig the Nixon Administration, Dissent opened the debate on the realities
of the American working-class life. Dissent^ editors, as Howe stated, attempted to
challenge the view of American workers as "brainwashed clods, hopelessly "one-
dimcnsional," mere creatures of the belly who are manipulated by the I'stablishment and
53
the media."
In the May-June 1069 issue of D/.v.sr;?/, Brendan Sexton, director of education
activities for the \ Inited Automobile Workers, discussed the "middle-class" status of
workers. Sexton set out to clarify "the assumption that blue-collar workers [werej
51
"middle class and sitting pretty." In 1%6, Sexton said, the median income of skilled
workers "the aristocrats of labor"— was $ 6,98 1 . for that year, the U.S. Department of
Labor had stated that $ 9,191 would provide a family of four with "a moderate standard
of living." By thai criterion. Sexton concluded, only one out of three American families
lived moderately well. Second, millions of families combined two or even three incomes
and still earned less than $ 5,()()(). Young workers were the hardest hit. Sexton argued:
they received the lowest pay and were the most likely to be laid off. I hird, working-class
Maurice Isserman, //7 had a Hammer... I he Death ofthe Old Left and the Birth of the
New Left (New York: Basic Books, Inc., Publishers, 1987), 76-77.
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children were "over-represented in the mass of those excluded from college."" Thus,
they were not sheltered against the draft for four years as were the middle-class youths
who secured student deferments.
In Sexton's view, the myth of working-class affluence was widely sustained for
two reasons. First, many liberals and new leftists in college circles
-out of touch with the
workers' every-day realities—believed that labor had become "middle class." Secondly,
the success story of the unions' gains had led many Americans to assume that the
workers "had made it too." To be sure, Sexton asserted, unions had made important
advances in wages, working conditions and fringe benefits. But there was a long way to
go. Trade unions faced many limitations. Middle-class liberals, Sexton pointed out,
were often outraged by strikes that upset the general public. New leftists, for their part,
seemed to show as much contempt for the working class as for the union leaders whom
they regarded as selfish and backward.^^
Andrew Levison echoed Sexton in his book. The Working Class Majority ( 1 974).
In the late 1960s, the working class still constituted the majority of American society,
Levison contended. Through an impressive interpretation of census data, he proved that
the U.S. was not a middle-class society: over sixty percent of the population worked with
their hands as the decade came to close. Levison claimed that the "typical" affluent
American worker constituted only 12 to 15 percent of labor, white and black. Eighty five
Ibid, 233.
Sexton, 238.
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percent of workers were not "typical": the average worker earned $ 9,500 in 1970, a
figure that placed him closer to poverty than to affluence
"
After debunking the myth of working-class affluence, Levison turned to
discussing labor's alleged apathy and conservatism. Throughout the 1960s, he pointed
out, a rising discontent with conditions of work and life was evident in the growth of
rank-and-file militancy. The increasing number of strikes, Levison concluded, "exposed
how shallow "the Social Issue" [was] as a description of what was going on in working-
class America." Far from being irrelevant, as many politicians believed, "it was the
economic issue, not the Social Issue, that moved millions of workers in active protest."^^
The 1969-1970 strike against General Electric, for instance, reflected not only rank-and-
file dissatisfaction over the "old-fashioned" economic issues but also the workers"
determination to reject un-negotiated contracts and to strike for longer periods despite -or
because of- the faltering economy.
Levison thus offered a sharp rejoinder to the mainstream press and the television
networks, which projected images of a middle-class America in which the blue-collar
worker was either to be feared for his bigotry or dismissed for his irrelevance. Like
Levison, labor leaders and radical students called for a new understanding of the working
class. Unionists tried to debunk the myth of labor's affluence and smugness. Inflation
and the price squeeze clearly showed the instability of the workers' "middle-class" status.
Radical students admitted that they had underestimated the role workers could play in
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changing American society. Rank-and-file militancy, new leftists now contended, could
be channeled into a radical transformation of labor-capital relations at the point of
production. While unions viewed collective bargaining as "the blueprint for a better
„59
tomorrow, SDS members regarded it as a flawed system. Collective bargaining
certainly protected the workers' interests. Yet, radical students argued, it also recognized
the companies* right to make huge profits while paying meager wages to workers who
did not share in the widely publicized American prosperity.
For their part, workers were unlikely to view themselves as either agents of world-
transformation or victims of exploitation. Left-wing intellectuals had to abandon their
abstract ideas about the union leadership and the rank-and file and look closely at the
lives of the workers and the workings of unions. Union leaders had to prove that they
could still obtain tangible advantages for their membership but also transcend their
pragmatism. In 1969, Fortune described organized labor as "'angry, aggressive, and
acquisitive," and predicted that "the coming year" would be "a time of epic battle
60
between management and labor." This would be a great opportunity for intellectuals
and union leaders to show what they could do for the American worker.
AFL-CIO News, 23 May 1 970, 24.
^Vichard Amstrong, "Labor 1970: Angry, Aggressive, Acquisitwe,"' Fortune, October
1969, 95.
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CHAPTER 3
THE GE STRIKE
As Fortune predicted, the winter of 1969-1970 was indeed '^a time of epic battle
between management and labor/"' The 102-day strike against General Electric that
started on October 26, 1969, was the most significant struggle of U.S. organized labor
since 1946. In order to explain this renewed militancy among the ranks of labor, it is
necessary to look at the changes that the U.S. economy was undergoing in the late 1960s:
the history of American trade unionism cannot be divorced from the evolution of
American capitalism. David Gordon, Michael Reich, and Richard Edwards have
developed a market segmentation schema that explains how organized labor has fit into
the contours of nineteenth and twentieth century U.S. capitahsm. Their approach is
based on the analyses of prevaihng ''social structures of accumulation'" that the authors
define as "the constellations of institutions which condition growth and accumulation in a
3
given capitalist economy."
According to Gordon, Reich and Edwards, the U.S. entered "the stage of
contemporary capitalism'' at the end of World War II as a new social structure of
Richard Amstrong, '^Labor 1970: Angry, Aggressive, Acquisitive/' For/WA?^, October
1969, 95.
2
See David M. Gordon, Richard Edwards, Michael Reich, Segmented Work Divided
Workers: The Historical Transformation ofLabor in the United States (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 1982).
3
D. M. Gordon, 'Prosperity to stagnation in the postwar economy;' in Michael A.
Bemstein and David E. Adler, eds.. Understanding American Economic Decline (New
York: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 48.
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accumulation arose. In this new phase of capitalist development, the government avoided
depressions and managed aggregate demand by using fiscal and monetary policies; the
country
-s military and economic leadership guaranteed a stable world market and "a
limited capital-labor accord" contained and institutionalized conflict within a collective
bargaining system. As the 1960s came to a close, Reich contends, 'Ihe system of
aggregate demand management, the structure of the international political economy, and
the domestic limited capital-labor accord each were no longer functioning to promote
prosperity..." This triggered "a shift from contained to disruptive class conflict.""*
Between 1966 and 1973, strike activity increased 40 percent over the relatively low level
of the 1959-1966 period.^
By the time Richard Nixon took office, a quarter century of American prosperity
was in jeopardy. Increasingly competitive European and Japanese firms were
undermining the posidon of the United States as the world's dominant economic power.
Moreover, foreign liberation movements, such as the revolutionary tide in Vietnam, were
challenging the U.S.' hegemonic position. The military spending necessary to maintain
such a position was a major drain on the productive capacity of the country. On the home
front, the limited truce between corporations and organized labor began to dissolve as the
promises of rising real wages, heightened job security and improved working conditions
were not met. The shift from economic boom to stagnation had begun in the mid-1960s:
between 1948 and 1966, the real median family income had risen at a rate of 3.1; between
4
Michael Reich, "Capitalist Development, Class Relations and Labor History," in J.
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The Problems of Synthesis (Dekalb: Northern Illinois Press, 1990), 40.
^Gordon, "Prosperity and Stagnation," 61.
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"was
1966 and 1973, it would fall to 2.2. 'The typical U.S. family," Gordon claims,
racing simply to stay in place. Prosperity had clearly given way to eroding well-being."^
In 1969, the average American worker was worse off than he had been four years earlier.
During the 1969-70 recession, consumer prices rose by 5.5 percent.^ The increase
in cost-of-living seriously affected workers, since unions had given up cost-of-living
escalators in a number of contracts. In an age of inflation, what mattered was the trend of
real wages; if rising prices threatened to reduce real wages, workers would try to keep
abreast or ahead of inflation. Beginning with the electrical manufacturers in October
1969, followed by trucking, meatpacking, rubber and automobiles in 1970, five major
industries were scheduled to negotiate new three-year contracts. Not only did organized
labor react vigorously against the decline in their members" real wages but it also dealt
with issues related to health and safety, intensification of the work pace, retirement, and
bargaining conditions. The 102-day walkout against General Electric not only indicated
the willingness of workers to strike for long periods of time but also revealed a reduced
corporate leverage over the workforce. On the one hand, unemployment, a traditional
source of capitalist leverage, was not a threat in 1969. On the other hand, the increased
availability of union strike funds, social insurance and unemployment compensation
provided laid-off workers with a cushion. In October 1969, GE employees decided to
take advantage of this reduced corporate leverage and use their most powerful weapon,
the strike.
Gordon, 45.
Irving Ross, "How to tell when the unions will be tough," Fortune, July 1975, 100.
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In the course of the GE walkout, 147,000 workers in 34 states struck for more
than three months. Fifteen unions coordinated their efforts, while the AFL-CIO
conducted a successful ftindraising campaign and mounted a nationwide consumer
boycott. The GE strike also offered a golden opportunity to those militant students who
hoped to forge an alliance with the rank and file. During the walkout, there were
instances of cooperation between the student left and the striking unions, but these
moments did not amount to a student-worker alliance. Instead, the strike proved that blue
collars were neither acquiescent nor comfortably middle class, as many observers had
assumed. In fact, rank and filers were turning militant, but they were doing so on their
own terms. Considering that the workers were striking one of the richest corporations in
the US, it is ironic that the Wall Street Journal should attempt to tarnish labor's militancy
by pointing out that its "prime goal" was "money;" "such mundane matters as workers'
pay." The goal certainly was not mundane to GE's workers.
The two unions holding national contracts with the corporation spearheaded the
campaign against GE: the United Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers of America
(UE) and the International Union of Electrical Workers (lUE). The strike was the first
called at GE since 1946 and marked the end of bitter rivalry between the independent UE
and the AFL-CIO affiliated lUE. As historians Ronald L. Filippelli and Mark McColloch
point out, "The Cold War's chilling effect on American society struck deep into the heart
of the American labor movement." In 1949 and 1950, the Congress of Industrial
Organizations (CIO) expelled eleven of its affiliates for being under "Communist
domination." Due to its left-wing leaning and, at the time, unacceptable position on
Wall Street Journal, 8 December 1969, 22,
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foreign policy, the UE was one of the casuahies in the purge. Immediately after the UE
charter was revoked, the CIO Executive Board established another union, the lUE, with
jurisdiction in the electrical, radio and machine industries. In its organizing drive, the
lUE leaders were supported not only by the CIO but also by the government, the Catholic
Church, the media, and the electrical corporations that did not miss the opportunity to
exploit the division among their employees.^
Twenty years later, the GE walkout transformed the relationship between the UE
and a number of AFL-CIO affiliated unions. For almost six months before the onset of
the 1969 strike, the UE and the lUE had been developing an understanding on the
presentation of economic issues and on allied cooperation with other unions. "All agreed
that come what may," unionists later recalled, "they would stick together."'" That would
be the key to success in negotiations with GE.
When picket lines went up on October 26, 1 969, the workers' demands were both
economic and contractual. Not only did rank and filers intend to obtain a wage increase,
they also attempted to deal a fatal blow to GE's take-it-or-leave-it approach to labor
relations. In his evaluation of the GE strike, Michael Harrington rightly pointed out that
"the issues which make the rank and file the most intransigent are those involving
Ronald L. Filippelli and Mark McColloch, Cold War in the Working Class: The Rise and
Decline ofthe United Electrical Workers (Albany, NY: State University ofNew York
Press, 1995), 1, 167.
'"james J. Matles and James Higgins, Them and Us: Struggles ofa Rank-and-File Union
(Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1974), 262.
94
whether they are treated as human beings or as cogs in a machine." ' Contrary to the
perception common in intellectual circles at the time, by the mid-1960s, life at work had
not been superseded by life outside work; there had not been a shift from the "primacy of
labor" to the "primacy of consumption." In sociologist David Halle's words, "Life at and
life outside the workplace coexist as usually separate spheres, sometimes in harmony,
more often in various degrees of tension. And life at work remains an important source
of class conflict that can take several forms." GE workers struck because their wages
lagged behind rising prices, but they also struck against "Boulwarism," the company's
paternalistic approach to negotiations.
Lemuel R. Boulware, the retired head of GE"s employee relations, had designed
"a formula"-which came to be known as "Boulwarism"- to weaken and destroy the
unions representing the corporation's workers. GE's method of negotiation was a year-
round program of "employee communications," which portrayed the corporation as the
sole defender of the workers' economic interests. GE allowed the unions to present their
contractual proposals for months before bargaining began. Before signing a contract,
however, GE would present a counterproposal on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. According
to James Crompton, chairman of the AFL-CIO Coordinated Bargaining Committee, the
Michael Harrington, "GE Strike Points Up Social Issues," Washington Star, 4
November 1969, newspaper clipping in GE Strike Files, Box 26, lUE Archives, Special
Collections and University Archives, Rutgers University Libraries (Hereafter RUL).
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company's technique rested "on the assumption that workers are primarily cost items and
like all costs, something to be minimized by any means."'^
Unionists used "Boulwarism" as a pejorative term meaning the refusal by
management to amend a first offer in labor negotiations. In the past, the UE and the lUE,
which represented seventy percent of GE's organized workers, had negotiated separate
contracts with the company. The smaller and isolated unions that represented the rest of
GE's employees were forced to bargain individually with the local plant management.
According to UE leader James Matles: "Everyone understood that this was no more than
marking time, that they were waiting until GE handed terms to UE and lUE."'"* The
corporation unveiled its offer in its own time, once workers had become impatient
enough to accept GE"s proposal. As soon as the terms had been announced, the company
tried to sign individual plant contracts as quickly as possible. By publicizing plant-by-
plant "'progress" in negotiations, GE created the impression that its offer was good
enough for the workers. Eventually, when GE said, "take it or leave it," UE and lUE had
no option but to take it.
By fostering antagonism among the different unions, GE had managed to make
the wages and working conditions of its employees inferior to those of other mass
production industries. On October 7, 1969, GE made its first offer. lUE president Paul
Jennings described it as "a horrible example of deceptive packaging which gives with one
AFL-CIO American Federationist, July 1970, 1.
"*Ibid., 251.
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hand and takes away with the other, adding up to one of the worst offers in GE history."''
Ahhough the biggest money-maker in the country, the corporation made the smallest
offer to its workers: twenty cents per hour the first year, nothing proposed for the second
and third years. This amounted to a 6 percent increase for the average employee. But
over the past three years, workers had lost 12.9 percent in raises due to cost-of-living
increases. The company offered practically nothing in pension, health, welfare, vacation
and holidays, and little in cost of living adjustments. The GE hospitalization plan was
"better than nothing," UE charged, but it was "next to nothing."'^ According to a 1969
UE News report, sick or injured GE workers got approximately fifty percent of their
regular wages. The company had not changed the plan for over thirteen years^ although
health care costs had increased considerably.'^
According to an lUE News editorial, the GE strike was "a fight for economic
1
8
justice, on-the-job dignity and true union recognition/' Workers expected to gain wage
increases in each of the three years of the contract, a cost of Hving protection, additional
holidays and vacations, and a fair sick leave plan. The striking unions also sought
substantial improvements in pensions. GE offered to raise the minimum pension from $
4.50 per month to $ 5.00 per month for each year of service; the unions were asking for a
15
'"GE's otter tar shorter ot worker needs," lUE News, 16 October 1969, 3.
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minimum of $ 7.50. Finally, workers were fighting for their right to take unresolved
grievances to arbitration as well as to engage in genuine contract negotiation.'^
Many new leftists saw in the GE walkout an opportunity to illustrate their new -
found faith in the working class as an agent of social change. Stanley Aronowitz" False
Promises (1973) is a good example of Herbert Marcuse"s popularity among new leftists
as well as of their disenchantment with trade unionism and. at times, with the workers
themselves. Like most radicals in the late 1960s, Aronowitz regarded unions as totally
integrated and subordinated to the large corporations. The 1969 GE strike, however, led
Aronowitz to concede:
Despite the conservative ideology of labor leaders and legal constraints upon
them, rank-and-file pressure today is occasionally (my emphasis) able to force
unions to lead the fight against employer efforts to transfer the working class the
burdens of recessions or the dislocations of the labor force that occur during
periods of technological change.
The Wall Street Journal conservatives shared the new leftists' low opinion of the
role that labor leadership played. According to the journal, union leaders launched a
crusade against "Boulwarism" only because this GE policy threatened "their own
political survival as union leaders.'* Under "Boulwarism," The Wall Street Journal
claimed, GE found out what its employees wanted, sought information directly and
through the unions, and balanced these desires against the company's situation, thus
making the best offer possible. Employees, the newspaper admitted, were
understandably concerned about inflation's inroads on their earnings. Substantial
^"^lUENews. 6 November 1969, 3
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increases, however, would be inflationary when the economy was sHpping into a
slowdown. This rhetoric was part of the barrage of anti-union propaganda designed to
confuse the issues connected with wages, prices, profits and inflation.^'
The radical students' and the conservatives' appraisals, however, differed on a
fundamental point. To the mainstream press, labor leaders needed the GE strike to
guarantee their political survival. To the new leftists, labor leaders had been compelled
by the rank-and-file to support the GE strike. One thing at least is clear: both the GE
workers and their union leaders - whatever their ulterior motives- viewed collective
bargaining as the most effective instrument in dealing with the corporation in the era of
monopoly capitalism.
The Wall Street Journal was not exceptional in its anti-union stand. By the end of
the strike, the organizers of the Citizens Committee to Support the GE Strikers claimed
that it was "a sad commentary on the state ofjournalism in America" that accounts by
Michael Harrington and Bayard Rustin should have been "the only columns to appear in
the press in support of the strike." Rustin's appeal to support the strikers was published
in thirty-two African-American newspapers. He contended that ''the security of every
worker in America, black or white, and the future of the collective bargaining process"
were at stake in the drive against GE. Harrington stressed the fact that GE could not take
"all the advantages in a boom of high profits and then expect the unions to be ascetics in
22
the name ot fighting inflation."
^'ibid.
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As wages failed to keep pace with soaring prices in the late 1960s, labor analysts
were alarmed at the rising family budget and at the fact that workers' purchasing power
had already fallen below the yearly average for 1965. Were the unions' demands for
wage increases as inflationary as the corporations claimed? In his Washington Star
column, Harrington provided a different explanation:
First of all, war and defense spending generally are, among their other tragic
aspects, inflationary, since they pay people but do not provide goods and services
on the domestic market. That is one more reason why, when the Vietnam horror
23
ends, it is so crucial to reduce military spending...
The AFL-CIO, however, neither presented the strike as an instance of "class
struggle," nor linked oppression by GE to the war in Vietnam or to U.S. imperialism. On
November 28, 1969, after the fourth week of the strike, AFL-CIO president George
Meany made the decision to take the dispute into the marketplace, and thus to build a
broader base of support for the campaign. The AFL-CIO president explained: "It is with
great reluctance but complete determination that we announce [...] a consumer boycott
24
against all General Electric products.'' A union advertisement, which appeared in
twenty-one major cities across the US, outlined the strike issues and called on consumers
to turn off GE. "We need your help," the ad stated, "and the help of every American who
25
believes in fair play."
The 1969 national boycott of GE products was the first ever to be called by the
AFL-CIO. This was not, however, the first time that American workers viewed
23
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themselves collectively as consumers rather than producers. As historian Dana Frank
says, 'The politics of consumption [...] have been central to class conflict and working-
class self-organization throughout U.S. history, in periods of both expansion and
retrenchment."^^ By the mid-1960s organized labor had adopted a more defensive
position toward consumption, but it could still mount boycotts under specific
circumstances. Cesar Chavez, the director of the United Farm Workers Organizing
Committee had revived the boycott as a labor tactic in 1968. The AFL-CIO leadership
fully supported Chavez' crusade to organize California farm workers, whose yearly
wages were far below the $ 3,000 poverty level. The mass boycott of table grapes was
crucial in the drive to grant farm workers the legal rights that most other workers already
held. To most Americans, it was clear that agribusiness exploited unorganized farm
workers.
The boycott of GE products was a different affair. The GE striking workers were
not only organized but also considerably better off than the California migrant farm
workers. Yet inflation and the price squeeze clearly showed the instability of American
blue-collar workers' "middle-class status." During the drive against GE, the AFL-CIO
did not draw exclusively upon working-class solidarity -as the Seattle Labor movement
had done in the 1920s- but on the widespread support of the American public. The
unions presented the GE strike and boycott as a contest with a "greedy" corporation that
26
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had a long record of contempt not only for collective bargaining but also for consumer
protection laws.
The boycott strategy quickly became a major target of criticism in the mainstream
press. Full-page company ads stated that "everybody loses" in a boycott and that a loss
of business by GE would bring a loss ofjobs. Regarding informational pickets outside
the stores, labor critics claimed that "the line between "information'' and coercion in such
circumstances [was] extremely fme."^^ Most newspapers failed to notice that the
company was also using coercion: General Electric had attempted to prevent welfare
payments to strikers in New York, Tennessee, Texas and other states.^^
During the 102-day strike, GE rank and filers proved to be capable of building
considerable community support. At St. Michael's hall in Lynn, Massachusetts, the
union served between 500 and 600 meals a day. In Akron, Ohio, the Hudson's Lumber
Company gave workers free wood to keep them warm on the picket line. Strikers could
also count on the money paid for picket-line duty and on donations from other workers.
Those with high skills living in industrialized areas were able to find interim jobs; others
went on welfare or simply dipped into their savings. Newspapers, however, seldom gave
workers any credit for the organizing effort that the strike and boycott against GE
demanded.
Wall Street Journal reporter David Gumpert explained how GE workers had
struck "the modem, painless way." As the workers had alternative sources of income,
Gumpert argued, "strikers did not suffer all that much." The favorable social and
28
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economic conditions in the U.S. had made it possible for the workers to hold out for so
long. Buttressing the myth of the "middle-class" blue-collar worker, Gumpert cited the
example of Robert Thompson, an 18-year veteran with GE: "When things looked bleak at
Christmas for the Thompson family, that symbol of middle-class opulence
-the Master
Charge credit card- came to rescue." The reporter added that the Thompsons had not yet
received the bills for the $400 worth of goods they had bought. America's prosperous,
middle-class society had taken care of the strikers.^^
The news coverage overlooked the fact that the GE workers' most powerful
weapon was the strike fund. James Matles, general secretary-treasurer of the UE,
proposed a $1 a week contribution from all union members in support of the GE strikers.
The UAW pledged to contribute up to $ 5 million to the eleven striking AFL-CIO unions.
In a telegram to Meany, UAW president Walter Reuther stated that winning the strike GE
was "the task of the entire labor movement" and invited the AFL-CIO president to meet
in Washington DC and discuss the details of the UAW proposal.^' Paul Jennings,
president of the lUE, found Reuther's "readiness to help meet the challenge of [...] the
historic struggle of the GE worker and his family [...] heartening," but Meany never
32
responded to Reuther' s telegram. In the end, the UAW simply deposited a million
dollar contribution in the name of the United Labor Defense Fund to Aid GE strikers.
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The UAW's "guarded conciliatory gesture toward its archrival," as the Wall Street
Journal described it, received a cool response from the AFL-CIO leadership. According
to Reuther's estimate, the AFL-CIO, which was nine times bigger than the UAW, should
have been able to contribute up to $ 45 million to the strike fund.^^ At the end of the
strike, however, contributions by AFL-CIO individual locals' amounted to approximately
34
$ 2.8 million.
The GE strike also gathered support outside the ranks of organized labor. Late in
November, the League for Industrial Democracy (LID) took the first steps towards
setting up the Citizens Committee to Support the GE Strikers. A. Philip Randolph, the
legendary trade unionist and founder of the Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters, helped
to assemble the Committee's sponsors and otTicers. Prominent Americans from the civil
rights movement, the religious community, the intellectual worid and the political scene
responded to Randolph's appeal. Former Illinois Senator Paul H. Douglas agreed to
serve as Chairman, Bayard Rustin as Vice Chairman, Father George B. Ford as treasurer,
and Tom Kahn as Coordinator.
Kahn was also the Executive Director of LID, a staunch anti-Communist and a
long-time foe of SDS. In The Sixties, Todd Gitlin portrays Kahn as "the son of a manual
laborer from Brooklyn" who was "full of class resentment of an SDS elite" that
disregarded both the labor movement and the liberal establishment. To Kahn, SDS
Charies B. Camp, "Reuther Vows to Seek Big Raises in 970; UAW Offers GE Strikers
Up to $ 5 million," Wall Street Journal, 10 November 1969.
^''gE Strike Contributions as of 2/12/70, GE Strike Files, Box 26, lUE Archives, RUL.
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regulars were "sort of playing a lot of intellectual games."'' During the GE strike, Kahn
welcomed the creation of a Youth Committee to Support the GE Strikers. Max Green
and Penn Kemble, the new committee's coordinators, reminded students that they were
"supporting the unions - not telling them how to run their strike,"^' and insisted that the
boycott of GE products was the area in which students could be most effective.
Student radicals did not intend to "teach" workers how to organize their drive
against GE, but many shared Stanley Aronowitz" view of the strike as "a unique
opportunity for the Left." Aronowitz argued that the GE struggle was giving radicals "a
chance to make the connections between corporate responsibility for imperialism and war
and the malevolent hypocrisy of this corporate leader and the conspiracy against
American workers" living standards and job conditions." Despite the factional divisions
that plagued SDS at the time, radicals found numerous ways of supporting the strikers.
In fact, some organizers of the Citizens Committee to Support the GE strikers were
concerned about "the low level of activity on the part of the official (my emphasis) Youth
Committee."
New leftists contributed money and food, walked on picket lines, boycotted all
GE goods and protested against GE recruiters on campus. Massachusetts' students were
the most militant in their support of the strikers. Anti-GE actions were staged at the
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Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Boston College, Holy Cross, Northeastern,
Boston University and the University of Massachusetts Amherst. On October 30 and 31,
1969, radical students along with a group of strikers from Lynn and Ashland picketed a
GE recruiter at MIT. The protesters sang "Solidarity" and chanted "Six, Five, Four,
Three; Organize to Smash GE!" Students saw such activism as an opportunity to protest
GE's exploitation of the workers in its plants, and more importantly, the company's
complicity in U.S. imperialism as the fourth largest defense contractor. Among the
slogans were "GE world scab" and "Ho, Ho, Ho Chi Minh."^^
Students at Boston College and Holy Cross also prevented GE personnel
recruiters from conducting interviews on campus. The Boston College SDS and the
Young People's Socialist League contended that, if the strike were to succeed, GE had to
be "shut down at all points," including campus recruiting. Their success had been "a
39
great boost to the BC students who participated." A similar action at Holy Cross
evolved into racial protest. One hundred members of the Revolutionary Student Union
blocked students from seeing GE recruiters. As protesting students chanted, "Workers
yes. GE no," counter demonstrators chanted, "Freedom yes. Students yes." This anti-
GE action resulted in the suspension of twelve white and four black students. The Black
Student Union contended that a disproportionate number of black demonstrators - four
out of five- had been selected for punishment. In protest, sixty-four black students -the
Old Mole, 7-21 November 1969, 7.
Old Mole, 21 November- 4 December 1969, 8.
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whole black student population- along with forty whites quit school until the sixteen
student demonstrators were reinstated by the Holy Cross administration.^^
At Boston University, an anti-GE demonstration ended in a bloody melee. About
a hundred SDS members tried to break up a seminar that George Meyer, a GE personnel
officer, was conducting at the BU Business School. As soon as the police arrived,
skirmishes broke out. Twenty-four students were arrested while three officers and a
number of protesters were injured. BU radicals, however, did not give up on their
struggle. On December 10, activists occupied the BU administration building for twenty-
seven hours. Among the students" demands were the banning of GE recruiters from
campus -unless they agreed to debate the strike against the company—and also the
university committing to participate in the AFL-CIO boycott of GE products. A few days
later, UE Local 205 Treasurer Charles Lovell and International Representative Florence
Criley delivered ''union thanks" at a meeting of 1,200 BU students. UE appreciated the
41
students' "wide support for the strike."
Striking workers were rarely involved in student demonstrations against GE on
university campuses. The protests at MIT, Boston College and Boston University are
examples of such participation. But the cooperation between students and workers was
highly limited. The strikers who directly supported the radical students' demonstrators
were overwhelmingly from the UE. If students were intent on using the GE strike to
connect corporate responsibility for U.S. imperialism to the Vietnam War, the UE's stand
40
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on the conflict made it easier for the radicals to estabhsh a link with some of the union
members.
Long an opponent of the Cold War, the UE had spoken against the Vietnam War
since 1965, when the U.S. had turned the conflict into an American war. In its
publications, the union linked the declining workers' living standards both to the war and
to raw corporate power. 'The current inflation,'" the UE News stated in July 1969, '"is
due to the sharp increase in military spending...and company price profiteering to take
advantage of these military expenditures."'*^ As one of the pillars of the military-
industrial complex, GE was a perfect target for the New Left: a corporation that both
fostered U.S. imperialism and exploited American workers.
Rather than the organizational worker-student alliance (WSA) that the
Progressive Labor faction envisioned, the cooperation between workers and radical
students resulted in more individual activism. Boston College activists claimed that,
although small, their protests had shown to "a few students" that workers were not
''redneck bigotsr and to ^^a few workers^' that radical students were not ^^spoiled kids who
43
hate their fathers/' New leftists tried to capitalize on the workers' determination to
oppose the power of GE. However, the similarities between the UE and the young
radicals should not be overstated. While the PLP worker-student alliance viewed trade
unionism as totally inadequate to improve the lot of the working class, the UE, as well as
the lUE, intended to protect the living standards of their members through collective
bargaining.
^^UE News, 2S My 1969, 6.
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At the University of Massachusetts, the GE strike brought the issue of working-
class affluence and conservatism to the forefront. Don GHckstein, the editor of the Daily
Collegian, the student newspaper, contended that the allegedly oppressed workers earned
a wage that was good enough for an American worker: $ 3.25/hour plus benefits.
Although he admitted that "Boulderism" was "unjust and illegal," the 20c/hour increase
that GE had offered was fair enough. Consequently, it was hypocritical for the SDS to
support the "racist lUE, or the UE, which had close ties with the "highly-Wallace
veering Auto Workers" and "the crime ridden Teamsters." Organized labor was not only
affluent, in Glickstein's view. It was racist and hawkish.
In a letter to the editor, SDS member Peter H. S. Dillard responded to Glickstein's
accusation. Dillard said that $3.25 amounted to $ 6,760 per year. This sum was well
below the $10,000 needed for a family of four, according to the federal govemment. The
new leftist added that it was "good propaganda to point out the figure $3.25/hr., to a
college community, since the average college kid.. .gets even less on his summer job and
remembers that he "made" it. Yet, most college students, Dillard claimed, were single
and not bound to spend the rest of their lives in a factory. Finally, he lamented such anti-
working sentiment among students who would graduate into "one of the most class-
45
oriented societies in the world."
Campus protests against GE also prompted a response from lUE leaders. To the
University of Massachusetts radicals" dismay, Paul Jennings sent them a letter of
"warning" the night before a campus sit-in to protest the presence ofGE recruiters.
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Violent protests, the president of the lUE asserted, would not help the strikers. At an
SDS meeting, students condemned Jennings for two reasons. First, SDS members
argued, his statement was also an attack on the rank-and-file strikers who had taken
militant action. Second, they felt that the recruiters had "no place on campus because
they were scabs." The UMass SDS chapter finally opted for a "non-obstructive"
demonstration and a petition to the administration, calling for the halt of GE recruitment
46
meetmgs on campus.
On December 12, 1969, about 20 members of the Students for a Democratic
Society at UMass staged a brief, peaceful sit-in outside the administration building.
Henry Lussier, secretary-treasurer of the New England lUE, met with the students and
told them that the union appreciated their support.'*^ He also asked the protesters to stop
distributing literature that contained misstatements of fact: it was not in the union's
interest to prevent the hiring of competent GE employees. The best way for students to
collaborate with the strikers, Lussier claimed, was to take part in the boycott of GE
products. In an official statement, the lUE leadership praised the efforts of "socially
conscious young people" who supported the GE strikers. However, the lUE president
disavowed "those who break up meeting and deny others their freedom of speech."
Campus disruptions worked to the advantage of the company, not the union or the
workers.
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lUE officials were embarrassed by supportive gestures coming from such groups
as the Progressive Labor Party or the Youth Revolutionary November Action Coalition.
The Boston Globe reported that some Lynn strikers were "downright hostile" toward both
the rhetoric and the tactics that the new leftists used. John Heim, aged thirty-three,
claimed: "We don't want to smash GE. We want to return to work after this strike is
over." Mai Mitchell, another employee at the Lynn plant, told the newspaper that
workers preferred to demonstrate in their own way, "picketing without violence." Many
strikers also feared that the students were simply trying to gamer publicity for
themselves. The unions welcomed the students" support as long as it was confined to
helping conduct a boycott of GE. Peter Di Cicco, business agent of striking Local 201 of
the lUE preferred the student demonstrators to follow the "union's guidelines,
Historian Peter Levy rightly claims that "the New Left's collaboration with the
lUE and the AFL-CIO was built on a shakier foundation" than the cooperation between
the UE and the student activists. Contrary to Levy's conclusion, the AFL^CIO did not
eventually "warm" to the new leftists' participation in the unions' drive against GE.
Jennings issued a "Statement On Confrontation Tactics, Vietnam and the General Electric
Strike." The lUE president admitted that there were "many well-meaning students who
wantfed] to join their support for the strike to their opposition to the war in Vietnam,"
but, to the AFL-CIO, this was "a serious mistake." The GE strikers, Jennings explained,
wanted the "support of responsible anti-war students" as well as that of "others on the
49
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campuses, in the general public, and [their] own rank and file - who [had] different views
on Vietnam.
In an AFL-CIO American Federationist article, entitled "American Youth: Which
Way Now?" Kahn chastised the New Left for being "a melange of grouplets, projects and
styles with no shared sense of direction, and very often, with profound and even bitter
internal differences." Nevertheless, Kahn admitted, numerous students had responded
positively to highly publicized labor struggles such as the farm workers strike and the
nation wide campaign against GE. In Kahn's view, LID had helped build student-worker
collaboration through workshops, student-labor institutes and different action projects.^'
This attempt to strengthen the ties between the labor and academic communities,
however, was far from the "revolutionary" coalition that some SDS factions had sought
when turning to the labor movement in the winter of 1969-70.
James Higgins, a staff contributor for The Nation, argued that the GE strike had
been a turning point in the relations between intellectuals and organized labor. For the
first time since the upheavals of the 1960s, "union and campus" had "been talking
,.52
together." This cooperation paved the way for a more formal academic-labor alliance
in October of 1 970. Among the alliance's promoters were MIT professor and Nobel
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Prize winner George Wald; Harold Gibbons, vice-president of the Teamsters; Leonard
Woodcock, president of the UAW; and Joseph Rhodes Jr., Harvard Junior fellow.
Members of the alliance-s executive committee were intent on redirecting public
attention from "student unrest and "permissiveness"'" to issues that troubled the working
class, such as unemployment, inflation, and racial injustice."
New leftists, however, did not maintain the newly developed cooperation between
campus and union. As Higgins admitted, "the definitive character of the student
movement in the US...has been its rootlessness. To date, this has been both strength and
a weakness. A strength in that it has enabled the New Left to stay clear of outgrown
institutional forms and functions. But a weakness ... in that there is no permanent base of
support, nothing from which consistent operations can be constructed."^'' This undercut
the possibility of an alliance between radical students and the rank and file. Despite the
support it provided, new leftists were not instrumental during the GE strike.
Many factors allowed the fifteen striking unions to maintain a strong coalition
until a settlement was reached. In order to rally widespread support behind the GE
workers, the unions appealed not only to its members but also to the general public. In
their counterattack on the company's anti-labor propaganda, the unions presented GE as a
greedy profiteer, a "Robber Baron" whose 1968 return on investment had been 22 percent
above the average for the nation's industrialists. This figure, the unions contended, was
easy to explain: it resulted from unusually low wages -worker exploitation- as well as
53
Deborah Shapley, "Labor-Link: Union Heads, Academic Leaders Discuss Alliance,"
Science 170, 30 October 1970, 516,518.
54
Higgms, 174.
113
unusually high prices, consumer exploitation. By calling a nationwide boycott against
GE products, the AFL-CIO took the dispute into the marketplace and thus made it
possible for the public to join in a labor cause.
Although the company claimed that GE"s ^'most important product" was
"progress,'- organized labor let the public know that it was "profit " The corporation had
a long history of price-fixing and antitrust violations. Since 191 1, GE had been the
defendant in 65 antitrust cases, 49 of them filed between 1959 and 1969. The last big
price-fixing indictment dated from 1960 and involved $ 1.75 billion in sales. By the end
of the strike, the UE stated, "Millions of Americans [had] seen in the General Electric
Company a prime example of corporate arrogance."^^
References to a new "Robber Baron era" were not unusual in the labor press as
the 1960s came to a close. In a review of Ferdinand Lundenberg's The Rich and the
Super Rich (1968), Steel Labor asserted that the years of the great family fortunes when
wealth was concentrated in a few hands were not over. '^Not only are they still with us,"
he said, "but bigger than ever- they own most of the action in America today."" In a
similar vein, Ray MacDonald, an AFL-CIO research economist, condemned "the
corporate octopus." The 1960s movement toward concentration of economic power,
MacDonald argued, surpassed the peaks of the two previous merger waves in the 1900s
and the 1920s. The consolidation of new conglomerates affected both consumers and
'^UENews, 1 December 1969, 6
^^"Back Again By Popular Demand," 7Vo/a Express, 5-18 December 1969; UE News, 9
February 1970,3.
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114
workers. It raised the prices of goods and services and posed potential problems for
collective bargaining.'^^
According to the UE general officers, the unity of the UE and the lUE at the
bargaining table was sustained because both unions "cast aside anything which interfered
59
with winning their fight " The unions' clashing positions on the Vietnam War
constituted, undoubtedly, the major rift between the two. The UE repeatedly argued that
inflation was caused not only by GE"s profiteering on civilian goods but also by its
extraordinary gains on selling military equipment. GE profits on defense contracts, a
1969 UE report stated, were "25 percent higher than they were during the 1959-1963
period, before the War in Vietnam."^*^ For its part, lUE remained consistent with the
AFL-ClO's support of American foreign policy, never referring to GE as a pillar of the
military-industrial complex. Union ads meant to counteract the company's propaganda
did not tie organized labor to the antiwar movement in any way.
The union coalition's approach to the strike won widespread backing. This in
turn enthused the workers with a renewed militancy. Baltimore employee Hugh
McCrukin Jr. explained: "People can't believe that the company is doing this to the
workers because GE has a big name. They didn't believe the company was so bad. With
the prices they sell the appliance in the market, they couldn't believe GE pays the
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workers so little." Community groups gave sandwiches and coffee to pickets. Fire
stations were open to collect food for the strikers. Workers were invited to explain their
grievances before religious groups. Teachers designed special material to discuss the
strike with their pupils. Retired workers contributed money. Nationally known writers,
scientists, editors, lawyers and public officials requested aid for the GE employees.
Hundreds of local unions collected money for the strike fund. Was this, as union leaders
claimed, "a glowing chapter in the history of American Labor"?^^
The three-month strike ended with the first negotiated settlement with GE in
twenty years. "Our members have nailed shut the casket of Boulwarism," claimed
Jennings. The company's take-it-or-leave-it dictates for collective bargaining had
collapsed. The agreement provided 50c an hour across-the-board wage increases; pay
increases of 55c to 75c an hour for high-skill workers, and four cost-of-living adjustments
in a forty month period. More importantly, general wage hikes were in cents per hour
rather than percentages. This was intended to help those workers who earned the least
63
and were hurt the most by the increasing cost of living and geographical differentials.
The unions also won a new minimum pension of $ 6.50 per month for each year
of service, the company's first offer had been $ 5.00. The settlement also included
numerous health insurance improvements: payment of the full cost of a semi-private
room and miscellaneous hospital expenses for 365 days, plus elimination of the
^^UENews, 17 November 1969, 7
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contributory aspect of employee insurance. Moreover, workers obtained a fifth week of
vacation after 30 years of service, and a fourth week after 15, rather than 20 years. There
had been real negotiation and GE's management had moved substantially in the course of
the bargaining. The final settlement was far better than GE's October 7 and December 6
offers. In wages and cost-of-living adjustments, the difference resulting from movement
by the company since the December proposal was almost 20 cents an hour. To the lUE
president, the new contract was "an incredible victory, won by the strikers through unity,
determination, courage and militancy."^"*
New leftists, for their part, regarded "the strike itself as "far more significant
than the settlement." Radicals viewed the renewed labor militancy as highly promising.
Some workers, they contended, had started to see the connections between the oppressive
GE policy and the U.S. government goals in Vietnam. New leftists nevertheless still
considered collective bargaining to be inadequate since it recognized the company's right
to make millions of dollars in profits each year while paying meager wages to employees
who had little control over production. To the radicals, GE had the last word in the strike
by announcing, on February 6, a 3 percent price increase on all major appliances.^^
When a long strike ends in contemporary capitalist society, the media usually
point out that workers would have "saved" a lot ofmoney -and trouble- if they had settled
for the last offer that the company made. This is based on the assumption that all strikes
are "only" about money. As Michael Harrington argued, however, strikes "are often
Ibid., 1-3.
Old Mole, 20 February- 5 March 1970, 8.
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concerned with much deeper, more social emotions and values, with the right of men and
women to have, as some of the current theorists of American labor put it, a 'voice.'"''
Harrington did not aim to romanticize the workers' drive against GE but to stress
the fact that vigorous wage demands from the rank and file call for considerable
organization and coordination and involve the workers' identity both at and outside the
workplace. The fact that workers viewed themselves as "consumers" as well as
"producers" did not necessarily mean that they had become incapable of challenging the
power of corporate America. In a message addressed to high school students, GE strikers
from Ashland, Massachusetts, summarized their aims: "We expect to work hard, but we
want honest pay for it and we want an end to the back-breaking speed-up." Rank and
filers also made it clear to the students that the corporation's attitude affected everybody:
GE tried to "get people to pay the highest possible price for the products" that workers
made.
The GE strike brought to light a number of important facts about American
workers in the late 1960s. Blue-collar workers were not fully integrated into the middle
class. At best, they nibbled at the edges of affluence. At worst, they were below the
poverty line. Contrary to what political analysts Richard M. Scammon and Ben J.
Wattenberg claimed, "The Social Issue" had not come to replace the "old-fashioned"
economic concerns. On December 21, 1969, the Citizens Committee placed an ad in the
New York Times headlined. "A Word About Some Forgotten Americans." GE workers
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were some of the "forgotten Americans," but they were not the quiescent members of
Nixon's "silent majority." The sponsors of the advertisement stressed the fact that these
forgotten Americans were not "the poorest of the poor;" they were not "unemployed or
unemployable;" and they did not work in "marginal industries or in sweatshops;" they
worked for a corporate giant. Readers were urged to express their solidarity with the GE
workers by joining a picket line, boycotting GE products or making a contribution."'
Even if radical students were among the most supportive of the GE workers, they
still viewed trade unions as bureaucratic and manipulative institutions that could only
obtain the quantitative economic demands that the leaders framed. The GE strike,
however, was not ''merely" about bread-and-butter issues. It was also about power.
Rank and tilers were confronting an international corporation that had held an
intransigent position for over twenty years. The New Left revolutionary project,
however, did not appeal to the overwhelming majority of workers. To the radical
students" disappointment, workers still resorted to collective bargaining and to labor
unions. Yet, this did not necessarily mean support for the status quo. In Them and Us,
James Matles contends that "seeds for change in the labor movement are sown among
69
rank-and-file workers by the conditions forced upon them." By the end of the GE
strike, it remained to be seen if the seeds for change would grow.
"A Word About Some Forgotten Americans," New York Times, 21 December 1969, GE
Strike II, lUE/UE, Box 26, lUE Archives, RUL.
^^Matles, 304.
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CHAPTER 4
THE GM STRIKE
After the settlement that ended the 102-day GE strike, union leaders insisted that
the workers' victory had "severely limited the ability of the fourth wealthiest corporation
in the United States to unilaterally dispose of the welfare of the working people and their
families."' Throughout 1970, blue-collar workers continued to make headlines as they
tried to "limit the ability" of the Big Three automobile manufacturers
-the General
Motors Corporation, the Chrysler Corporation and Ford Motor Company- to set the tenns
of a new three-year contract with the United Automobile Workers (UAW). White House
economists regarded the results of the automobile negotiations as crucial since they were
bound to set the pattern for talks in other industries and thus have a decisive impact on
the U.S. economy. Following the auto settlement, contracts would be negotiated in the
steel, copper, can, railroads, meatpacking, and aerospace industries as well as in the
postal service.
Early in 1970, Richard Nixon claimed that the nation's economy was slowly but
appreciably recovering from its 1969 slump and exhorted both organized labor and
management to avoid inflationary settlements. Gradualism characterized the Nixon
Administration's economic agenda in 1969 and 1970, as the president waited for fiscal
and monetary policies to do their slow job of stimulating economic growth. The
combination of fiscal austerity and monetary restraint, however, eventually plunged the
'"A statement from the General Officers of the United Electrical, Radio and Machine
Workers of America (UE)," UE News, February 1970, 3.
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country into a recession. By mid-1970, Robert M. Collins contends, "The economy was
mired in a new condition
-"stagflation"- which combined the problem of inflation with
sluggish output and rising unemployment."' It was clear to Nixon's most realistic
advisors that the state of the economy could prove the Republicans" Achilles heel in the
November congressional elections. The UAW could choose to mount a strike not only
against the General Motors Corporation but also against the administration and the
Republican Party.
The UAW did both. As contract negotiations collapsed, the union decided to
stage a walkout against GM, the world's largest, most powerful and profitable
manufacturing enterprise. By 1970, the corporation employed around 800,000 workers
woridwide, paid more than 1.7 billion dollars in taxes and spent 200 million dollars on
advertising. It sold 52 percent of the cars, 49 percent of the trucks and 80 percent of the
buses bought in the United States.^ There is no doubt that the autoworkers were taking
on the toughest target that they could find. The strike against GM became a test case for
both the UAW and the Nixon Administration. The walkout revealed the extent to which
the various tensions within the union membership could -or could not- be overcome. In
an off-year election, moreover, the economic and political impact of the GM strike tested
Nixon's ability to capture the working-class vote that he so badly needed. As the
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economic downturn deepened, the president's greatest challenge was to win the support
of organized labor.
As the year began labor leaders were unwavering in their criticism of the
administration's economic policies. The AFL-CIO Executive Council periodically issued
reports that described a bleak economic outlook. Throughout the first quarter of 1 970.
the AFL-CIO leadership insisted that "the worst combination of economic trends
continue[d] to plague the American people.*" The inflation rate kept rising from 4.2
percent in 1968, to 5.4 percent in 1969 to nearly 6 percent in the first quarter of 1970.
Unemployment had jumped from 1.1 million in 1969 to 3.9 million in early 1970: this
equaled 4.7 percent of the work force. The AFL-CIO Executive Board claimed that the
Nixon Administration had chosen "economic restraint instead of "selective measures to
aid the economy." In the union leaders' view, three factors were slowing down the
economy, depressing residential construction and causing rising employment: tight
money, high interest rates and the reduction of federal appropriations for essential
4
government programs. Despite its negative appraisal of the government's economic
approach, the AFL-CIO Executive Council showed its willingness to collaborate with the
administration under very specific circumstances:
If the President determines that the situation requires overall stabilization
measures [...] the AFL-CIO will cooperate. But such mandatory controls must be
equitably placed on all costs and incomes -including all prices, profits, dividends,
5
rents and executive compensation, as well as employees' wages and salaries.
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UAW president Walter Reuther, George Meany's archrival, was less sympathetic
to the president's call for restraint in the negotiations between the UAW and the
automobile industry. Reuther acknowledged that the economic climate was not
favorable, considering that there were more than 100,000 autoworkers laid off. Yet the
UAW president asserted that "no corporation [was] going to hide behind Mr. Nixon's
recession and try to deny [auto workers] ...equity." Reuther stressed the incredible
profitability of the American auto industry. From 1947 to 1969, General Motors, Ford
and Chrysler, Reuther said, had combined earnings of $ 35 billion. This figure was
equivalent to a return 14 times greater than their total investments. Autoworkers were
entitled to a share of those profits and the UAW was "prepared to fight for that equity on
the picket lines in 1970." As Nelson Lichtenstein claims, "Walter Reuther seemed ready
to strike out on his own, to test his new freedom with neither Lyndon Jolinson nor George
Meany looking over his shoulder." The UAW president's immediate challenge was to
face a tough bargaining season and meet the expectations of a fractious membership.^
In the late 1960s, Reuther had been involved in many battles outside and inside
the UAW. As we have seen, the UAW leadership had been stunned by George Wallace's
popularity with white autoworkers in 1968. Though they had been able to swing many
autoworkers back into the Democratic column in November, it was clear that racism cut
deeply through the white rank-and-file. Racism on the shopfloor, meanwhile, had led
radicalized black workers to organize dissident rank-and-file groups that fueled "black
power" ideology in the plants. The Dodge Revolutionary Union Movement (DRUM)
^
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formed in 1968 and soon had offshoots in several other plants, such as the Jefferson
Avenue Revolutionary Movement (JARUM) and the Eldom Revolutionary Movement
(ELRUM) at the Eldon Gear and Axle plant. The RUMs were black Marxist-Leninist
groups that opposed the UAW leadership as much as they antagonized the company.
They accused the union of perpetuating in-plant racism and sub-standard working
conditions. Because of their revolutionary ideology and overt hostility towards white
workers, these groups soon became isolated. Their importance, however, should not be
underestimated. The RUMs, contends Heather Ann Thompson, "had made the issue of
racism central in ways that the UAW leadership had never done, and they had challenged
the assumption that the leadership was always acting aggressively on the workers'
behalf"^
The 1970 round of contract negotiations took place amid these internal tensions.
Mainstream publications dutifully covered the developments at the UAW, beginning with
the union's April collective bargaining convention in Atlantic City. The union adopted a
program for negotiations with the Big Three that stressed the losses workers had suffered
as a result of inflation and called for substantial across-the-board wage increases and
restoration of full cost-of-living protection. The delegates also voted that the union
should have a pension goal of $500 per month at 30 years of credited service, regardless
of age. "The loudest and longest thunderclap of applause," the UA IV Solidarity reported,
"boomed through the Atlantic City Convention Hall" when Walter Reuther voiced his
Heather Ann Thompson, "Auto Workers, Dissent, and the UAW: Detroit and
Lordstown," in Robert Asher and Ronald Edsforth, eds., Autowork (Albany: State
University ofNew York, 1995), 190-191.
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wholehearted support for the 30 years-and-out retirement program. The UAW president
told the 3,142 delegates:
We have understood this demand. You do not have to be a social psychologist toknow why It is that there is a deep human urge on the part of a worker who has
been buckmg a Ime for 30 years and who wants to get out of the rat race in the
plant... Frankly, had 1 been bucking the line for 30 years I would have been
raising hell about that a long time ago.^
[e m
Reuther wanted his union to win what Newsweek called "the fattest packag(
UAW history." Moreover, he rightly claimed that rank-and-filers were solidly behind
him. When Reuther and his wife lost their lives on a plane crash shortly after the
convention, many thought that much of the zest of battle in the negotiations between the
UAW and the Big Three would soon die. Yet, contrary to most analysts' predictions,
Leonard Woodcock, who took charge of the union 55 days before negotiations started,
skillfully guided the UAW through the summer bargaining, the autumn strike, the winter
settlement, and the workers' ratification of the pact. In a mid-term election year marred
by recession, the GM strike, which idled 394,000 autoworkers for almost two months,
took on special relevance.
Most analysts agreed that Reuther' s successor was likely to be UAW vice-
president Douglas Fraser, but he withdrew from the competition for the union presidency,
The UAW Executive Council eventually elected Woodcock, who had been the head of
9
the UAW's General Motors Department since 1955. The upcoming contract
negotiations offered Woodcock an opportunity to prove his leadership skills. As
president of the UAW. he could have delegated the task of negotiating with General
^"Reuther Urges "Total Fight" for Key '70 Proposals," 8
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more
Motors to another nicnibcr of the Executive Board, but he decided to get directly
involved in the bargaining process. The mainstream media portrayed Woodcock as
''businesslike,"
"professional;' and "generally unemotional" than his predecessor.'"
Some observers believed that the union's change in leadership would avert a strike. Yet
when the Big Three delivered their first economic offer in September, it was clear that the
adversaries were far apart. Woodcock would try to live up to the union's reputation for
tough bargaining.
The companies offered a wage increase of 7.5 percent for the first contract, and 3
percent for the following two years. The Big Three also expected to keep the existing
ceiling of 8 cents an hour a year on cost of living adjustments. Proposed changes in
Supplemental Unemployment Benefits (SUB) were small: only one cent an hour per
worker would be added to the SUB fund. The corporations also offered an unbroken
Christmas- New Year's holiday but proposed no improvements in vacations, overtime or
seniority. Finally, workers would have to pay part of the increasing health care insurance
11
costs.
"Grim-faced United Auto Workers officials," The Detroit Free Press reported,
"quickly rejected the three-year contract offers from the automotive Big Three." The
UAW sought "substantial" wage increases, as much as a 16 to 20 percent hike for the
first year. More importantly, the union aimed to remove the cap on the cost of living
allowance (COLA) and to obtain greater supplemental unemployment benefits, which
provided workers with income protection in the event of short-term layoffs. As far as
""Heading for the Strike Nobody Wants," A/t^w.vwcv/:, 14 September 1970, 79,
The Detroit Free Press, 2 September 1 970. 1
.
126
pensions were concerned, autoworkers wanted $ 500 a month, after 30 years in the plants,
regardless of age. Apart from the unbroken Christmas-New Year's holiday that the Big
Three offered, the union was demanding longer vacations and the right of workers to
refuse overtime. While the companies expected their employees to share the cost of
health insurance, the UAW called for a company-paid dental plan plus improved health-
care coverage. After the corporations had announced their first offer, Irving Bluestone,
co-director of the GM's department, pointed out, "the gap is enormous in every area."'^
The UAW's demands heightened the debate on a number of economic and social
issues directly related to blue-collar life. The corporations as well as many political
analysts argued that wage increases in the auto industry would be inflationary. Union
leaders responded that there was not a "wage-price" spiral; a "price-wage*" spiral drove
inflation. Autoworkers were demanding higher wages because their purchasing power
had been significantly eroded since the UAW signed its previous contract in 1967.
Corporate leaders, for their part, complained that absenteeism had doubled in the past ten
years, from two and a half percent a day to more than five percent. Moreover, younger
members of the work force were absent more often than were other workers. This was
allegedly the result of the widely publicized "blue-collar blues." If the 30-and-out
program was approved, the auto makers claimed, plants would be made inefficient, since
the retirement plan that the union proposed was bound to deplete the companies of their
most reliable employees.
During the UAW's negotiations with the Big Three, it became evident that "old
fashioned" economic issues were still central, as they had been at GE. The autoworkers
'^ibid.
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were often thought of as the aristocrats of the blue-collar world. But in fact the average
blue-collar employee at any of the Big Three auto corporations earned $ 9,599 in 1969.
This sum was below the minimum required for "modest but adequate'" income, according
to government figures. Inflation had taken its toll on autoworkers' purchasing power.
Under the UAW's 1964 contract, workers had been guaranteed an extra penny an hour
for each gain of four-tenths of a point in the government's consumer price index, no
matter how high the index climbed. In 1967. the UAW had agreed to limit such increases
to a maximum of 16 cents over the three years of the contract. Had the union not agreed
to a cost-of-living cap, by 1970 the autoworkers would have been receiving 26 cents an
hour over and above the 16 cents that autoworkers were now drawing.'^ In view of the
increasing inflation and unemployment, the UAW considered a return to the original
cost-of-living clauses to be crucial. For the contract's first year, the union called for an
eight percent increase over 1970 base pay rates. Added to that would be the 26 cents an
hour cost-of-living "overage" that workers considered "owed" to them, plus another five
cents an hour from the increase in living costs between April and July 1970. That
14
amounted to an average wage increase of 61.6 cents an hour.
"Non-economic" demands such as the 30-and-Out retirement plan and the
elimination of compulsory overtime reflected grievances directly related to working
conditions in auto plants and to the nature of assembly-line work itself Autoworkers
commonly complained about speed-ups, long hours, unhealthy and unsafe environment
and short breaks. Throughout 1970 autoworkers' stories appeared in a wide range of
'^"Heading for the Strike Nobody Wants," 80.
'"*"
Analysis of GM's Latest Economic Offer," UAW Solidarity, October 1970, 4
128
publications. Even Fortune, the quintessential business magazine, devoted two articles to
a thorough and empathetic discussion of the "blue-collar blues" on the assembly line. In
fact, the auto corporations were particularly concerned about blue-collar workers'
discontent, as absenteeism was becoming a growing malady in the plants. The effect of
missing men and women on an assembly line that depends on the unbroken chain of
willing hands is obvious. Management officials, union leaders and intellectuals alike
attempted to develop theories for such a phenomenon.
The workers themselves provided the most persuasive explanations. Grover
Moses, an assembly line worker at the Ford River Rouge Complex in suburban Detroit,
told a Detroit Free Press reporter: "I dropped my glasses yesterday and 1 didn't have
time to pick them up for two hours. You get behind and you can never catch up. They
never stop coming at you." Moses was twenty-eight, had worked at Ford for seven years
and had had to take a week off -without pay- for being absent too often. Henry Wilson,
another Ford Rouge assembly man, explained: "Each year the line is a little faster and the
man with a stopwatch watches you all day and has the foreman add a little extra to your
job.. .In three days, you do five days work."
^
The increasing number of younger workers on the auto plants was undoubtedly
linked to the growing absenteeism. At the General Motors Corporation, for instance, out
of a total of 394,000 workers represented by the UAW, 1 14,000 were under twenty-five
years of age. It was a fact of factory life that the more seniority a worker had, the easier
the job he was assigned. Because their jobs were more onerous, some analysts argued.
Tom Ricke, "The Workers' View From the Line," The Detroit Free Press, 20
September 1970, Section B, 1.
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the younger workers stayed away from the plant more often. The UAW leadership also
recognized the problem of absenteeism among the younger work force. Shortly before
his death, Walter Reuther said:
I believe that the most important factor is a new breed of worker who is not as
willmg to accept the discipline of the work place and to have a management
decision that vetoes what he considers to be an individual decision on how he
lived his life.
The UAW president told both managers and union leaders that to solve the problem of
absenteeism workers had to be given "a sense of worth and dignity" and not be treated as
an "extension of the production process."'^ Although many reports pointed to boredom
and monotony as the major causes for blue-collar workers' restlessness, discontent often
stemmed from a plant management system that workers considered oppressive and union
contract gains that they regarded as insufficient to offset the corporations" excesses.
At age twenty-nine, Gary R. Bryner, president of the 8,200-member Local 1 1 12 in
Lordstown, Ohio, had become one of the most vocal leaders of the UAW's "new breed of
worker" that Reuther had described. Bryner insisted that there was a question of
"manliness in being able to stand up to the giant." When the General Motors Assembly
Division moved to his plant, the young unionist remembered, Lordstown became the
most automated and fastest line in the world. GM production managers constantly used
stopwatches and told assembly line workers how many seconds or hundreds of seconds it
took to walk from one place to another; how many seconds it took to shoot a screw; how
fast the gun turned; how deep was the screw's hole. At one point, GM even tried to take
'^Jack Crellin, "Young worker to have his day in auto talks," The Detroit Times, 26 July
1970, Section A, 23.
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the newspapers off the line, Bryner recalled. The young leader claimed that in the
numerous local disputes with management, assembly workers were telling GM:
We perspire, we sweat, we have hangovers, we have feelings and emotions, and
we re not about to be placed in a category of a machine. When you talk about that
watch, you talk about it for a minute. We talk about a lifetime.
To the younger workers, Bryner argued, the most important incentive was not to make an
extra dollar but to keep their senses while on the assembly line and to have the prospects
of more leisure time.'^
Many autoworkers shared those feelings. In late August, as negotiations between
the union and General Motors heated up, the UAW's 30 and Out National Committee
paid for an ad in Detroit's newspapers presenting voluntary retirement after thirty years
of service as ^Ihe number one issue." This grass roots demand, the committee argued,
aimed at giving men who had spent thirty years in a plant "more of those Golden Years
18
ot retirement." Gary Blonston, a Detroit Free Press writer, stressed the fact that 30 and
Out was "not an issue concocted by the hierarchy of Solidarity House," but rather "the
19
product of a long-term, widespread, grassroots campaign." The prospects of voluntary
early retirement appealed to autoworkers of all ages. For the senior blue-collar workers,
the major motivation was leaving the plants with enough money to enjoy life while they
could still do so. To younger workers, 30 and Out meant something else: every time a
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worker with 30 years of service decided to retire, he opened up a possibility for a younger
employee to move up the job hierarchy in the plant.
The 30-and-Out plan was anathema to the Big Three management. Earl R.
Bramblett, GM vice-president for personnel and head of its bargaining team, viewed most
of the UAWs demands as
-fantastic'" and "deliberately vague''. He was particularly
outraged, however, at the union's proposed 30-and-Out plan. The major objection was
"the potential loss of experienced skilled trades employees." In September 1970, the
number of (IM hourly employees with thirty or more years of service reached 16,820; out
of these, almost one third were skilled workers. Replacement of these employees would
be extremely costly for GM. Using the on-the job-employee-in-training method,
Bramlett argued, it took eight years for an unskilled worker to become a journeyman.
Moreover, the GM vice-president did not regard monotony on the job. harsh discipline or
poor working conditions as causing the increasing absenteeism on the plants. In
Bramlett's opinion, the nation's economic abundance along with the industry's high
degree of security and social benellts allowed autoworkers to insist on even more benefits
and improvements. Bramlett insisted that the union's demands were "just too many and
21
too high."
On September 1 1 , GM presented a new contract offer to the 1 1AW. According to
the corporation, this was a final offer. Although the union quickly rejected it and
announced that the walkout was inevitable, the proposal was a substantial improvement
20
"Statement by GM's Bramblett," The Detroit News, 14 September 1970, Section A, 12,
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over the Big Three's offer of September 1. GM offered the UAW a 9.8 percent wage
hike over a three-year period, compared with the original 7.5 percent. This increase
would mean an additional 38 cents an hour the first year and 12 cents an hour in each of
the next two years. I he corporation also lifted the ceiling on the cost of living allowance
from 16 cents to 28 cents over the life of the contract, fhe UAW was asking for a 61.5
cent an hour in increase in the first year and an unspecified boost after that. The proposal
was silent on the union's demand for a dental care program and for improved benefits for
retired workers. Finally, in order to address the 30-and-out demand, GM offered its
employees the option of retiring at any age after thirty years of service but placed
limitations on the benefits a retiree could receive. At age 58, an autoworker would retire
on a monthly $500 pension. This amount, however, would be reduced by 8 percent a
year when an employee retired prior to the minimum age of 58. "The burden of
supporting large numbers of workers in a period of long retirement," Bramlett insisted,
"...was a responsibility that neither the U.S. economy or any industry [could] afford to
22
assume."
From the beginning of the negotiations between the automobile industry and the
UAW, the company spokesmen had stressed the fact that it was in the interests of the
entire American economy to reach a non-inllalionary settlement. Michael Harrington, a
UAW ally, described the corporation's position as "the myth of greedy workers forcing
23
civic-minded corporations into an inflationary spiral." For his part. Woodcock depicted
^^"Statement by GM's BrambleU," 12
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GM as a "monstrous monopoly" and accused it of "chiseling and cheating" in drafting its
economic offer. The possibility of a strike against GM, Woodcock stated, loomed large.
A walkout against the nation's biggest manufacturer could deplete the union's $ 120-
million strike fund within eight weeks. Nevertheless, Woodcock said, the UAW would
conduct any such strike in the "old fashioned way," by depending on other unions'
support and cutting down on strike benefits.'' Despite the UAW's disaffiliation from the
AFL-CIO and the clear differences between the two labor organizations, the AFL-CIO
voiced its support for the autoworkers. In an attempt to preserve profits, Meany said, the
Nixon Administration sacrificed the workers' earnings. The AFL-CIO leader warned:
"The reaction of America's organized workers to this unjust and unfair economic policy
is obvious. They can -and they will—seek to redress their grievances [...] at the
25
collective bargaining table."
President Nixon was well aware of the fact that workers could also "seek to
redress their grievances" at the ballot box. In 1968, Nixon had built a conservative
political base -the American middle class of business and professional people, farmers,
skilled workers, suburbanites, and the "new South"- that had given him a very narrow
margin of victory. Maintaining this coalition would guide White House politics for some
time. It was clear to Nixon that the first major political test of his administration would
be in the congressional election. To maintain its coalition, the Republican Party needed
24
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the support oforgani/ed labor. Dissalisllcd blue-collar workers represented a potent
political force and the key to building real majority;- In 1970, the president lelt
pressed to prove that Washington was hearing the blue-collar blues; accordingly, he made
several political moves, i-irst, the adnunistration issued a study by assistant secretary oC
labor .lerome M. Rosow, which sympathetically described the frustrations and concerns
of blue-collar workers. Second, on Labor Day, Nixon hosted about two hundred union
leaders and their wives "at a banquette under the glittering chandeliers of the Fa.st Room
of the White 1 louse."^^
(leorge Meany was the guest of honor at the extravagant Labor Day dinner.
Nixon toasted the AI L-CIO president and praised him as ''a pillar in the storm—strong,
lull of character, devoted to his church, devoted to his family, ..standing with his country
when he felt that served the interest of freedom." f ollowing the president's toast, Meany
stood up and started his reply by saying that, regardless of their political differences, all
the presidents that he had known had shared something: they had all wanted to be the best
president they could possibly be for the American people. And then, with a nod toward
Nixon, he concluded: " This applies to this man here. I may be bouncing on your head
27
tomorrow mornmg, but this goes tonight."
Meany "s comments in a pre-Labor Day interview prompted a number of articles
and editorials on Nixon's relationship with organized labor. I he Al L-C'IO president
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reiterated organized labor's support of the president's policies on the Vietnam War and
domestic unrest but repeated his disapproval of the administration's economic policies.
The Democrats could not escape Meany's criticism either: he insisted that the party was
"disintegrated" and about to be taken over by "extremists." Some analysts interpreted
Meany's statement as a political tactic. The AFL-CIO president was warning the
Democratic Party not to take labor's support for granted and lean farther Icftward.^^
Former Vice President Hubert Humphrey was already following Meany's advice: he
urged liberals to let working people know that they too condemned ''criminality and riots
and violence and extreme social turbulence" and scorned "extremists of the left as well as
extremists of the right—black extremists with guns and white extremists with sheets and
29
guns."
During the interview, Meany made it very clear that, despite the workers'
economic concerns, the AFL-CIO leadership had not moved to the left. In his discussion
of labor-management negotiations, Meany claimed that trade unionists increasingly
viewed the strike as a "much less desirable weapon." The AFL-CIO president stated that
it made no sense for "a well-established union" to strike "a well-established industry."
Yet, workers needed to retain the right to strike in case an employer did not want to
"listen." As the walkout against GM seemed more and more likely. The Detroit News
claimed: "...the country owes [Meany] a debt for frankly admitting that the strike is an
Boyed, 1.
I
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expensive weapon that doesn't make sense, often doesn't settle a thing and, in effect, is
an anachronism in this day and age."^
The UAW leadership and membership did not share the newspaper's view. On
September 15, two weeks after the White House dinner, workers at GM plants in thirty-
one states and two Canadian provinces walked off their jobs and joined thousands of
others who had started wildcat strikes during the day. Bramlett, the chief negotiator for
GM, considered the autoworkers' action "a strike against reason." To Woodcock, "the
company [had] held out no other choice."^' The strike lasted for almost ten weeks and
idled 383,626 UAW employees in the U.S. and Canada, plus 9,676 lUE workers and
4,350 United Rubber Workers who were sent home as a result of the walkout.^^
The indictment of the UAW leadership for using an "anachronistic" weapon - the
strike- against GM was mild compared to some reporters' description of the GM
negotiations and walkout as little more than a charade. This kind of accusation was
grounded in the belief, shared by many leftists, that only wildcat strikes were legitimate
signs of a rank-and-file militancy. These illegal walkouts were allegedly the only way
that workers had to try and shape to their own needs a system built on bureaucratic
business unionism. If workers made gains because of a legal strike, the union leadership
had delivered the goods simply to take the wind out the dissident groups' sails. A
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majority of blue-collar workers, however, still regarded the union-sanctioned strike as a
good enough weapon to negotiate better contracts/^
The coordinated effort of the UAW leadership and the rank and file along with
considerable community support, contributed to the success of the strike. On September
30, two weeks after the strike had begun, the UAW International Executive Board,
fearing the strike fund would soon be depleted, reduced the salary of all Officers,
Executive Board Members, International Representatives and other non-office and
maintenance staff by fifty percent. Furthermore, as soon as strike benefits were not
available for GM strikers, Secretary-Treasurer Emil Mazey announced, the union
employees would receive no pay. These emergency measures were passed in an attempt
to ameliorate a serious economic situation: as a result of the GM walkout, both income to
the union's General Fund and the Strike Fund would be reduced by $ 1,250,000
month,
a
34
As had happened almost a year before during the electrical workers strike against
GE, the automobile workers' cause rallied the support of prominent American citizens.
The National Citizens' Committee to Aid the Families ofGM Strikers was created only
two weeks before the strike settlement was announced; however, its mere formation,
UAW leaders argued, had "an immeasurable public relations benefit to the UAW and the
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numerous
strikers." One of the aims of the Committee was to counterbalance the
editorials that criticized those autoworkers who resorted to food stamps and welfare
assistance to remain on strike. Some conservatives even argued that if the strikers and
their families got hungry enough, they would eventually force their leaders to accept
GM's original offer.^^
On October 30, the Citizens' Committee ran an advertisement in twelve national
and local newspapers. The key paragraph pointed to the inhumanity of those who
expected the striking workers to go hungry: "We do not want the hunger and misery of
the strikers' families to be a deciding factor in the strike's resolution." The ad also urged
American citizens to contribute "from $ 1 on up" to help the strikers who were in dire
straits. The Committee claimed it was "not taking sides in the dispute." It also claimed
that any money raised would not go to the UAW; local committees would "make specific
allocations to hardship cases."^^
On November 1 7, Secretary Lawrence Carlstrom reported that, in its short life,
the Committee had received contributions from 550 donors amounting to $ 30,464.
Although Carlstrom considered this sum to be "disappointingly small," he believed that
the Committee had served a useful purpose all the same. The most interesting section of
Carlson's report was, in fact, the inclusion of some of the numerous "for and against"
letters that the Committee had received since its formation. Apart from the short notes of
support that accompanied most donations, 66 citizens had expressed their disagreement
35UAW Inter-Ottice Communication, Folder 8, Box 34, Leonard Woodcock Files, UAW
President's Office, WSUA.
^^Advertisement, Folder 7, Box 34, Leonard Woodcock Files, UAW President's Office,
WSUA.
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with the Committee in signed letters, while 178 had sent unsigned responses that were
written in vituperative and even obscene language. These anonymous replies were a
clear indication of the extent to which the GM strike had polarized public opinion.
Carlstrom pointed out that "not since the early days of the New Deal" could he remember
"such a paranoiac reaction to a plea for help."
The anonymous notes ranged from a mere "Let them starve!" or "You greedy
bastards have got to be kidding" to "The hell with the stinking UAW! Congress should
smash the goddam unions to pieces." In other cases, the target was not the workers or the
unions but the Committee members themselves: "You gotta be crazy! The list of
supporters looks like a list of Who's Who Communist Party U.S.A.;" "What percentage
of the donations do you Jew radicals plan to split with the Negroes on said Committee?"
or "Same old tired, worn out letter-head liberals. Not a dime when you have
revolutionaries like Julian Bond amongst your group." Julian Bond was in fact a member
of the Committee, as were prominent Americans figures as disparate as George Meany,
Caesar Chavez, Michael Harrington, Reverend Francis B. Sayre and Rabbi Jacob J.
38
Wemstein.
The UAW strike against GM also reopened the possibility of a student-worker
alliance that the GE walkout had raised the year before. Radical and liberal students alike
mobilized to support the strikers in various ways. Two days before the strike deadline,
University of Michigan student radicals organized a group that would back GM workers
37
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if they decided to walk out. The Students to Support Auto Workers
-as they ealled
themselves- would provide "politieal and material support" to the strikers, a spokesman
lor the group said. The group's intention to link CJM policies to the defense industry
and imperialism prompted responses from other students who believed that it was "not
nccessaiy to agree with the workers' analysis of their problems to support them."'" In an
impassioned article that echoed his uncle Walter's rhetoric, Al Rcuther, a senior in
history from Troy, Michigan, called on the student community to reject the Students To
Support the Auto Workers" "self-delusions." These radical students, Rcuther argued, had
to "accept the workers as their equals- equals who (were| qualified to lead their own
strike and determine their own destinies."^'
During the GM strike, a comparatively moderate faction of the much-divided SDS
also had the chance to forge a new student-worker alliance. SDS chose Detroit as the site
for a demonstration to gather radical students from around the country on Election Day.
On November 3, around a thousand students gathered on the Wayne State University
mall and then staged a rally at the nearby General Motors Building. Most of the
demonstrators were from the Detroit area, but there were also students from Georgia,
Minnesota, Illinois. Ohio and New York. "Only a handful of workers" participated in the
demonstration. The Dctroil Free Press reported. Throughout the day, SDSers carried
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banners that read, "War Maker, Strike Breaker, Smash GM" or "Smash Racism" as they
chanted, "Elections are a pack of lies, don't vote organize," or "Same enemy, same fight,
workers and students must unite."'' Though the activists explicitly distanced themselves
from the Weathermen, the SDS radical splinter group, their rhetoric was inflammatory
enough to estrange the vast majority of workers who did not want to "smash GM" but to
win a fair three-year contract. Moreover, most workers still believed that their votes
could make a difference. The students' harsh criticism of GM's "racist," "war oriented"
and "capitalist" policies were bound to rally few workers.
For its part, the UAW was also interested in fostering cooperation between
workers and students. The union's approach, however, was very different from that of
the students". The Alliance for Labor Action developed Worker-Student Support
Committees that worked closely with UAW regional directors in Michigan, Los Angeles,
Chicago and New Jersey, areas in which the largest numbers of strikers were
concentrated. Carl Wagner, the twenty-five-year-old project coordinator, explained that
students performed a number of "behind-the-scenes tasks," such as collecting food for
43
Strikers m need. In California, for instance, UAW Local 645 voted to accept donations
of food and money from University of California at Santa Barbara students and other
community organizations except for the Progressive Labor Party, the SDS, the
Communist Party, John Birch Society and the Ku Klux Klan. Paul Schrade, the UAW
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regional director in California, insisted: "Neither the extreme right nor the extreme left is
going to hijack our strike." Yet, rank-and-filer l Yank 1. Shaw led a small group of
workers who attempted to stop UC Santa Barbara students from unloading food on the
union premises. C,M workers did not want any of their ^'commie food," Shaw argued."''
The Local 645 incident, which made the headhnes in the Los Angeles Times, was
an indication of workers' distrust of college students. The UAW's students strike support
committees and strike schools served a double purpose, fhey attempted to show to the
workers that the majority of students were "realistic" and "democratic," and not
"followers of the Weathermen, the rock-throwers, or the obscenity chanters." I hey also
catered to those students who wanted to get politically involved but were confu.scd or
frustrated. Patricia Cayo Sexton and Brendan Sexton, themselves members of (he I lAW
leadership, sununed it up in the following way:
Many students want to examine the real world and make it better. When they turn
to action, they have almo.st nobody on campus to talk to, almost no intellectual
leadership that makes sense. In their confusion and agitation they turn in wild
directions to druj^s, freak-outs, Yippies, and the refurbished Stalinist elitism of
I lerberl Marcusc.
The UAW leadership was not alone in its effort to improve the relationship
between organized labor and the university community. During the GM strike, initiators
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of a national movement to bring labor, faeulty and students together held two meetings at
Harvard University. Participants claimed that reactionai-y political forces were trying to
"foment hostility" between these groups. "Peace, racial justice, job security and decent
environments" were concerns that American workers, students and faculty members
shared, fhe facuky group present was led by Nobel laureate Dr. George Wald and
included academics from Columbia, Cornell, Brandeis, Boston University, Massachusetts
Institute of Technology and 1 larvard. Representatives of AFl^CIO unions, including the
Steelworkers, the Oil. Chemical and Atomic Workers and the Amalgamated Clothing
Workers, as well as leaders of the independent UE, UAW and Teamsters, also attended
the meeting. Though probably very limited in scope, this was a clear attempt to revive
the Democratic labor-liberal alliance that had been seriously weakened in 1968.'^'
During the nine weeks that the GM strike lasted, then, autoworkers were both
backed and chastised by the American public, fhe UAW gathered support from
prominent political, religious and union leaders as well as from students from a range of
political persuasions. Strikers also became the targets of ferocious criticism for
"selfishly" deepening the country's economic recession. On November 1 1, GM and the
UAW settled the dispute. The new contract did not put an end to the controversy over the
automobile negotiations, but rather furthered it. Was the settlement inllationary? Would
the American public eventually pay for the autoworkers' gains? Had Woodcock led the
UAW into a costly strike only to prove his leadership qualities? Had the whole affair
essentially been a sham?
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At the onset of the strike, many observers thought that it was senseless for the
UAW
-with a strike fund of $ 120 million- to confront a corporation that had liquid assets
of more than $ 4 billion. On November 1 1, however, most observers thought the GM-
UAW contract to be a union victory. A GM spokesman affirmed that the corporation
could have afforded a much longer strike, but management estimated that in two weeks'
time the employees' hardships "could have been the seeds of lasting bitterness." It was
true that in another two weeks the autoworkers would have exhausted their strike fund,
but it was also an important fact that GM was losing $ 90 million in sales daily ."^^
The turning point in the talks came the first week in November when GM agreed
to restore the cost of living protection without a ceiling. Woodcock thus "corrected" the
strategic error that the union had made in 1967 when limiting the cost of living allowance
(COLA) to 16 cents per hour over a three-year period. The UAW leadership also
managed to establish the 30-and-out retirement principle, but not "at any age," as the
rank-and-file had demanded. GM workers with 30 years of service could retire at age 58
with a $ 500 monthly pension; in 1972, the age limit would drop to 56. On the wage
front, the union's long-term gains -especially the COLA formula- were more important
than immediate wage increases. GM initially offered a wage boost of 38 cents an hour
for the first year of the contract, while the UAW demanded 61.5 cents. The UAW and
GM finally settled on 51 cents. Due to inflation, however, 33 of the 51 cents were
48
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It is evident that to obtain the cherished unhmited cost of Hving allowance, the
UAW retreated from the first year wage increase of 61.5 cents an hour and compromised
on the controversial 30-and-out demand. Yet there were other less published gains. The
full amount of cost of living adjustments would be paid each week. Deferment of
payment over three-month periods
-provided under the 1967 contract- was ended. The
company would also contribute 5 to 10 cents an hour per worker in Supplemental
Unemployment Benefits, a clear improvement on the previous settlement. As regards
fringe benefits, after 20 years of service, workers would be entitled to four weeks of
49
vacation mstead of three.
The UAW fared most poorly on its non-economic demands. In August 1970,
when contract talks started, the union officers put on the table a number of proposals for
"making the work more tolerable and the workers happier, thus improving plant
efficiency and product quality." There was no doubt that tensions on the shopfloor were
high. In addition to the soaring absentee rate, the number of grievances in GM plants had
increased from 106,000 in 1960 to 256,000 in 1969. In response to the mounting
tensions, the UAW proposed to limit the company's right to discipline a worker until
proof of misconduct was officially recorded. The union also called for the introduction
of a team system on assembly lines, varying each worker's job content to lessen the
monotony of performing the same task fifty to a hundred times an hour. Furthermore, the
UAW sought the elimination of noise and fumes in the plants as well as the right of the
50
worker to refuse overtime.
The Detroit Free Press, 13 November 1970, Section A, 10.
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Most of the above demands virtually disappeared after the Big Three made their
first offer on September 1. By the time of the settlement, only a highly restricted right to
refuse overtime remained in the contract. According to the 1970 agreement, where there
were sufficient workers available and capable of doing an assignment, GM employees
who did not wish to work overtime were excused. Also, blue collars who had worked 13
consecutive days would be excused from work the next following Sunday.^' Compared
to the union's initial non-economic demands, these were token gains. This apparently
lent credence to the accusation that the UAW won economic gains because it guaranteed
a slow grievance process and never invaded the
-'sacred" area of management rights.
Yet those who defended the role that unions played in capital-labor relations
viewed collective bargaining in a different light. Labor reporter Ralph Orr said of past
negotiations in the auto industry.
In the 59"" minute of the 1 1"" hour, when the choice was one less step in the
grievance section or another five cents an hour in wages, reality dictated the
52
choice: a nickel is visible and spendable, a shortened contract clause is not.
In 1970, practical and political necessity once again dictated that economic gains should
prevail over worker prerogatives. The strike against GM cost the UAW about $ 160
million and almost bankrupted the union while the nation's most powerful corporation
lost millions of dollars in its nine-week resistance to the autoworkers' demands. Eighty
The Detroit Free Press, 13 November 1970, Section A, 10.
Ibid.
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five percent of production workers and eighty percent of the skilled tradesmen eventually
ratified the CJM-UAW pact that many critics referred to as a sell-out."
The Nixon Administration immediately singled out the C.M-UAW contract as
inllationary. Woodcock insisted that the government's evaluation was incorrect. "...A
large element oithe wages that will be paid in this contract," stated the IJAW president,
"will be as a result of the cost-of-living clause. Those payments will be made ajhr [my
emphasis] prices have risen."^" The debate on the inllationary effects of increases in
labor costs had been going on for months. In its reports on the national economy, the
Al L-C'IO leadership repeatedly argued that the rising inflation was largely ''a profit
in Hal ion" caused by businesses that tried to "maintain or increase large prollt margins."^^
The President's condemnation of the OM settlement highlighted Nixon's political
dilemma: the economic downturn had dramatically limited his ability to rally the blue-
collar vote. As New York Times reporter James Reston put it, "the Nixon-labor alliance
split at the wallet." The considerable increases in the cost of living and interest rates
combined with the 5.1 percent unemployment rate were enough to wreck the
Republicans" "blue-collar strategy.""^^' As historian Alan Matusow points out, " fhe GM
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B. .1. Widick, "Sweethearts or Adversaries?" The Nation, 16 .lune 1973, 792; Lawrence
G. O'Donncl, "The Conspiracy Theory About the Big GM Strike," The Wall Street
Journal, 23 March 1973.
^"^Howard I.ipton, "GM Strikers Blaze Victory Trail," (JAW Solidarity, December 1970,
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Gary Fink, ed., AFL-i TO Executive C \)uncil. Statements and Reports, 1967-1972,
(Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1977) Vol. 4, 1953.
^^'.lamcs Reston, "Political Nightmare," The Detroit Free Press, 18 September 1970,
Section A, 6.
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Strike and the grim economic news doomed Nixon's hopes for major inroads among
middle-income blue-collar workers. An October Gallup poll on Congressional
preference indicated that 60 percent of the manual workers with incomes over $ 4,000
would vote Democratic, almost the same percentage as in 1966,
The off-year election results made it clear to the president that the social issue had
not yet replaced the Economic Issue in American politics. During the Congressional
campaign, Nixon's national strategy was designed to defuse and neutralize those issues of
substance that might stimulate a broad-based political participation in the 1970 election.
The Republicans managed to virtually eliminate the war as a political issue. But once the
peace issue was obscured, the state of the economy assumed considerable importance.
This was precisely what Nixon feared might prove the OOP's undoing. By October, the
president knew that the Economic Issue was killing him. Nixon and Vice-President Spiro
Agnew then launched frenzied cross-country tours in a clear attempt to turn the elections
on the Social Issue.
While the Republicans seemed to stake all their party's hopes on the belief that
the electorate's major concerns were social, labor leaders revived the national economy
as a campaign issue. Just a few days before the election, in a paid political radio
broadcast on the CBS network, George Meany urged workers: "Cast your ballot as if
your job, your health, your pocketbook and your family's future depended on it. They
58
really do. They are what is at stake in this election.'* Whether union members followed
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Matusow, Nixon 's Economy, 82; Alec Gallup and George H. Gallup, eds.. The Gallup
Poll Cumulative Index: Public Opinion, 1955-1975, Report N° 64, October 1970, 17.
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the AFL-CIO president advice or not, a post-election Gallup survey showed that in 1970
blue-collar workers had voted even more strongly for Democratic candidates than in ,
previous elections.^^
Although Nixon insisted that the administration was pleased with the returns, on
November 3, the Democrats scored several important victories. The party gained
seats in the House of Representatives and a majority of state governorships
-twenty-ni
out of fifty- with a net increase of eleven. Democratic candidates also captured from the
Republicans control of one or both houses of the legislatures in seven states and narrowed
the GOP margin in a number of others. The Democrats kept control of the Senate, with a
net loss of only two of the twenty-five Democratic seats at issue. Moreover, the turnout
of 57.6 million voters set a record for an off-year election.^"
The Progressive identified "some encouraging signs" in the election results. In
California, Ronald Reagan, the foremost proponent of the "law and order" strategy, ran
behind moderate Republicans on his ticket. Democrat John V. Tunny had defeated
Senator George Murphy, Reagan's close partisan, while African-American candidate
Wilson C. Riles had defeated Dr. Max Rafferty, "long a symbol ofjingoistic know-
nothingism." Nixon's Southern Strategy did not appear to be infallible either. In Florida,
moderate Democrats defeated racist Republican candidates. In Texas, a conservative
The Gallup Poll, Report N° 65, November 1970, 1.
^°John M. Barry, "The Voters' Decision
—
1970,'" AFL-CIO American Federationist,
December 1970, 1-2.
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Democratic candidate for the Senate defeated a very conservative Republican, George
Bush, who many already considered likely to become a figure in national politics"
The GOP's hopes lay on the belief that the ''Middle American" was moving
towards conservatism. Tired of crime, campus disruption, bombings and narcotics, the
"forgotten American" would vote Republican. But the mid-term electoral returns
shattered the fiction of a "silent majority" that blindly followed the administration's '"law
and order" slogans. In the states in which Vice President Agnew aggressively
campaigned on the Social Issue, six of the candidates whom he supported for Senate won
while thirteen lost. Seven candidates whom he backed for governor were elected but
fourteen were defeated; 1 1 1 candidates for House seats won with his endorsement and
62
121 lost with it. It was evident that the public was not swinging to the right and thai the
business-dominated Republican Party was finding it very difficult to win over a blue-
collar majority. It was also apparent, however, that the Democrats could easily lose the
blue-collar vote if they ignored the workers' needs. In an attempt to capture the working-
class vote, the administration had tried to exacerbate the differences that existed within
the Democratic coalition between workers and unionists, who were mainly concerned
with bread and butter issues, and the more ideological middle-class liberals. For their
part, the Democrats found in the UAW walkout against GM an excellent opportunity not
only to show that economic issues were not "old-fashioned" but also to revive the labor-
liberal coalition. In an article published a couple of weeks before the elections, Michael
Harrington praised the AFL-CIO president for backing Democratic candidates with
^'"The People, Yes," The Progressive, December 1970, 4,
^^Ibid., 2.
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whom he disagreed on the Vietnam War. If President Nixon were to be removed from
office in 1972, Harrington concluded, "middle-class reformers and anti-warriors" would
have to "overcome their parochial righteousness and win with the trade-unionists.""
Unfortunately, labor leaders and liberals found it much easier to agree on the Economic
Issue than on the Social Issue. The Vietnam War remained as divisive as ever.
" Michael Harrington, "'GOP bid for labor vote futile," The Detroit News, 23 September
1970. Section B, 9.
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CHAPTER 5
ORGANIZED LABOR'S MOST DIVISIVE ISSUE:
THE VIETNAM WAR
During the first two years of the Nixon Administration, American labor unions
were generally successful in coordinating their efforts in defense of their members'
standard of living. The AFL-CIO affiliated lUE, the independent UE and thirteen other
unions collaborated during the walkout against General Electric and the AFL-CIO
supported the disaffiliated UAW during the latter's strike against General Motors. Union
leaders usually agreed on their assessments of rank-and-file grievances. Yet on U.S.
foreign policy issues generally and on the American involvement in Vietnam in
particular, there were longstanding and deepening divisions within the ranks of labor.
During their drive against GE, the lUE and UE leadership carefully avoided any
reference to the Vietnam War in their presentation of the workers* grievances to the
public. The lUE continued to back the organization's official position on the conflict:
George Meany's and Jay Lovestone's unconditional support of American military
intervention in South Vietnam. For its part, the left-leaning UE had opposed the war
since 1965, and repeatedly linked the workers' loss of purchasing power to the increase
in military spending: "The war and profiteering corporations," reported the UE News in
1969, "have undermined the U. S. economy, causing higher prices and taxes." Similarly,
by the time of the GM strike, the UAW had not only left the AFL-CIO but also joined
1
those who called for an immediate withdrawal of American troops from South Vietnam.
'"Viet Nam Resolution," UE News, 6 October 1969, 6.
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Conflict over U.S. foreign policy was not new to organized labor. During World
War 11, ideological differences had been submerged in the service of the cause. From the
time of the German attack on the Soviet Union in 1941 until the end of the war, CIO
president Phillip Murray allied with the communist members of his organization in
support of the war effort. The onset of the Cold War between the United States and the
Soviet Union made such cooperation almost impossible. Labor divided ideologically into
two camps and the pressures to choose sides became almost inescapable. Murray was
determined to impress both the U.S. government and American society at large with
organized labor's commitment to national values and goals. Consequently, the CIO
president undermined the left within his organization. The 1948 presidential election
proved to be crucial in the CIO unions" political alignment: "Murray," claims Ronald
Schatz, "made support for Truman and the Democratic ticket the test of loyalty of the
CIO.'" The leaders of the left wing unions supported Progressive Party candidate Henry
Wallace, and thus adhered to the Communist Party line rather than the Democratic Party
line.
The UE, the largest Communist-led union, boycotted the 1949 CIO convention to
show its disgust for the CIO"s raids on its membership. The C10"s purge of left-leaning
unions soon followed. Under Murray "s leadership, the convention expelled the UE and a
smaller communist-led union, the Farm Equipment Workers (FE). Delegates also
approved several other decisive measures. Through a constitutional amendment,
Communists were barred from holding CIO offices; the International Union of Electrical
^Ronald W. Schatz, "Philip Murray and the Subordination of the Industrial Unions to the
United States Government,"" in Melvyn Dubofsky and Warren Van Tine, eds.. Labor
Leaders in America (Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1987), 253.
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Workers (lUE) was chartered to rival the UE; and hearing boards were set up to try ten
other unions on charges of "Communist domination." By 1950, the CIO had expelled
seven other unions: the Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers; the Fur and Leather Workers;
the Food, Tobacco and Allied Workers; the Marine Cooks and Stewards; the Fishermen's
Union; the International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union and the American
Communication Association/
The CIO's indictment of the left-wing unions rested on the argument that the
Communist labor leaders' priority was not to strengthen the unions and thus defend the
economic and job-related interests of their members but rather to use the unions as fronts
to advance the interests of the Soviet Union. Their main objective was supposedly to
radicalize American workers and achieve a proletarian dictatorship along Soviet lines. In
sum. Communists were eliminated from the labor movement in the name of national
security. Many American citizens probably shared Congressman Fred Hartley's belief
that "a single Communist in a position of power within the labor movement could act
under the direction of Russian agents so as to seriously hinder this country's ability to
4
defend its people and wage war against its enemies." Neither the quintessential labor
bureaucrat George Meany nor the progressive union leader Walter Reuther remained
aloof from the Cold War rationale that came to dominate American domestic and foreign
policy.
Ronald Radosh, American Labor and United States Foreign Policy (New York: Random
House, 1969), 437.
^ Ronald L. Filippelli and Mark McColloch, Cold War in the Working Class: The Rise
and Decline ofthe United Electrical Workers (Albany: State University ofNew York
Press, 1995), 185, 1.
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Meany was a staunch anticommunist throughout his career. During World War
II, he saw the U.S. alliance with the Soviet Union as a necessary evil to defeat fascism.
In this period, he drew closer to leaders such as David Dubinsky of the International
Ladies' Garment Workers' Union (ILGWU) and the quintessential anticommunist and
"spymaster" Jay Lovestone, who also regarded communism as an evil, expansionist and
enslaving force. In their view, the Soviet Union was a threat to the U.S. in the
international arena while Communist party members were a domestic menace. After the
war, Meany became even more vociferous in his anticommunism: "The Communist
conspiracy," he proclaimed, "overshadows everything that we may think of."^ Even in
the darkest days of the Vietnam War, Meany steadfastly supported U.S. military
intervention in Southeast Asia.
In fact, for over twenty years, Lovestone wrote the AFL-CIO president's foreign
policy papers. A former communist purged from the party in 1928, Lovestone was
crucial in steering U.S. foreign policy away from detente with the Soviet Union at the end
of World War II. Dubinsky described this enigmatic personality in American politics as
"the unofficial Secretary of State for the labor movement."^ Working in close
collaboration with the U.S. Department of State, the Central Intelligence Agency, and
later the AFL-CIO, Lovestone turned the Free Trade Union Committee (FTUC) -
originally created to aid European unionists—into a bastion of anticommunism within the
Quoted in Robert Zieger, "George Meany: Labor's Organization Man," in Labor
Leaders in American, 337
^Quoted in Ted Morgan, A Covert Life. Jay Lovestone: Communist, Anti-Communist, And
Spymaster (New York: Random House, 1999), 370.
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American labor establishment.' In 1963, he was designated as head of the AFL-CIO
International Affairs Department and thus became an "openly prominent" character.
Nevertheless, as Ted Morgan claims, "while Lovestone's appointment seemed to crown a
long career, it was in fact the beginning of a ten-year-decline...Above all, his full support
with Meany for the Vietnam War would contribute to his demise, dividing the labor
movement, as it divided the nation." Among labor leaders, however, there were
disagreements on foreign policy issues long before the war in Southeast Asia escalated.
It is even possible to talk about the Meany and the Reuther "camps."
Walter Reuther began his participation in the labor movement as a sociaHst. The
UAW president, as Nelson Lichtenstein claims, "came to combine the tactical approach
of traditional business unionism of liberal Keynesianism and the social vision of western
9
European social democracy." Reuther consolidated his control of the UAW during the
union's 1947 convention, when his caucus took over almost every key position within the
UAW hierarchy. Although a critic of the government's increasingly virulent
anticommunism, Reuther made sure that most CIO union leaders signed the
anticommunist affidavits required by the Taft-Hartley act and repudiated Progressive
Party candidate Henry Wallace during the 1948 presidential election. Rather than taking
issue with the emerging Cold War foreign policy consensus, Reuther accepted it. His
^Mari Jo Buhle, Paul Buhle, and Dan Georgakas, eds.. Encyclopedia ofthe American Left
(Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1990), 435-437.
8
Morgan, 336.
9
Nelson Lichtenstein, Walter Reuther and the Rise of Labor-Liberalism," in Labor
Leaders in America. 280.
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assessment oreoinnuinisiu, however, dilTeied considerably from Meany's. Reutlier
believed that eonununisni was a system that thrived only where poverty and degradation
allowed it to exist. If advanced capitalist nations waged an assault on poverty. Reiither
hoped, the attack would produce a liberali/.ing etlect within the nations under the Soviet
sphere. He also believed that the U.S. should secure a modus vivcmU with the Soviet
Union and thus temper the arms race, l ike most CIO leaders, Reuther regarded the
support ol'st>cial relbrm programs abroad as the best way to contain communism and
disapproved of the obsessive anticommunism of AI L leaders. After the 1955 Al' l.-CK)
merger, however, the AM, hawkish anticommunism dominated organized labor's stand
on foreign policy for more than fifteen years. But the differences between Meany and
Reuther remained just below the surface throughout the 195()s and the early 19()()s.
In the post-World War 11 period, cooperatit)n between organized labor and the
Icderal government in foreign pt>licy issues was taken as a given. Most observers
probably shared .lohn Windnuiller's description of the iabt>r leadership's commitment to
a variety of international activities and causes as "substantial, controversial, and probably
n reversible." Historian Ronald Radosh was far more critical of labor's involvement in
the implementation of U.S. foreign policy, frade unions, Radosh claimed, participated
actively in cold-war politics around the world because the survival of their "corporate
unionism" depended on the continued existence of "corporate capitalism." I'or this
reason, unions supported a cold-war economy and protluctiiHi for military defense.
Radosh was categorical in his indictment of organized labor:
"'.lohn P. Windmuller, " The Foreign Policy Conflict in American Labor." /V)//7/<v//
Science Quarlerly 82, no. 2 (June 1967): 205.
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Unions are meant to be junior partners of the large corporations, and their leaders
seek only those gains acceptable to the system's top leaders; they see the chance
for these gains disappearing if they move to challenge corporate foreign policy.'
'
Furthermore, rank and filers, Radosh contended, were either unwilling or incapable to
challenge their unions' support of "a backward and reactionary foreign policy/
In the mid-1960s, however, U.S. foreign policy issues triggered a major
controversy within organized labor's leadership. In 1966, Meany and Reuther had a
serious confrontation over American labor's boycott of the International Labor
Organization (ILO) in Geneva, a decision that Meany allegedly took without discussing
the issue with other members of the AFL-CIO Executive Council. In that year, Leon
Chajn, the Polish government delegate to the ILO, was elected chairman of the
organization by a delegate vote of 184 to 183. After consulting with Meany, the AFL-
CIO worker delegate Rudy Faupl walked out, refusing to "sit in the Conference presided
over by a representative of a totalitarian country." Reuther learned about this incident by
reading the newspaper headlines. He condemned the walkout as "unwise,"
13
"undemocratic," and "unauthorized."
The AFL-CIO policy in Latin America also provoked friction between the
Meany-Lovestone dominated Executive Council and Victor and Walter Reuther. In
1962, a group of AFL-CIO leaders -Meany among them- established the American
"Radosh, "Labor and Foreign Policy," The Nation, 8 September 1969, 210.
12
Radosh, American Labor and United States Foreign Policy (New York: Random
House, 1969), 29.
Quoted in Windmuller, "The Foreign Policy Conflict in American Labor," 208, 212.
Interestingly enough, the ILO claimed 64 million affiliate members in 94 non-Communist
countries.
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Institute for Free Labor Development (AIFLD) to increase U.S. aid to Latin American
labor. As the AIFLD technically was not part of the AFI^CIO, it could receive funds
from U.S. business firms and contracts from government foreign aid agencies. In 1966,
Victor Reuther denounced the AIFLD for its inclusion of American businessmen with
important holdings in Latin America and stated -in a published interview- that the
Central Intelligence Agency was involved in its activities.'" In Reuther* s opinion, this
was "a propaganda gift to the enemies of free trade unions who effectively
characterize[d] these businessmen as symbols of Yankee imperialism and enemies of
15
social progress."
During an AFL-CIO Executive Council meeting in Chicago shortly after the ILO
walkout, Meany and his close advisors presented a special report on the activities of the
AIFLD. Victor Reuther's harsh criticism of the AIFLD, though resented by those at
whom it was directed, could not be disregarded, as it came from the high echelons of
organized labor. In the course of the meeting, the board passed a resolution praising the
AIFLD's work in Latin America and rejecting Reuther's "vilification'" of the
organization. Only Walter Reuther and Joe Curran of the National Maritime Union voted
against the resolution. This was a clear sign of Reuther's growing isolation within the
AFL-CIO Executive Council.
By then, the Vietnam War was becoming another matter of contention within the
labor ranks. Reuther was initially as opposed as Meany to an American withdrawal from
14
Harry Bernstein, "AFL-CIO Unit Accused of "Snooping Abroad," Los Angeles Times,
22 May 1966.
'Victor Reuther, 'The International Activities of American Trade Unions," in William
Haber (ed.). Labor in a Changing America (New York, 1966), 304-305.
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Southeast Asia, but the UAW president stood eloser to the doves than to the advoeates of
escalation. In 1966, Reuther summarized his position in the following way:
We must work toward an international guarantee of peacekeeping in Vietnam and
a negotiated settlement under the auspices of the United Nations or another
mternational agency. Only this rational and responsible solution will enable the
long-suffering people of Vietnam to process toward social betterment and
economic progress.
In opposition to Reuther, the AFL-CIO Fxecutive Council adopted a decidedly hawkish
resolution on the American involvement in Indochina.'^ Reuther, who had left the
meeting before the statement was passed, later condemned the resolution as "intemperate,
hysterical, jingoistic and unworthy of a policy statement of a free labor movement."'*
By the time dissent began to appear within the union leadership, the antiwar
movement was swelling. In the 1965-1975 period, a wide array of Americans embraced
peace activism: liberals and radicals, men and women, blacks and whites, students and
professors. Some scholars even argue that there were "many" antiwar movements in the
United States during the Vietnam War. I he movement did not have a single directing
organization; there was not a unified leadership; and there was no consensus on "what
was wrong" with American foreign policy. Peace activists, however, tried to subordinate
their differences in the interest of ending the war. In its origins, the movement was an
extension of the antinuclear campaigns of the late 194()s and 1950s. Between 1965 and
16
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1967, as they faced pro-war majorities, peace activists engaged in respectful protests that
were designed to build an antiwar consensus. They discussed the war, organized teach-
ins, and marched peacefully. Some protesters burnt draft cards. This kind of antiwar
effort aimed at influencing policy-makers and was largely perceived as middle class and
respectable.'^
"It will come as a surprise to many even inside the labor movement to learn,"
Phillip S. Foner states, "that organized labor was an important force in the first anti-
20
imperialist movement in American history." Foner's point is well taken. It has been
widely asserted that American workers overwhelmingly supported a "hawkish^" position
on the conflict in South Vietnam„ As early as in 1965, however, several traditionally left-
activist unions -Local 1 199 of the Drug and Hospital Employees Union and District 65 of
the Retail, Wholesale and Department Store Union- came out against the war. The AFL-
CIO Executive Council resolutions applauding the Johnson Administration's escalation
of the war, however, drowned the early voices of opposition to American military
involvement in Indochina. The formation of the National Labor Assembly for Peace in
1967 broke the once seemingly monolithic stand of the AFL-CIO on the war issue.
Over the next few years labor leaders and rank and filers grew increasingly
''dovish," but most labor unions' stand for peace did not match the anti-imperialist,
antiwar position of the radicals. In fact, the overwhelming majority of union members
19
Charles DeBenedetti and Charles Chatfield, An American Ordeal: The Antiwar
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never spoke for or against the American military intervention in Indochina. In October
1967, more than two years before Nixon introduced "the silent majority" in one of his
speeches, leading members of the Cold War establishment created the Citizens
Committee for Peace with Freedom in Vietnam. This organization was allegedly meant
to give "the silent center an opportunity to support [the U.S.] commitment in Vietnam
and the policy of non-compromising— although limited resistance to aggression."
Founding members of the committee included former Presidents Dwight Eisenhower and
Harry Truman; former Senator Paul H. Douglas of Dlinois as organizing chairman; and
General Omar N. Bradley, Archbishop Robert E. Lucey of San Antonio and AFI^CIO
president George Meany as co-chairmen. The AFL-CIO Executive Council voted to
contribute $ 10,000 to the newly formed Committee.^'
Just a month after the creation of the Citizens' Committee, the Chicago Labor
Leadership Assembly for Peace attracted nationwide attention. It was the first time that a
large number of trade unionists really challenged Meany' s position. The 523 middle
echelon labor leaders who attended the meeting represented sixty different unions,
despite the fact that very few locals had taken an official anti-war position. For the first
time in almost thirteen years, AFL-CIO unionists sat down with "outcasts" like the
Teamsters, the International Longshoremen's and Warehouseman's Union (ILWU), the
UE, and others, to discuss American foreign policy issues. To the UE leadership, the
assembly was "an important step in the direction of redeeming the labor movement."
22
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During the meeting, the highly respected socialist leader Norman Thomas called on trade
unionists to unite for political action against the war. It was evident that an increasing
number of union leaders had doubts about the righteousness of U. S. military intervention
in Southeast Asia. Rank and filers' sentiment towards the conflict, however, was more
difficult to gauge.
Many workers considered foreign policy matters to be far removed from their
daily concerns. It is not surprising, therefore, that on foreign policy issues, union leaders'
views should play a more prominent role than in other areas. Given the field's
"remoteness" from union members, labor leaders can follow their own preferences more
freely in foreign policy issues than in collective bargaining or political action.
Consequently, political commentators presented the AFL-CIO leaders' support of the
Vietnam War as representative of the workers' attitude towards the American military
involvement in Indochina.
There were several factors that contributed to a widespread -and often
unexamined- view of blue-collar workers as staunch supporters of the war. First,
working-class citizens were viewed as more "authoritarian" and willing to support "law
and order" issues than other segments of American societ>'. Second, the rather limited
participation of union members in anti-war rallies led many observers to conclude that
workers unconditionally backed the administration's handling of the war. And third,
scattered displays of patriotism, such as the 1970 hard-hat demonstrations in New York
City, reinforced the stereotype of the American worker as hawkish.
164
A number of political scientists used sociologist Seymour Lipset's theory of
working-class authoritarianism to explain the workers' presumed support for an
escalation of the conflict in South Vietnam. In 1959, Lipset stated:
A number of elements contribute to authoritarian predispositions in lower class
mdividuals. Low education, low participation in political or voluntary
associations of any type, little reading, isolated occupations, economic insecurity,
and authoritarian family patterns are some of the most important
"
Lipsefs argument was based on two assumptions: first, that sociocultural and economic
factors determine personality traits such as authoritarianism, and second, that the more
"authoritarian" an individual, the more prone he or she is to support "hawkish" policies.
Survey data, however, undennined that conclusion. In January 1968, for example,
a Gallup Poll found that adults in union member families were almost evenly divided on
the war issue. Moreover, 43 percent said that the United States had made a mistake in
sending troops to South Vietnam. In an editorial comment on the survey, the New York
Times claimed that on the war issue "labor leaders [were] not always good barometers of
24
the thinking of their members." Nevertheless, as the 1968 presidential campaign heated
up, two developments apparently confinned Lipset's thesis that authoritarianism was
more pronounced among working-class citizens. In August, a Gallup poll reported that
seventeen percent of union families backed the independent party candidate George
25
Wallace. White workers' support of the Alabaman ex-governor seemed to show that
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they were more hawkish than middle-class Americans. The working class' negative
reaction to the Chicago 1 968 antiwar demonstrations apparently also indicated the
existence of higher levels of authoritarianism among lower-status groups.^^ The AFL-
ClO president assailed the antiwar protesters as "dirty-necked, dirty-mouthed
demonstrators" who had tried Mayor Richard Daley's patience beyond endurance and
' 27
received from the Chicago police exactly what they deserved. Thus, a number of
political analysts found in Lipset's authorharianism thesis an explanation for both
working-class support of Wallace and rejection of antiwar protesters.
These conclusions were soon challenged. After a thorough analysis of data
collected by the University of Michigan Survey Research Center in the 1964-1968
period, James D. Wright found that social class and support for escalation of the war
were either unrelated or inversely related. Wright pointed out that the most "hawkish"
working-class citizens were those most, and not least, integrated into middle-class
28
political culture and exposed to mainstream media. The class argument that certain
political attitudes are the inevitable result of certain sociocultural and economic
conditions, Wright said, did not hold true. Workers' attitudes changed over time and
29
were ''quite malleable'' or ''quite responsive to specific sociopolitical events."
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Wright also outlines the implications of the class authoritarianism argument:
...the educated upper middle class represents an enlightened culture which
embraces the desirable norms of tolerance. These groups represent the bulwark,
of liberality and are to be trusted in the democratic arena. The lower strata, on the
other hand, are not, unless they can be indoctrinated into the enlightened culture.
s
I
30
It is evident that political analysts tended to overestimate the liberalizing influence of
education and social status. Conversely, many underestimated the working-class capacity
for progressive reform.
Working-class authoritarianism, moreover, was not an adequate measure for
attitudes on the Vietnam War. Workers could oppose the conflict in Indochina and at the
same time reject anti-war demonstrations at home. Some observers -especially those
more understanding of American working-class realities- explained this apparent
contradiction by stressing the fact that low-income groups were more reticent to air their
opinions than high-income citizens, particularly when those opinions might be viewed as
"unconventionaP" or "unpatriotic." Furthermore, while the middle- and upper-class
citizens analyzed the Vietnam War in abstract terms -whether they viewed it as a
necessary anti-Communist struggle or as an American imperialist venture- many
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working-class Americans saw the conflict in a more pragmatic way.
By the end of 1969, economic hardship at home coupled with the rising toll of
American casualties led many union members to turn against the war. It was becoming
evident that Meany did not speak for the 14 million AFL-CIO rank and filers, since
unionists seemed to be as divided as the rest of the country on the war issue. A
Wright, 142-143.
^'Harian Hahn, "Dove Sentiments Among Blue-Collar Workers," Dissent 17, no. 3 (May-
June 1970): 203.
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Dcconibcr 1969 Clallup poll indicated that 55 percent of American adults described
themselves as "doves," and 3 1 percent as -hawks." The lower a person's income, the
more likely he or she was to disapprove of the war. l-ilty percent of those who made S
15,000 and over called themselves "doves;" among those who made less than $ 5,000 a
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year, 62 percent favored de-escalation of the war.
The antiwar movement tried to tap into working-class opposition to the war in the
late 1960s and early 1970s. By late 1967, Charles (Miatllcld claims, "the weight and
initiative in the antiwar movement had shifted to the left."^^ As the conllict escalated and
the political system did not seem to respond, opponents of the war despaired. Many
antiwar activists moved from protest to conlVoiitation. fhey abandoned their attempts to
inlluence policy-makers and worked to mobili/e large demonstrations. Protest grew
sharper and more theatrical. A tiny number of extremists resorted to violence: they
detonated bombs, attacked the police and vandalized buildings. To the pacillsts" dismay,
the media played up these actions, which became attached to the public image of the
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antiwar movement.
After S1)S collapsed in 1969 and Republicans assumed control of the White
I lou.se, antiwar liberals felt in a stronger position to bring the anti-war movement into the
political mainstream. In an attempt to rally popular support for U.S. withdrawal from
Vietnam, liberal and radical antiwar activists agreed to collaborate in the organization of
^^The Gallup Poll Cumulative Imlcw Report N° 54, December 1969, 7-8
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two efforts: the Moratorium and the New MobiHzation. Peace campaign veterans Sam
Brown, Marge Sklencar, David Hawk and David Mixner were the founding members of
the Vietnam Moratorium Committee (VMC), which coordinated the nationwide antiwar
demonstrations of October 15, 1969. The organizers' aim was to take the antiwar
movement into the communities where people who had never protested against the war
before could do so "respectably.'- Simultaneously, the New Mobilization Committee to
End the War in Vietnam was preparing for a national demonstration in Washington D. C.
for November 13-15. The New Mobe leaders rallied the support of radical groups yet
pledged to keep the demonstration non-violent. Both the VMC and the Mobe were intent
on countering the anarchic and violent protest of the 1968 Chicago demonstrations.
Prior to the October 15 Moratorium, the Alliance for Labor Action (ALA) placed
large ads in leading American newspapers. Hoping to rally workers to the anti-war
movement, the official statement began, "We take our stand with the millions of our
fellow-Americans who call for an end of the war in Vietnam." The advertisement was
signed by the heads of the UAW, the Brotherhood of Teamsters and the Chemical
Workers Union, who represented over four million members. Peace, the ALA claimed,
would reunite America and allow it to fight against "poverty, hunger, ignorance and
disease." There was nothing to be won in Vietnam, the ALA insisted, but there were
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many problems to be solved at home.
About a hundred unionists of the San Francisco Bay Area gathered in Oakland,
California, a few days before the Moratorium. They unanimously passed a resolution
that was most indicative of the antiwar trend within the ranks of organized labor. This
UAW Solidarity, November 1969, 11
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chapter of the Labor Leadership Assembly for Peace disavowed the AFI^ClO's support
of the administration's Vietnam policy and called for an immediate withdrawal of
American troops from Southeast Asia. During the convention, Ann Draper, officer of the
Amalgamated Clothing Workers, was unabashedly critical of the AFL-CIO president:
It is characteristic of the muddled mind of Meany and an indication of his
unconcern for the membership that he should castigate all of Nixon's domestic
policies and then endorse the Nixon war policy which is the major base and
aggravation of our severest economic and social ills.
The assembly called upon union leaders and rank and filers to support the October 15
Moratorium and the November 1 5 National Mobilization to End the War. "This stand
symbolizes," the resolution read, "the great gulf between the labor bureaucracy and the
membership.'*^^
Millions of citizens participated in the October 15 Moratorium. The activities,
intended to suspend "business as usual,'" were varied: wearing black armbands, shining
car headlights, passing out antiwar flyers from door to door, joining demonstrations.
Over a 1 00,000 people gathered on the Boston Common and approximately a quarter
million participated in various antiwar activities in New York City. Coretta Scott King
led a candlelight vigil in Washington D. C. Political figures as varied as Dr. Benjamin
Spock, former Supreme Court Justice Arthur Goldberg, pacifist David Dellinger and
diplomat Averell Harriman voiced their opposition to the war. "The Moratorium was,"
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Charles DeBenedetti stated, "a national demonstration, teach-in and memorial service."
Resolution, 1969, Folder 13, Box 74, Jay Lovestone Files, International Affairs
Department, GMMA.
^^DeBenedetti, 263.
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A cross section of leftists and radicals
-especially those associated with the
Socialist Workers Party (SW1>) and the Young Socialist Alliance (YSA)- was thrilled at
organized labor's participation in the Moratorium. George Morris, a contributor to The
Mililcmt, claimed that the alignment of a large section of the trade union movement with
the Moratorium had played a crucial role in the massive eruption of national antiwar
sentiment throughout the country. Ad hoc Moratorium committees of local and regional
labor leaders had been formed in cities such as New York, San I-rancisco, Chicago, and
Washington I). C. October 15 1%9 was, in Morris's words, "a turning point in the
struggle for an end to the war in Vietnam, and, objectively, against imperialism."^"
The Moratorium signaled an unprecedented broadening of antiwar protest but
analysis such as George Morris were wrong to believe that labor's opposition was "anti-
imperialist." Neither the ALA advertisement nor the resolution passed by the San
I'rancisco Bay Area unionists presented its opposition to the Vietnam War as part of an
anti-imperialist crusade. Furthermore, the signers of the ALA statement disassociated
themselves from the more violent antiwar demonstrators: "We deplore the reprehensible
activities of a small minority who burn the American Hag and equate anti-Americanism
39
with anti-war, lor their actions are indefensible and counter productive." Radicals
largely admitted that the decision of most Americans to speak again.st the war was less
"ideological" than was the radicals' opposition to the war. Yet many believed that the
Moratorium had to a certain extent vindicated those militants who had resisted the draft.
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demonstrated at the Pentagon, and confronted Mayor Daley's police in the streets of
Chicago.^^
The ALA'S criticism of U.S. foreign policy probably sounded mild to most
radicals: "Let us now put the sad Vietnamese chapter of our history behind," exhorted the
labor alliance's ad," but remember that "of all political systems, democracy is the least
capable of being transplanted at the point of bayonet." American military intervention in
Indochina had been a mistake, the ALA said, but the decision had not necessarily been
"imperialist." Ramparts -a publication largely representative of the New Left critique-
stated that the military debacle in Indochina was a direct consequence of the U.S. "global
empire's" growth. The editors summarized the antiwar protesters" role in the following
way:
The job of the radicals in the Moratorium is to convince the new protesters that
Vietnam is not simple aberration, but rather the natural outgrow of a system that
seeks to lock the third world into a permanent state of indentured servitude.^'
The differences between liberal and radical antiwar dissidents thus were substantial.
Broadly speaking, liberals saw the Vietnam conflict as a very serious mistake in foreign
policy that could be corrected through civil participation and electoral politics. Radicals
regarded American military intervention in Indochina as a counterrevolutionary war that
the U.S. waged for American capitalism to remain hegemonic. The two factions'
willingness to downplay their differences made the massive support of the October 15
mobilization possible.
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In response to the Moratorium Day demonstrations, the Citizens Committee for
Peace with Freedom in Vietnam published, 'The Choice in Vietnam," a pamphlet
designed to explain ''the dangers of a unilateral standstill cease-fire" to "a war weary
public." In the first place, the Committee claimed, such an action would encourage the
victors to try more Vietnams in Asia, Africa and Latin America. Second, the
Communists would take over South Vietnam and attacks on towns and villages would
mount. And finally, if Americans turned their backs on their commitment in Southeast
Asia, the U.S. leadership would be discredited throughout the world. Despite the
undeniable increase in antiwar demonstrations, the Committee still insisted that "the
silent center" represented the majority of the American people who was unhappy about
the war but did not "want to buy an end to hostilities at the price of defeat, dishonor and
of peace with freedom here and abroad." The AFL-CIO American Federationist
reproduced the text of the Committee's pamphlets, thus allowing it to achieve a wider
audience within the working class. As members of the Cold War establishment, both the
Committee and the AFL-CIO top ranks described those who supported immediate
withdrawal as allies of the Communists. The October 1969 document concluded:
Hanoi is fighting on three battlefronts -in Vietnam, in Paris, and in American
public opinion. The enemy's only remaining chance for total victory lies here in
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the U. S. -in the pressures ot American public opinion.
Hawks and doves alike claimed to have the support of the so-called "silent
center." And, in a way, the working class showed many of the characteristics that Nixon
attributed to the "silent majority." The President introduced the slogan in his speech of
"The Choice in Vietnam," (1969), 14-15, 16, Folder 14, Box 031, International Affairs
Department, GMMA.
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November 3, 1969, when he stated, "And so tonight-to you, the great silent majority of
my fellow Americans- I ask for your support/' To enable South Vietnam to assume full
responsibility for its security, Nixon stated, the country had considerably increased the
training and equipment of South Vietnamese forces. The U.S. air operations had been
reduced by twenty percent and American casualties had declined to the lowest point in
three years. By December 15, 1969, Nixon promised, over 60,000 men would have been
brought home. The president made it clear to the American public that the rate of U.S.
troops withdrawal depended entirely on the progress of the Paris peace talks, the training
program of South Vietnamese forces, and the Communists' level of military activity in
Indochina. To dismiss the importance of the increasing antiwar protests, Nixon said: "If
a vocal minority, however fervent its cause, prevails over reason and the will of the
majority, this nation has no future as a free society." In other words, the "silent majority"
could not allow the antiwar '"minority" to jeopardize democracy at home and the U. S.
43
role abroad.
The AFL-CIO Department of Public Relations immediately released a statement
by Meany on Nixon's Vietnam speech. The AFL-CIO president praised Nixon's
decision to honor U. S. commitments abroad as well as his attempt to achieve "an
honorable, negotiated peace." Meany also chastised the administration's critics for not
accepting that continued hostility or peace was entirely Hanoi's responsibility. Nixon's
detailed description of his Vietnam policies. Meany claimed, "deserved the backing of
the AFL-CIO and the American public." To the antiwar activists' dismay, the hawkish
43
"Nixon Calls for Vietnam Unity, Says No Pullout Now," Presidential Report, 1969,
2233-2236, Folder 19. Box 028, COPE Research Files, GMMA.
174
minority was not the only Americans that found Nixon's arguments persuasive. Two
days after the president's speech, a Gallup poll indicated that 77 percent of Americans
supported the president's policies, whereas only 6 percent opposed them.'' With a
masterful address that exploited the ^achievements" of his Vietnamization plan, Nixon
won the backing of "the silent majority."
Despite the volatility of American public opinion on the war, liberal antiwar
activists claimed that "the silent majority" shared their concerns, and not those of the
administration. The publication of Vietnam and the Silent Majority: the Dove 's Guide
was indicative of the peace advocates" preoccupation with the state of the antiwar
movement and with Nixon's attempt to capitalize on the silence of most American
citizens. Social scientist Sidney Verba described "the silent majority" as both "a cleverly
designed symbol" and "a reality," but said it was "more complicated than the monolith
suggested by the President's speech and feared by many opposed to the President."
Democratic Senator George McGovem praised the analysis presented by Verba. Milton J.
Rosenberg and Phillip Converse, and concluded:
The authors confirm that the war is in sharp conflict with beliefs and attitudes held
by most Americans. All that remains is to make the connection compelling
enough to alter their positions on Vietnam itself There is a broad community of
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interest in terminating the war waiting to be perceived and activated.
The silent majority argument presented the antiwar groups as antagonizing not
only the administration's foreign policy but also the majority of Americans. In fact, the
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majority of those who demonstrated against the war were not violent, and the majority of
working-class Americans were not staunch hawks. Most Americans did not have definite
and well thought-out opinions about foreign policy issues. Furthermore, the way in
which survey questions were formulated often influenced the results that pollsters
obtained. Citizens tended to oppose an American withdrawal from Vietnam when words
such as '^defeat," "Communist take-overs," or "Moss of American credibility" appeared in
the questions. More people supported de-escalation when terms such as "killings,"
"continuing war," or "domestic costs" were used in opinion polls on the war."*^
Patriotism, anticommunism, and trust in the Executive's handling of foreign
policy supposedly hindered many American citizens from joining the peace movement.
In The Dove 's Guide, Verba claimed that most people turned against the war because it
was "intruding into their lives and hurting them in ways that [were] very close to home."
Among the most compelling pragmatic reasons for supporting a U.S. withdrawal of
troops were the faltering economy and the decay in American quality of life due to social
unrest. Economic hardship had led many workers to want an end to the war, as opposed
to those peace activists whose motivations for participating in the antiwar movement
were allegedly more "ideological." Milton, Rosenberg and Verba presented an
empathetic discussion of the views of lower-status groups on the Vietnam War. But
these liberal analysts who avoided the excesses of more radical peace activists also
overlooked several issues. First, the Vietnam War was "intruding" into the workers'
lives because in many cases their sons were doing the fighting in Indochina. And
46
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secondly, a large number of peace demonstrators were also motivated by pragmatic
reasons, such as avoiding the draft.
Throughout the conllict in Southeast Asia, the social origins of those who were
fighting in Vietnam were seldom the focus of debate; the only exceptions were some
union publications that reported that workers paid the heaviest human cost of the U.S.
military intervention in Indochina. The attention devoted to "Middle America ' or "the
silent center" in the early 197()s attest to the mass media's attempt to mask or
underestimate very tangible class differences that, contrary to widespread belief, existed
in the country. The class inequalities of military service were not documented and the
complex feelings of working-class families whose sons were in Vietnam were hardly
considered. One of Appy"s interviewees summed up his class resentment towards the
youngsters who managed to avoid the draft in the following way:
Where were the sons of all the big shots who supported the war? Not in my
platoon. Our guys" people were workers.. .If the war was so important, why didn't
our leaders put eveiyone's son in there, only us?
Student peace activists believed that their anti-war crusade was a noble one, but they
often failed to notice that while they avoided the draft, joined demonstrations, and
confronted the American establishment, other youngsters -working-class boys- were
domg the "dirty work" in Southeast Asia.
Antiwar liberals advised peace protesters to dissociate themselves from the public
stereotype of the violent demonstrator, to avoid downgrading patriotism, and to cite the
great number of leaders who opposed the war. "Respect for, and comprehension of, the
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other man's concerns is the beginning and the basis for lasting political persuasion,"
recommended The Dove 's Guide. Although many peace activists were genuinely
committed to understanding ^the other man's concerns," they did not always Cully
understand the war's real impact on the lower classes of American society. Also, radicals
often jailed to acknowledge the fact that many workers viewed their antiwar struggle as
an elitist attack by a privileged minority who could avoid the draft.''^
Rather than resist the draft, many college men who opposed the war in Vietnam
chose to evade it, taking what journalist James f allows called the 'Ihinking-man route."
Middle-class students knew the details of physical deferments; an "underweight
disqualification," for instance, could do the job. Working-class youngsters seldom had
access to this kind of information, f allows, a Harvard University alumnus, recalled how
his humane Cambridge antiwar friends "let the boys from Clielsea be sent off to die."
Not only did college students often have very personal motivations to oppose the war,
fallows claims, but they also harbored class prejudices against the workers. In their
narrow mindedness, he says, many peace activists thought that the working-class boys
simply needed some lessons on the correct approach to the war in Indochina and to the
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dralt at home. One ol the priorities ol the worker-student alliance that some radicals
proposed was to launch political-educational campaigns to reach the American working
class. A Cambridge pamphlet that circulated in the summer of 1970 admitted that the
peace movement was largely middle class: 'Though there is very wide opposition to the
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war among workers," the document stated, "as a class they stand back from the
movement." As they had done in the summer of 1969, radical antiwar activists were
inviting students to participate in a work-in that would build ties between the antiwar
activists and the workers/'
The work-in was a well-intentioned effort, but college students were not always
aware of their class privileges. Although peace activists frequently mentioned casualty
rates in their speeches against the American military intervention in Vietnam, they rarely
stressed the "class" percentage of the dead and wounded. Students also often looked
down on the "ignorant" lower class who appeared to support the war. And linally, large
numbers of peace demonstrators used the word "pig" to refer to blue-collar citizens who
disapproved of antiwar demonstrations such as the one staged in Chicago in 1968. "We
hated the pigs," Fallows stated, "and let them know it, and it was no great wonder that
.
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they hated us m return." The ritt between the antiwar movement and the working class
was widely discussed throughout the late 1960s. Events in May 1970, however,
galvanized the image of the white worker as a reactionary and rampaging patriot.
By the spring of 1970, many peace activists felt that their efforts during the
October Moratorium and the November Mobilization to End the War had accomplished
little. "In April 1970," Foner stated, "the antiwar movement was in a state of quiescence"
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but "it was the calm before the storm." At the end of the month, Nixon's decision to
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3, Vietnamese Conllict, Vertical Files, RWLA.
52
Fallows, 16-17.
53
Foner, 96.
179
send U. S. ground troops into Cambodia further polarized American public opinion on
the war. According to Newsweek, the president "had plunged American troops into
Cambodia in hopes of shocking the Communist enemy and stabilizing a turbulent
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world/' Nixon's move was a gross miscalculation. His announcement of the invasion
of Cambodia shocked Americans who believed de-escalation of the war was underway.
In response, thousands joined antiwar demonstrations throughout the country.
Nixon's decision hardly moved Meany and his supporters. The AFL-CIO
leadership simply reaffirmed its support for the administration's handling of the war. On
May 1. 1970. the AFL-CIO Department of Public Relations released the following
statement:
The President has clearly outlined the problem to the American people. It is
unmistakably clear that he made his decision on the basis of his clear obligation as
commander-in-chief to protect American servicemen[...] In this crucial hour, he
should have the full support of the American people. He certainly has ours.^^
A few days after Nixon's Cambodian decision, a violent confrontation between peace
demonstrators and New York construction workers reinforced the image of working-class
hawkishness.
Violent protests broke out immediately after the president's announcement of the
Cambodian invasion and within a few days there was serious unrest at a number of
colleges and universities. The list included the University of Maryland, the University of
Cincinnati, Ohio State University, and Columbia University. But it was Kent State
University in Ohio that made the shocking headlines on May 4, 1970. During a campus
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antiwar demonstration, the Ohio National Guard shot and killed four students and
wounded another twelve. Nixon made his chilling response to the Kent State killings
public through his press secretary: "When dissent turns to violence, it invites tragedy.'
The Kent State students were not the only victims of the widespread violence: this widely
publicized tragedy was followed by the less reported police shooting of six African-
Americans in Augusta, Georgia and another two at Jackson State in Mississippi.
The murder of peace demonstrators prompted more protest and eventually led to a
violent physical confrontation between students and workers. On May 8, 1970, about
two hundred flag-waving construction workers armed with hammers and lead pipes
attacked a group of demonstrators who had gathered in New York's Wall Street district to
honor the memory of the students killed at Kent State University. After the assault, the
"hardhats -as the mass media would call them—invaded City Hall and then left to break
57
mto Pace College and attack some students there. As Maurice Isserman contends, "The
"hardhats" were instantly enshrined in political myth, symbols ofunthinking
authoritarianism to the left, and of rugged patriotism to the right."' To journalists, social
scientists, politicians and moviemakers alike, the construction worker soon became the
symbol of American labor: the hard hat was the "Middle American," the member of "the
silent majority" who had finally decided to speak his mind.
^^"Mr. Nixon's Home Front," 27,
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Peter I. Brennan, president of the Building and Construction Trades Council of
Greater New York, claimed that the construction workers' violent protest had been
spontaneous. The union leaders, Brennan insisted, had not played any role in planning it,
"They did it," Brennan said, "because they were fed up with violence by anti-war
demonstrators, by those who spat on the American flag and desecrated it."^^
Nevertheless, on May 19, during a Council meeting held at the Commodore Hotel, the
union leadership approved the decision to hold a rally at City Hall the following day.
The union minutes summed up the purpose of the demonstration:
[...] let the general public know what we think of our flag and country. ..the one
and only, U.S.A. [...] bring your banners and get your rank and file members to
march, but once again. ..no violence. Let us show the city and the country that we
are law-abiding citizens.
It would prove very hard for construction workers to recover their image as "law
abiding" citizens after the mass media had portrayed them as believers in "God and
country" and "not necessarily in equality for all and the right of dissent."^' The hard-
hats" reputation was further damaged by the accusation that most workers had not
participated spontaneously in the pro-war and "patriotic" demonstrations. Fred Cook, a
contributor to The Nation, contended that most protests had been carefully orchestrated.
Construction firms encouraged the demonstrations, by allowing workers to close down
their jobs and paying them for marching instead of working. The New York City police
^Vook, 716.
^Vhe Minutes of the Building and Construction Trades Council (1936-1984), Microfilm,
George Meany Files, Office of the President, GMMA.
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either turned a blind eye on hard-hats' violent behavior or simply cheered construction
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workers on. At a Washington Press Conference, UAW president Leonard Woodcock
referred to the hard-hat demonstrations as ''mobilized, organized, possibly paid violence."
Construction workers, Woodcock contended, had received "the same pay as if they had
63
continued to work all week."
The Cambodian invasion and the developments that followed deepened the
divisions within organized labor as a larger number of leaders and rank and filers became
»
more vocal for or against the war. Jack Barnes, the Socialist Worker Party secretary,
claimed that the post-Cambodia upsurge had brought about crucial changes in the labor
movement:
[ The] open breaks in the labor bureaucracies make it possible for opponents of the
war inside the unions to effectively argue their view and mobilize the sentiment
against the war that already exists among millions of American workers.''^
Barnes" claim, though probably optimistic, was well taken. For the first time, a number
of union leaders did break with the AFL-CIO official stance on the Vietnam War.
At about the same time that hard-hat demonstrators stormed into the Wall Street
district to beat up peace activists, a different kind of labor activism was taking shape on
the West Coast. Organized labor in the San Francisco Bay Area directed its anger against
the Nixon Administration's escalation of the war and not against the antiwar movement.
"cook, 713.
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On May 18, 452 Bay Area trade union officers, executive board members and shop
stewards placed a full-page advertisement in the San Francisco Chronicle. "Dear Mr.
President:" the ad began, "American working people and their families are deeply
disturbed at your expansion of the war into Cambodia. Those men being killed are our
sons..." I he unionists^ petition stressed their distrust of the administration and demanded
U. S. immediate withdrawal of troops from Vietnam and Cambodia."
Another important development took place on May 24. Jacob S. Potofsky, a
member of the AFL-CIO thirty-five man Executive Council, publicly broke with the top
bureaucracy's position on the war. The president of the 41 7,000-member Amalgamated
Clothing Workers of America contended that the union's rank and lile, "like the majority
of all Americans," longed for "peace now, without delay, without further military
adventures, without more killing." In a similar vein, the American Federation of State,
County and Municipal Employees (AFSCME), which represented about 490,000
workers, called for an end to the war. The union passed a resolution stating that the
AFSCME not only opposed "the expansion of the Vietnam War into Cambodia" but also
called for "the immediate and total withdrawal of all U. S. armed forces from Southeast
66
Asia."
A day after Potofsky's break, August Scholle, the Michigan State AFI^CIO
president, also distanced himself from Meany's position on the war. At a news
conference held at the Michigan AFL-CIO headquarters in Detroit, Scholle stressed the
need for the labor movement to join students in their opposition to the war. The highlight
""We've had it!," San Francisco Chronicle, 18 May 1970, 15.
^Yabor Says: "End the War," fiyer. Folder 1, Box 12, Labor Today Collection, WSIJA.
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Of the press conference was the unionists' call for an Emergency National Conference
Against the Cambodia-Laos-Vietnam War. The sponsors of this antiwar parley stated
that the conference was not intended "to hammer out the strategy of tactics of social
revolution or to found a new political party or movement;" its major aim was to organize
massive opposition to the war. The Cleveland Area Peace Action Council would host
this antiwar meeting, the first one with significant trade union sponsorship,
Nixon's decision to invade Cambodia and the social unrest that followed further
polarized U.S. society. The May 1970 events marked a turning point in organized labor's
stance on the Vietnam War. A large number of leaders and rank and filers decided either
to break openly with the AFL-CIO top bureaucracy's position or to embrace a pro-war
position by participating in "patriotic" demonstrations. Numerous unions made public
statements against the war and distanced themselves from the "official" AFL-CIO"s
support of Nixon's handling of the war. But it was the New York hard-hats' pro-war
demonstrators that made the headlines in the media.
In public discourse, the mass media and commercial iconography, the
construction worker would replace the factory worker as the prototypical American blue-
collar. The New York hard-hats matched the stereotype of the American rank and filer as
relatively affluent and satisfied with his job but also authoritarian and hawkish. Many
observers argued that the hard-hats were simply "Middle Americans/' members of the
"Silent Majority" who were now openly demanding law and order at home and peace
with honor in South Vietnam. Reports of the hard-hats" displays of patriotism soon
eclipsed the discussion of the "blue-collar blues" that had occupied political analysts at
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the end of the decade. In the construction workers Nixon saw an unprecedented
opportunity to expand his poUtical base in the direction of the blue-collar workers,
especially in northern industrial areas that had traditionally aligned themselves with the
Democratic Party. As the president prepared for the 1970 Congressional elections, the
first political test of his administration, a White House strategist stated that workers were
"swimming toward the Nixon Administration on grounds of patriotism, support for law
and order, and against the left-wing extremists in the Democratic Party."^^
As Senator McGovcrn stated in his foreword to The Silent Majority and the
Vietnam War, II. S. military intervention in Indochina was "in sharp conilict with beliefs
and attitudes held by most Americans." The war's consequences such as high taxes,
infiation, social unrest and rising casualties were debasing the "American Dream." In
order to turn "the silent majority" against the Vietnamese conflict, McGovern argued,
peace advocates needed "to make the connection"" between the war and the people's
69
hardships "compelling enough." As the Congressional elections approached, it
remained to be seen who would be the most successful in making the "right connections."
Inspired by the hard-hats" patriotic demonstrations, Nixon exacerbated the Social Issue.
The 1970 election results eventually showed that the Economic Issue could not be
underestimated.
"Nixon"s Plan To Win The Blue-Collar Vote," U. S. News & World Report, 20 July
1970, 20.
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CHAPTER 6
THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY IN DISARRAY
In the months preceding the 1970 congressional elections, it was clear to Richard
Nixon that he faced an uphill struggle to win workers away from the Democratic Party.
Jerome M. Rosow, the Assistant Secretary of Labor for Policy, Evaluation and Research,
was one of the administration's blue-collar strategists. At Nixon's request, in 1970,
Rosow produced a report on The Problems ofthe Blue-Collar Worker. The working
group that joined Rosow in his venture included George P. Schultz, the Secretary of
Labor, Attorney General John N. Mitchell; Donald Rumsfeld, director of the Office of
Economic Opportunity, and Daniel P. Moynihan, counselor to the president. Rosow
stated that his objective was to prove that there was a "blue-collar problem" and that the
administration was intent on solving it. "We know the United States is an affluent
society,'" added the assistant secretary of labor, "and it goes against our preconceptions to
think that the American worker is in a bind."'
The public release of Rosow's report on August 13, 1970, was a clear indication
of Nixon's intention to win over the votes of blue-collar workers during the forthcoming
elections. The analysis focused on the problems of families with incomes between $
5,000 and $ 10,000 a year. This income range covered families living above the poverty
level but below the $ 10,664 a year that the Labor Department considered necessary for
an urban family of four to enjoy an "adequate" standard of living. The report advocated
^CPR NationalJournal (January 1, 1971), 236, Folder 17, Box 031, COPE Research
Files, George Meany Memorial Archives (Hereafter GMMA).
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better educational opportunities for working-class children and adults, tax breaks,
improved housing, and better transportation. He proposed, however, no concrete
measures to achieve these goals.
Most labor leaders gave Rosow's report a cold shoulder. When questioned about
The Problems ofthe Blue-Collar Worker, union presidents Paul Jennings, I. W. Abel and
Leonard Woodcock, who represented the electrical, steel and autoworkers respectively,
agreed that it was facile and that the conclusions were obvious. The administration was
dramatizing facts that union leaders had been saying for many years. Moreover, the
report was flawed in that it downplayed the impact of unemployment and inflation.
Woodcock stated, "There is no question that the blue-collar believes that he has been
neglected. People do want to know that the leaders of unions and political leaders are
2
aware of their problems and thinking of solutions to them;' Despite the administration's
efforts to express concern for the plight of the worker, the labor leaders asserted, it would
prove very difficuh for Republican candidates to woo the blue-collar voter with a an
economic "game plan'^ that entailed tight money, unemployment and high interest rates.
The "game plan'' was the administration's first response to rising inflation, which
was perceived as the most pressing economic problem by the time of Nixon's
inauguration. The president was undoubtedly a conservative, but his conservatism was
often hard to categorize. On the one hand, Nixon believed that the federal government's
intervention in the economy should be minimal. On the other hand, he viewed "activism"
as the key to a great presidency. In its successive attempts to solve the country's
^Ibid., 238.
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economic problems, the administration would not only be active; it would also contradict
most of Nixon's conservative tenets. Ironically, to a president so intent on exploiting the
Social Issue, the Economic Issue became a paramount concern. Historian Allen Matusow
explains:
[Nixon] spent countless hours pondering how to prevent the economy from
defeating him, how to manipulate foreign trade and monetary issues to woo labor,
how to appease voters with doubtful policies he did not believe in while keeping
'
his conservative base intact.
In the late 1960s, Kcynesianism and monetarism were the two dominant and
opposing economic theories. Keynesian economists regarded the private sector as
responsible for economic instability and the government's fiscal policy as capable of
keeping the economy running smoothly. By cutting taxes and increasing expenditures to
raise aggregate demand and maintain employment, Keynesians asserted, the government
could avoid recessions. By raising taxes and cutting expenditures to take pressure off
prices, conversely, the government could curb inflation. Monetarists disagreed. Milton
Freeman of the University of Chicago, monetarism's highly regarded theoretician,
contended that governments, not the private sector, caused economic instability. The
U.S. Federal Reserve, which controlled the money supply in the country, was the true
cause of booms and busts. Economic stability depended largely on the Federal Reserve's
monetary policy. While Kcynesianism prevailed during the Democratic administrations
of the 1960s, monetarism dominated the economic policies of Nixon's first two years in
office.
Allen .1. Matusow, Nixon "v Economy: Booms, Busts, Dollars, and Votes (Lawrence,
Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 1998), 6.
^bid., 12-14.
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In 1969 and 1970, Paul McCracken, a monetarist and the first chair of Nixon'
Council of Economic Advisors (CEA), shaped the administration's game plan. The
Director of the Office of Management and Budget (0MB), the chair of the Federal
Reserve and the secretary of the treasury completed Nixon's quadriad of economic
advisors. McCracken sought to cool off the economy and curb inflation by resorting to
both fiscal and monetary restraint. His policy, McCracken told Congress, was to slow the
economy "gradually"; consequently, it came to be referred to as "gradualism." The
government extended the existing 10 percent income tax surcharge and repealed the
investment tax credit while the Federal Reserve slowed the growth in the money supply
from 7.9 percent in late 1968 to less than 5 percent in mid- 1969.^ Intended to stifle
inflation, the "game plan" ran the risk of causing a recession. By the end of 1970,
gradualism had not worked in the way economic analysts expected. The economic
downturn that Nixon feared so much had cost him substantial political losses during the
off-year election.
The 1 970 Congressional election returns reinvigorated labor leaders' confidence
in the New Deal coalition of workers, liberals and minorities as an effective base for
winning elections. That year's voting patterns seemed to indicate that the American
public rejected conservatives. Democratic candidates drew 69 percent of the votes of
blue-collar workers, 75 percent of low-income voters, 59 percent of city dwellers and 90
percent of African-Americans. Nationally, the Democratic Party received 53 percent of
"Robert M. Collins, More: The Politics ofEcofwmic Growth in Postwar America (New
York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 1 12.
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the vote. The presence of George Meany and other top labor leaders at the 1 970 Labor
Day dinner held at the White House created the impression that the AFL-CIO president
was on the verge of supporting Republican candidates. During the Congressional
election campaign, however, Meany chastised the Nixon Administration and urged union
members to vote for labor-supported candidates.
Al Barkan, director of the AFL-CIO Committee on Political Education (COPE),
contended that during the 1970 electoral campaign the Republican Party had misjudged
the appeal of the law-and-order issue to workers and underestimated the importance of
their economic concerns. In a statement issued at the end of 1970, Meany claimed:
While people are losing their jobs, the Administration is talking about its game
plan. ..Approximately two million more Americans are out of work today than a
year ago. Those who still have jobs have been hit hard by an economic policy
that increases unemployment, continues inflation, cuts the workweek and reduces
production. Its game plan has failed. Economically and humanly, it flopped.
In the aftemiath of the 1970 congressional election, Nixon's political strategists
thought it evident that the Republican candidates would not secure endorsements from
the unions in the near future. The Republicans' aim therefore should be to capture votes
from the rank-and-file. If the economic difficulties were turned around and the
Democrats did not have a program to take on the offensive, the administration was
confident that the Republican Party would make a strong appeal to union members in the
next election campaign. This would be more a '^Middle America strategy'' than a blue-
collar strategy.
^Memo from COPE, Committee on Political Education, AFL-CIO (January 4, 1971), 2,
Folder 17, Box 031, COPE Research Files, GMMA.
^CPR National Journal 233.
192
The crucial issue in 1971 was the administration's ability to reverse the economic
downturn. While gradualism had hurt the administration in the 1970 election, it had
achieved some victories, according to Alan Matusow. ''At relatively little cost," he says,
"the administration had reduced excess demand and now stood on the brink of non-
inflationary recovery/'** Although his economic policies were producing slow resuhs,
Nixon stayed with gradualism a few more months. Nixon still trusted the judgment of
George Schultz, the head of the Office of Management and Budget and a Friedman
disciple. Yet the president promised that his 1971 State of the Union Message would be
"the most comprehensive, the most far reaching, the most bold program in the domestic
9
field ever presented to an American Congress." This was Nixon^s attempt to assume the
role of a domestic reformer and thus pave the way for a reelection bid in 1972.
During his address, Nixon anticipated expansionary policies. In a demagogic
effort to align himself with the dissatisfied ''middle Americans," the president made what
Time referred to as a "self-condemnatory statement:"
Most Americans today are simply fed up with government at all levels. They will
not—and should not— continue to tolerate the gap between promise and
periormance.
A ''new American Revolution", Nixon contended, "a peaceful revolution in which power
was turned back to the people," would remedy the situation. The president's most
significant proposal was a 25 percent net increase over the 1971 budget in the funds that
8
Matusow, 87.
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'The Nixon ^^Revolution": Promise and Performance, " Time, 1 February 1971, 1
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flowed from the federal government to states and communities. Although Nixon
proposed total spending of $ 16 billion, only $ 6 billion of that sum was newly
appropriated money. Nixon told a newspaper reporter at^er the speech, "I'm now a
Keynesian in economics."''
Organized labor received the State of the Union message as coolly as did the
democratically controlled 92"'' Congress. Soon after the address, UAW president
Leonard Woodcock, testifying before the Joint Economic Committee of Congress,
contended that Nixon's budget was "simply a mildly expansionary budget." The
administration would spend the same amount it received in revenues and thus achieve
"full employment." In the UAW president's view, however, Nixon's "full employmenf
was actually a four percent rate of unemployment. Moreover, Woodcock criticized
Nixon's plan to share federal revenue with states, since "the greater part of the funds for
revenue sharing would come from cutting back existing federal programs." Woodcock
contended that state and local governments were often less concerned with the needs of
the people and more subject to the influence of special interest groups than was the
federal government.'^
The presidential decision that really infuriated labor leaders was his thumbs-down
on the manpower bill. During the highest unemployment in more than a decade -6
percent in January 1971- Nixon vetoed a bill that could have created thousands of public
service jobs and provided funds for urban development, pay raises for federal workers,
and an extension of a hospital construction aid program. The bill had passed in the
Business Week, 16 January 1971, 22
UAW Solidarity, March 1971, 3
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House of Representatives by a 177-159 vote, and in the Senate, 68-13. The AFL-CIO
Committee on Political Education contended that "the manpower legislation stood as one
of the most important pieces of domestic legislation" because it had intended to establish
for the tlrst time "federally-supported public service employment." The bill would have
enabled local and state governments and nonprofit institutions such as community
hospitals to hire unemployed workers for needed services, with the federal government
paying 80 percent of payroll costs. Both Meany and Woodcock condemned Nixon for
distorting the bill's language and intent in his veto statement. Labor leaders viewed the
bill as indispensable to creating "useful jobs needed by the community," not "dead-end,
make-work jobs," as Nixon called them.'"'
The first months of 1971 were undoubtedly one of lowest points of Nixon's first
term as president. In his memoirs, he admitted that the administration's problems were
so overwhelming that even his nomination for reelection in 1972 was being questioned.'^
In February 1971
,
the construction industry presented a profound challenge to Nixon's
ability to control the inflationary spiral. The nation's largest industry had negotiated
first-year wage increases averaging 8 percent; to administration officials, something close
15
to 6 percent would be justified. The president had two options. He could institute a
clampdown on construction prices and wages under the authority granted to him by
13
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Congress
-despite his opposition- in August 1970. Or he could suspend the Davis-Bacon
bill that since 1931 required contractors to pay union rates on federal or federally
supported construction projects. Despite advice to the contrary, Nixon chose to suspend
the Davis-Bacon bill and thus permit federal construction contracts to be negotiated
below prevailing wage rates.
Unions regarded this action as union busting. Construction firms that were
unionized were alarmed at the possibility of losing contracts to nonunion contractors.
Nixon's decision caused a flurry of activity among union leaders who viewed it as a
crackdown on unions. Meany made it clear that the AFL-CIO did not consider the
administration's effort to restrain construction wages even-handed or workable. '1t is
absolutely, completely unfair to make the construction worker the whipping boy," the
AFL-CIO president insisted. In an April Senate appearance, Meany roasted Arthur F.
Bums, one of the architects of the administration's economic policy and chairman of the
Federal Reserve Board. Meany lashed out at the administration's "'double standard" of
rewarding big business and banks while demanding wage restrains from working people.
In the AFL-CIO leadership's view, the Nixon Administration intended to cover up the
.16
failure of its economic policies by making a "scapegoat" of American workers.
In May 1971, a Gallup survey indicated that public concern over inflation was
greater than during the 1958 recession. The Vietnam War continued to be named as the
'^"Meany Hits Move to Brand Workers as ''Scapegoats:' AFL-CIO News. 10 April 1971,
1-2.
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country's top problem but economic issues were now a close second.'^ A few months
later, public confidence in the Nixon Administration's game plan reached a new low.
More than five million workers were unemployed and several million more were working
less than full-time because of production cutbacks. Unemployment rates for construction
workers were up to 9.6 percent, 10.1 percent for African-Americans and 10.1 percent for
1
8
young men 20 to 24 years of age.
By June 1971, the CEA seriously doubted that gradualism could work. Nixon's
economic advisors seemed to be slowly metamorphosing into Keynesians. There were
calls for a 7.5 percent growth in the money supply over 1972, an 8-million tax cut and
even wage-price controls. Years later, Nixon stated:
The economy remained sluggish in the early months of 1971 . There were signs of
improvement ahead, but patience had worn thin and we ran out of time. Demands
for action poured down on the White House from all sides. Media criticism of our
policies became intense. Republicans as well as Democrats reflected the pressure
they were receiving from their constituents and vociferously called for new
policies.
On August 13, the president and his top economic advisors left Washington D.C. for a
secret meeting at Camp David. The key figures making the trip were Treasury Secretary
John Connally, head of the 0MB George Schultz, chairman of the Federal Reserve
Arthur Bums, and chainnan of the CEA Paul McCracken. As Nixon recalled, they were
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"running out of time." The president's chances of reelection depended largely on his
successful handling of the economy.
The administration desperately needed to find a way to promote economic
recovery and reduce unemployment while solving the problems of inflation and the
international standing of the dollar. The New Economic Policy (NEP) agreed upon
during the Camp David meeting was an all-out war on the nation's economic woes. The
new plan relied largely on three key measures. First, Nixon"s advisors expected a series
of tax cuts for business and individuals to stimulate the economy and bring down
unemployment rates. Secondly, a 4.7 million-dollar cut in federal spending along with a
90-day freeze on wages and prices would supposedly cool off the inflationary spiral.
And thirdly, the president's top aids argued that the termination of the dollar-gold
convertibility and a 10 percent border tax on imports would protect the dollar and the
..... 20
country s economic position in the international scene.
On August 1, 1971, the New York Times pointed out, "It may well be, as President
Nixon's top advisors have been suggesting, that with more patience and persistence
everything will work out fine. But the ranks of the doubters seem to be growing steadily
21
and substantially." Two weeks later, the president unveiled "the most comprehensive
New Economic Policy to be undertaken by this nation in four decades." Time compared
Nixon's swift reverse in policy to the sweeping changes introduced during the first
hundred days of the New Deal in 1933. Faced with mounting inflation and
unemployment, the president imposed direct controls on prices and wages for the first
20
Collins, 120-121; Matusow, 150.
^^New York Times, 1 August 1 1971, Secfion III, 1.
198
time since the Korean War and committed the federal government to a major role in
businesses' pay and pricing decisions. When Nixon announced the wage-price freeze,
the president based his action on the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970. This law
granted stand-by powers to the president to "issue such orders as he may deem
appropriate to stabilize prices, rents, wages and salaries." Ironically, Nixon had
vigorously opposed the bill and insisted that he would never use it. Not only was the
president taking the Democrats' advice in economic matters, he was also resorting to
legislation that the opposition party had forced upon him.
The most controversial element in Nixon's package was the freeze on prices,
wages, rents and dividends for a 90-day period. Labor leaders quickly spelled out their
objections to the president's grand design for economic recovery. Meany was outraged at
what he considered a highly discriminatory program that favored big business at the
expense of workers. Wages were frozen but there was no freeze on interest rates, profits,
stocks, the price of land, capital gains and dividends. Employers, the AFL-CIO president
argued, would be happy to enforce the wage freeze but there was no effective machinery
to enforce price controls.
On August 19, the AFL-CIO Council issued a report that described the freeze as
"unequitable, unjust, unfair and unworkable." The practical effect of the president's
design for recovery was to nullify every collective bargaining agreement that provided a
wage or salary adjustment during the 90-day period. The statement concluded with a
pledge that the AFL-CIO Executive Council had made on other occasions since 1966:
We will cooperate with fair, equitable, across-the board mandatory controls on all
costs, prices and incomes including profits, interest rates, dividends and executive
^^Time, 30 August 1971, 8.
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compensation as well as workers' wages and salaries. The presidenfs program
does not meet that test.
Within forty-eight hours of the president announcing his new game plan, the
UAW International Executive Board met in special session to analyze the implications of
the freeze. The Board unanimously agreed that the union would not permit abrogation of
wage provisions, including its cost-of-living and annual improvement factor clauses. The
UAW board also authorized Woodcock to propose to Meany and Teamsters president
Frank Fitzsimmons "joint action" to mobilize other unions against the wage freeze. In an
August 18 wire sent to the AFL-CIO chieftain. Woodcock stated: "we are ready to join
with you and all of American labor in necessary action to obtain an economic policy in
24
the interests of the broad mass of the American people." Labor leaders appeared to be
united on their all-out campaign against Nixon's order. Woodcock's appearance at
Meany 's Washington office shortly thereafter fueled press speculation that the UAW
might soon re-affiliate with the AFL-CIO.
Shortly after the AFL-CIO report was issued, a group of labor representatives was
invited to the White House to meet with the president, John Connally, George Schultz,
Paul McCracken, Arthur Bums, Hebert Stein and Jim Hogson, the men in charge of
making the wage-price freeze work. The Cost of Living Council, under the chairmanship
of Treasury Secretary Connally, was the agency empowered to impose the controls. "We
^^Statement by the AFL-CIO Executive Council, Washington D.C. (August 19, 1971),
Folder 2, Box 4, Leonard Woodcock Papers, UAW President's Office, Wayne State
University Archives of Labor and Urban Affairs (Hereafter WSUA).
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told them," recalled Meany, "that we would suggest the establishment of an independent,
voluntary agency free from government control, of a tripartite nature, similar to the War
Labor Board of World War II."'' The AFL-CIO president's recommendation eventually
shaped Phase II of Nixon's new program, which was to begin on November 13 when the
90-day freeze on prices and wages expired. The administration's NEP in general and the
price and wage controls in particular earned considerable public approval. Trade
unionists were the biggest exception. This posed a serious problem for Nixon as the
president was convinced that his building of a New Majority depended largely on
organized labor's support. Before Phase I was over, Nixon set out to make peace with
the upper echelons of the labor leadership.
The administration's first conciliatory gesture came on October 5. Labor
Secretary James Hogson announced that the president had agreed to the AFL-CIO" s plan
for an independent voluntary agency. The three major economic watchdogs to police
Phase II of the program would be the Price Commission and two semiautonomous
groups, the Cost of Living Council and the Pay Board. The Price Commission,
composed of several private citizens appointed by the president, was to develop price and
rent guidelines and to provide supervision, interpretation and enforcement. The fifteen-
member Pay Board would be composed equally of representatives of labor, business and
the public. The five union leaders would be Woodcock, Meany, Fitzsimmons of the
Teamsters, 1. W. Abel of the Steelworkers, and Floyed E. Smith of the Machinists. This
agency would set up wage yardsticks and see that labor and business respected them.
'^AFL-CIO President George Meany 's opening remarks to the ninth convention, ^FI-
CIO American Federationist. December 1971, 3.
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After the brief television address in which the president announced the guidehnes for
Phase II, Meany told the press, "Speaking for organized labor, we will agree to help make
It work."
Union leaders' optimism about labor's participation in the enforcement of an
equitable wage-price freeze soon disappeared. It was not clear to the AFL-CIO
Executive Council that the Pay Board would be a truly independent agency, and Meany
demanded total autonomy. "We were not going to provide a facade for an agency that
really was not voluntary, but was under government control," Meany claimed. In an
October 1 1 Memorandum, Nixon reassured the Pay Board's labor representatives that the
Cost of Living Council would not "approve, revise, veto or revoke specific standards or
27
critena developed by the Pay Board and Price Commission."
The veto issue clarified, labor leaders then had serious objections to Nixon's
choice of public representatives for the board. Judge George Bolt, the appointed
chairman of the Pay Board, was on the federal payroll. The second member, William
Weber, had been on the government payroll from January 1969 until October 21,1971,
when he became a public representative. Another board member was William Caples, a
retired businessman who had spent most of his life in industry as executive vice-president
of Inland Steel Company. The fourth and fifth members were Kevin Gordon and Dr.
Neil H. Jacoby. Gordon was from the Brookings Institution and one-time Director of the
Budget and Jacoby was a conservative economist from the Council of Economic
^''Newsweek, 18 October 18 1971, 26,
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Advisors during the Eisenhower Administration. Considering the pubUc members,
Meany concluded that being on the board was like "'playing with loaded dice." The AFL-
28CIO president saw "very little hope for equity."
The rift between organized labor and the Nixon Administration deepened in
November when the business and public representatives of the Pay Board reftised to grant
retroactive wage increases that fell due during the freeze period of Phase T In an attempt
to confront labor on its own turf, Nixon attended the AFL-CIO Convention in Bal
Harbour, Florida, and delivered a speech that received, at best, polite applause. Nixon's
message was clear: the administration would press wage-price controls whether labor
liked it or not. In his address to the convention the day before, Meany had said: "If the
President of the United States doesn't want our membership on the Pay Board on our
terms, he knows what he can do." In his speech, Nixon asserted that the AFL-CIO
president was correct: "A great majority of the American people, and a majority of union
members want to stop the rise in the cost of living - and that's what we are going to do."
Nixon's presence at the convention made headlines in all the major newspapers. Most
reports said that the president was shocked and angered when Meany banged his gavel
and ordered delegates back to their seats and added, "We will now proceed with Act
AFL-CIO President George Meany's opening remarks to the ninth convention. ^FI-
ClO American Federationist, December 1971, 5-6.
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The AFL-CIO Executive Council stood firm in its criticism of the
administration's wage and price control mechanisms, issuing a scathing resolution on
labor's role on the Pay Board. The statement made two major accusations. The board's
public members, the AFL-CIO council claimed, were ^'not independent but rather ...
handmaidens of the Administration." The second accusation referred to the Pay Board
rulings against wage increases due contractually during the 90-day freeze: "We flatly
reject the concept that anyone," stated the report, "has the power to abrogate any legal
collective bargaining agreement...
"^^
The president did not miss the chance to exploit the rift between organized labor
and his administration and to speak over the labor leaders' heads to working people, the
middle Americans whom he had targeted. Nixon had done this during the 1968
presidential campaign when he spoke to the "forgotten American" and again in 1970,
when he praised the hard-hats for their pro-war march down Wall Street. In the midst of
the controversy over the wage-price freeze, the Administration brought up the old
question of "who represents labor?" Government officials pointed out that only 25
percent of the American work force of 80 million people were unionized and that the
AFL-CIO unions represented only 16 percent of workers. Treasury Secretary John
Connally told the press: "We cannot permit one man to put himself above the interest of
„31
all the working people of this country. He does not represent all ot those people."
Resolution on Labor's Role on the Pay Board, AFL-CIO American Federatkmist,
December 1971, 5.
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Surveys conducted after Nixon's announcement of the wage-price freeze gave
substance to the accusation that labor leaders were '^out of touch" with their membership.
According to an August Gallup poll, seven in ten Americans approved of the president's
new economic program: 46 percent approved of it strongly and 22 percent only mildly.
The report stressed that 91 percent of the persons interviewed had heard or read about the
president's 90-day program, "the highest awareness figures registered in Gallup surveys
32
m recent years." In October, Albert E. Sindlinger took a consumer confidence poll for
Time. His findings appeared to confirm the results of the August Gallup Survey. Of
1,114 people polled, 73 percent thought that the freeze was a good economic measure,
while 16 percent thought that it was not. The survey results among union members were
slightly different. When asked if they thought that Meany and Woodcock were right in
their opposition to the freeze, 37 percent agreed with the labor leaders while 54 percent
disagreed. In non-union households, 20 percent considered that the leaders were right
and 60 percent that they were wrong.
In March 1972, the clash between organized labor's leadership and the Nixon
Administration reached a climax when the International Longshore and Warehouse
Workers Union (ILWU) won a strike with a 21 percent wage increase. The ILWU's
gains violated the Pay Board standards that set a ceiling for annual wage increases at 5.5
percent. Harry Bridges, the West Coast dockworkers' leader, threatened to resume the
strike if the Board reduced the settlement. The Pay Board responded on March 16 by
The Gallup Poll Cumulative Index, Report N° 74, August 1971, 1-2.
"Support for the Rank and File," Time, 6 September 1971, 12.
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cutting the ILWU's contract from 21 percent to 16 percent. Bridges eventually
capitulated, handing the Pay Board an important victory. Two months later, the Board
applied the ILWU settlement formula to the Atlantic and Gulf contracts negotiated by the
International Longshoremen's Association (ILA). First-year wage increases were cut
from 15 percent to 12 percent in some ports and from 12 percent to 9 percent in others.^^
The Pay Board's actions won it the respect of those Americans who regarded the unions'
gains as inflationary.
The AFL-CIO president and three other labor members walked off the Pay Board
in protest. In a unanimously adopted statement, the AFL-CIO Executive Council stated:
"We will not be part of the window-dressing of a system of unfair and inequitable
government control of wages, for the benefit of business profits." Meany, Abel of the
Steelworkers and Floyd E. Smith of the Machinists resigned immediately. Woodcock
resigned the following day after a meeting with the UAW Executive Council. Teamsters
president Fitzsimmons decided to remain on the board although he was said to be
dissatisfied with its composition and major decisions. By the time the labor leaders left
the Board, however, almost all control procedures and policies had been formulated and
the year's major bargaining problems had been settled. Despite the labor leaders'
indignation at the Pay Board's wage cuts, Newsweek contended, "it was politics more
36
than economics that compelled the labor members to quit even then."
Newsweek, 27 March 1972, 83.
35
Matusow, 197.
"AFL-CIO Quits Pay Board, Sees "No Hope" for Justice," ^FL-CVC; News, 25 March,
1972; Newsweek, 1 April 1972, 21.
206
Soon after the labor representatives' resignations, Nixon announced a revamped
Pay Board. The tripartite structure was dropped and a single public unit set up. The new
board would consist of the five public members, labor leader Fitzsimmons, and a
businessman to be selected by Nixon. The seven new board members would represent
"the public,'' Nixon said. The president did not miss the opportunity to win support for
the new arrangement by pitting union members against non-unionized workers. After
accusing the three labor leaders of being "selfish and irresponsible," Nixon said:
As president, I cannot permit any leader representing a special interest, no matter
how powerful, to torpedo and sink a program which is needed to protect the
public interest.
Nixon figured that there might be resentment among nonunion workers over the wage
increases that the most powerful unions won for their unions. An attack on the labor
bosses, he thought, could win blue-collar voters.
In the months that followed the labor walkout from the Pay Board, the president's
fortune shifted dramatically. Early in 1971, few political analysts would have predicted a
Nixon landslide but in 1972 the incumbent swept the electoral map of the United States
except for liberal Massachusetts and the mostly African-American District of Columbia.
Many different factors contributed to the record defection of Democratic voters and the
dramatic alteration of traditional voting patters. But Nixon's decision to capitalize on the
grievances of "'Middle America" and downplay the Economic Issue was crucial. The
president's strategy was to concentrate his efforts on stimulating a pre-election economic
Text of President Nixon's statement on the labor resignations from the Pay Board. The
Washington Post, 24 March 1972, Secfion A, 16.
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boom and on capturing the blue-collar vote. As Matusow puts it, "1972 was the year
everything seemed to break right for Richard Nixon."^^
On the home front, Nixon used his New Economic Policy in an effort to steal
away from the Democrats their key issue, the economy. As the 1972 presidential
campaign approached, Democratic politicians struggled to turn the Economic Issue
against the administration once again. Criticism of Nixon's New Economic Policy was
varied. Senator Edmund Muskie argued that the president had taken too long to react to
the faltering economy. In two and a half years, Muskie stated, Nixon's economic policy
had been "no economic policy." Senator George McGovem contended that the
administration's tax proposals benefited only businesses and hurt the working man and
woman and the middle-class taxpayer. To Senator Hubert Humphrey, the new policies
were not stimulative enough to solve the problem of rising unemployment. "What the
administration just does not understand," insisted Humphrey, "is that the No.l domestic
39
priority of the nation is jobs, jobs, jobs, jobs."
The Democratic senators' indictments were well grounded. Yet Nixon had made
Democratic proposals the heart of his economic programs. The president thus left his
critics with few additional suggestions to make. To the Democrats' dismay, by the first
anniversary of Nixon's New Economic Policy, most analysts rated it as "a success." As
the presidential campaign heated up, the administration talked only about the previous
year. Herbert Stein, then chairman of the CEA, recounted the good economic tidings:
Production and employment are rising strongly. Unemployment is declining.
38
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The rate of inflation has been redueed. Our international eeonomie position is
improvmg. These lavorable trends will almost eertainly eontinue throughout the
year.
Under Phase 11, inflation had fallen from 4.9 percent in 1970 to 3.2 percent. In the
second quarter of 1971, real output had grown 8.9 percent. The least satisfactory
progress had been made in reducing unemployment, but Nixon's advisors expected it to
be around 5 percent by the end of 1972.
The president also scored a couple of important victories on foreign policy issues.
By late 1971, with increasingly powerful North Vietnamese forces to China's south and
Soviet forces aligned all along their country's northern borders, Chinese leaders decided
to seek a rapprochement with the United States. Nixon exploited that decision to
normalize diplomatic relations with China. His ten-day visit to China in f ebruary 1972
was a brilliant diplomatic move that forced the Soviets to invite Nixon to Moscow for a
summit of their own in May 1972. Both trips took place with considerable fanfare. The
administration's surprising reversal in foreign policy seemed to indicate a softening of the
conservative view of the communist regimes. A nationwide Gallup survey conducted at
the close of Nixon's summit meetings with Soviet Party leader Leonid Brezhnev showed
Nixon's popularity at its highest point in nearly two years. Sixty-one percent of U.S.
41
citizens approved ot the way the president was handling his duties as Chief Executive.
The apparent success of Nixon's "Vietnamization" program also contributed to his boost
in popularity. By reducing U.S. troops in Indochina from 536,000 in 1969 to 24,000 in
Business Week, 29 July 1 972, 1 6.
^Whe Gallup Poll Cumulalive Index, Report N° 84, June 1972, 1-2.
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December 1972, Nixon neutralized the Vietnam War issue and gradually removed it from
the center of American politics.
The Democrats' self-destructing behavior also increased Nixon's chances for re-
election. They nominated as their presidential candidate George McGovem, a liberal
senator who conservatives tagged as the proponent of the three A's: "Acid, Abortion and
Amnesty." Despite the support of liberal Democrats and the efforts of the United
Automobile Workers and other unions, McGovem proved anathema to large sections of
an American electorate. When asked in a June 1971 Gallup poll how they would
describe their political philosophy, 1 1 percent of those interviewed responded "very
conservative;" 28 percent "fairly conservative'" and 29 percent "middle of the road."
Nineteen percent considered themselves "fairly liberal" and only 7 percent "very
43
liberal." In such a political climate, Nixon's efforts to court the "Silent Majority" paid
off
In the first half of the 1972 presidential campaign, the Democratic Party went
through an unprecedented series of twenty-three primaries. The season extended over a
four-month period, the first primary taking place in New Hampshire on March 7 and the
last one in New York on June 20. During the 1972 State of the Union Message, Nixon
won an appreciative chuckle from the audience at Congress when he remarked: "There
are more candidates for the Presidency in this chamber today than there probably have
been at any time in the whole history of the Republic." Nixon was referring to Maine's
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Senator Edmund Muskie, Minnesota's Hubert Humphrey, and Massachusetts' Edward M.
Kennedy. Other potential candidates such as George McGovem and Henry Jackson
missed the speech because they were campaigning.
When McGovem declared his candidacy in January 1971, he expressed his
concern about American politics:
The most painful new phrase in American political vocabulary is "credibility
gap" -the gap between rhetoric and reality. Put bluntly, it means that people no
longer believe what their leaders tell them...The kind of campaign I intend to run
will rest on candor and reason...! make one pledge above all others
-to seek and
speak the truth with all the resources of mind and spirit I command.^^
The key elements on the Democratic candidate's platform were an immediate
withdrawal of American troops from Vietnam, important cuts in defense spending, and
redistribution of income. By 1972, McGovem's position on the Vietnamese conflict was
widely known. In fact, his proposal to slash the Pentagon budget by $ 32 billion over a
three-year period was more controversial. Basically, this would mean cutting armed
forces and civilian Pentagon employees by nearly 30 percent. Apart from the practical
and political problems of laying people off, American allies might be disconcerted at
such a defense cut. Simultaneously, McGovem contended that his major goal was to
provide employment for every able-bodied American. If elected president, the
Democratic candidate claimed, he would tell American people, "Look, everybody who
wants work is going to have a job. We don't know quite yet what you'll be doing, but
"Mr. Nixon takes the hard road," Newsweek, 31 January 1972, 11.
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;es,
you're going to have a good job. And the Government is going to guarantee employment
at decent wages.
As for income redistribution, McGovem's program involved profound chang(
He proposed to raise the corporation tax rate from 48 percent back to 52 percent, its level
before the tax reform of 1964, to end investment tax credit, and to tighten depreciation
rules. In practical terms, this meant not only less profits for the corporations but also
reduced dividends for stockholders. McGovem's most controversial proposal -and
eventually worst fiasco—was the "Demogrant." He would substitute welfare payments
with minimum income grants of about $ 1,000 per person annually. A family of four
without any income would receive $ 4,000 a year. A family of four making $ 8,000 a
year, would keep $ 2,000. Families with incomes above $ 12.000 would be taxed at
progressively higher rates. In this way. about $ 43 billion a year would be shifted fi-om
the more affluent to the relatively poor. Median family income in 1972 was $ 1 1,000. In
sum. those who barely made ends meet would be paying higher taxes to support the very
poor. During the California primary, Hubert Humphrey dealt a fatal blow to McGovem's
plan. Humphrey correctly pointed out that the program would, for instance, require an
unmarried secretar>' earning $ 8,000 to pay $ 567 in additional taxes; a family of four
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making $ 1 2.000. would have an increase of $ 409.
As chairman of a Commission on Party Stmcture and Delegate Selection prior to
the Democratic National Convention in 1972, McGovem helped enact party reforms that
Time, S May 1972, 19.
"^^Time, 8 May 1972, 19; Theodore H. White, The Making ofthe President 1972 (New
York: Atheneum Publishers, 1973). 128; Matusow, 208.
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gave increased representation to minority groups at the convention. After the Democrats'
Chicago debacle in 1968, the party modified the mechanics of its delegate selection to
make the whole process more democratic and "open/" Primaries rather than the state
party caucuses became the major route of delegate selection. Before 1972 most states did
not rely on the primaries to choose delegates to the presidential nominating convention.
At the Chicago convention, for instance, organized labor had 200 delegates and 100
alternates among the 3,500 present. Under the then-existing rules, most of them were
.... . 48
political appointees. That would not be the case in 1972.
Primary procedures varied substantially from state to state. In "delegate
primaries," voters only selected the delegates, but in the "binding primaries" the elected
delegates were obliged to back the specific candidates who had won the primary. In
South Dakota and California, voters cast their ballots for a complete slate of delegates
committed to a single candidate, but they did not know the delegates' names. In New
York, the opposite happened: voters knew the delegates' names, but not whom they
49
would support at the convention. The diverse and intricate nature of the multi-
candidate twenty-three primaries made it difficult to predict the future of the Democratic
Party in 1972.
In February 1972, several Democratic presidential candidates attended a meeting
of the AFL-CIO Executive Council in Miami Beach, hoping to woo the vote of their old
supporters in organized labor. Humphrey, "the darling of labor for 25 years," was
confident about the union leaders" backing, but the AFL-CIO Council had decided not to
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endorse any Democratic candidate before the July party convention. AFL^CIO hardliners
considered Edmund Muskie, who appeared at the time one of the most promising
Democratic candidates, to be ^'dangerously soft" on the Vietnam War. Two other
hopefuls were also present: Indiana's Vance Hartke and Washington' Henry Jackson.
Though considered "friends of labor," these two candidates' chances of success were
very slim.
Forty years before. Franklin Delano Roosevelt had transformed the Democratic
Party into a coalition that allowed it to win seven of the next ten presidential elections.
Roosevelt's coalition included the South, family farmers, blue-collar workers in the big
cities, minority groups and liberals. In the evolution of the Democratic Party, 1972 was a
watershed year because George McGovem, the Democratic candidate who few predicted
would win the nomination, channeled his energies into capturing the vote of the
intellectuals, the middle-class suburbanites and the young. In most states, McGovem
focused directly on his antiwar constituency and then tried to expand his appeal to the
discontented working class. During the Democratic Party primaries, the work of
McGovem' s active followers was crucial in rallying support at the local level. Journalist
Jules Witcover described the senator's "grassroots leaders" as "independent and highly
motivated "cause people," who were strongly committed to registration drives,
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canvassing, and tund-raising.
In May 1972, just before the California primary, a Gallup survey indicated that
McGovem was in a three-way tie for the nomination with Hubert Humphrey and George
^^Jules Witcover, "The Ultimate Test For McGovem," The Progressive, November 1 972,
12.
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Wallace. The South Dakota Senator had two advantages over his rivals. He was stronger
than the other Democratic candidates among voters who considered themselves
independents, and he had more followers among college-educated and higher income
voters. These groups usually vote in larger numbers in the primaries and work harder to
win support during the elections. According to the Gallup poll, Democrats and
independents with college background preferred McGovem over Humphrey by a 3 to 1
.
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margm. The California primary was crucial because the winner would take all of the
state's 271 delegates to the nominating convention.
The Democratic primaries highlighted the divisive forces that were tearing at the
party in the spring of 1972. Humphrey won four primaries, drawing 4 million popular
votes, but lost to McGovem in California and thus fell behind in delegates. Humphrey
was "an old face'' in American politics and voters often perceived his attempts to cater to
both the liberal and conservative wings of the Democratic Party as "fence-sitting." By
winning the Michigan and Maryland primaries, Alabama Governor George Wallace was
strengthening his position as a national rather than a regional candidate. Yet his race
ended abruptly on May 1 5 when he was shot and left paralyzed. Wallace had almost
managed to match Humphrey's delegate total. Maine Senator Edmund Muskie, who
seemed to be the leading candidate in national polls early in the year, abandoned his
candidacy after losing to McGovem in Massachusetts and to Humphrey in Pennsylvania.
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With the middle-income vote, McGovem won the primaries in Wisconsin,
Massachusetts and Oregon. He lost to Humphrey in Pennsylvania and Ohio and to
Wallace in Michigan, three industrial states. These returns clearly indicated that the
Democrats would have a very difficuh time unifying their party and that the blu^collar
vote was deeply divided. Hubert Humphrey was largely perceived as a liberal Democrat
who offered programmatic solutions to social problems. Wallace remained the epitome
of the racist Southerner who blamed liberalism and its social programs for the problems
of "the little man." By late June, McGovem had won the last six primaries and passed
the most critical test in California. T he South Dakotan had a potential total of over 1,300
delegate votes, fewer than 200 short of a first ballot victory at the Democratic
Convention. As the 1972 National Convention approached, the Democrats were so
divided that many feared the party would splinter. Although the South Dakotan had
neither a majority of delegates actually pledged to vote for him nor sufficient votes to win
the nomination, he was clearly the front-runner.
Newsweek stated that those who attended the Democratic convention "were as
unlikely and as unpredictable a group as ever assembled under the banner of a major
party to pick a candidate for president." The report's description of hundreds of
delegates as "hippies," "yippies," and "zippies" was a clear indication of the mainstream
media's bias against the left-liberal wing of the party. There were certainly more young
people, more women, more African-Americans and more Mexican-Americans, but they
were not necessarily "hippies," "yippies," or "zippies." The young dissenters who
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supported the South Dakota senator were matched by a large number of old timers who
rallied round the "Anybody But McGovem" (ABM) movement
"
The ABM alliance was made up of Democrats who had traditionally controlled
the presidential nominations: labor leaders, city bosses, veteran congressmen, and a
variety of southerners. McGovem's rivals
-Humphrey, Muskie and Wallace- joined the
movement. Probably no one did more than Meany and other AFL-CIO labor politicians
to stop McGovem from receiving the Democratic presidential nomination. The AFL-
CIO delegates in the Credentials Committee objected to McGovem's claiming all of
California's 271 delegates. The South Dakotan had won 44 percent of the vote in the
primary so members of the ABM movement contended that McGovem was entitled to
only 120 delegates. After submitting the issue to balloting, however, the Credentials
Committee seated all of McGovem's 271 votes Califomia delegates. Even with the
support of organized labor, the "old party" of city bosses, veteran congressmen and
Southerners was outnumbered. The ABM movement failed and the setback had long-
lasting effects for both organized labor and national politics. Some Democrats feared that
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McGovem might lose horribly; others feared that he might win.
Ben Wattenberg, who thought Democrats might lose the presidential election on
the Social Issue, said of the McGovem-dominated Platform Committee:
Their struggle is between the wild wing and the mild wing; what they're doing is
selling out their tme believers on things like pot, amnesty and abortion. There
"Showdown: The Democrats" DUQmrna,"" Newsweek, 17 July 1972, 14.
White, 170-175.
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wtm t any niA% in Miami because the people who rioted in Chicago are on the
V ... f . .1 , . .y -rn fj/Tftmixux
-they outnumber us by three or four to one.
t/rwai^ old party bofKS. In 1968, 2.6 percent of the Democratic delegates were
miderlbirty; 5,5 ptro^. were African-American and 1 3 percent were women. In 1 972.
the convention's demographic breakdow n looked % er^- different: 23 percent of delegates
under thirty, 1 5 percent were African-American and 38 percent were female. In 1968.
the candidate mom acceptah\t to the regular organization leaders won the nomination
after having entered feu- primaries. In 1 972, the candidate who lacked the part> "s
organi/^ional support won the nomination thanks to the primaries and the aggressi\ e
campaign of hii followers. Yet the primaries had polarized the Democratic Part> s
constituencies along ideological lines and eventuall} deprived McGovem of the
organizational support necessary to win a presidential election.
After the conventkML Meany steered the AFL-CIO into a neutral course in the
presidential race. The Democratic candidate was anathema to the federation's president
and the Cold War estabHalMnent. McGovem was too ''soft" on communism for the cold
warriors to accepL The South Dakotan's attitude towards the So\ iet Union was not new:
in 1948, he had endoised Ikny Wallace, the communist-supported Progressive Part>
candidate. Ahliougfa McGovem had an almost perfect congressional \ oting record on
labor issues, that was not enough for the AFL-CIO president. For the first time in almost
fort>" year? orgamzed laiMirdU not endorse a Democratic presidential ticket. Meany
explained:
Under tbe circamstaDces. the .AFL-CIO will refrain from endorsing either
candidate for tike office of President of the L'nited States. Fhose circumstances
calL rMher. for die maodmum concentration of effort upon the election of Senators
Ibid.. 101.
:i8
and Representatives whose records commend them to the working people of
America.
The Executive Council's decision barred any state or local AFL-CIO unit from
supporting McGovem or Nixon, but the 1 1 7 member unions were free to adopt whatever
position they wanted. This was hard blow for McGovem since he lost the use of the
AFL-CIO' s political arm, the Committee on Political Education, and its war chest of
approximately $ 6 million.
Yet not all labor leaders turned their backs on McGovem. After the nomination,
the Democratic candidate's strongest labor supporter was Leonard Woodcock, the
president of the United Automobile Workers. Woodcock had imtially backed Muskie but
switched to McGovem when the Senator from Maine virtually abandoned the presidential
race a month before the convention. In fact, Victor Reuther, the retiring director of
Intemational Affairs for the UAW, was the lonely voice for McGovem early in the year.
Reuther was right in his prediction that substantial backing from the young -both college
students and workers- would take McGovem to the nomination. "McGoven's record is
pro-labor," Reuther insisted, "he only has to prove he can win." As the presidential
election approached, the South Dakota Senator's voting record on labor issues became a
matter of controversy, and McGovem found it increasingly difficult to prove that he
could win.
George Meany's Statement, Folder 4, Box 9, Rebhan Collection, UAW Intemational
Affairs Office, WSUA.
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McGovem's campaign quickly fumbled. Two weeks after the Miami Convention,
Senator Thomas F. Eagleton of Missouri, the vice-presidential candidate, revealed that he
had been hospitalized for treatment of emotional exhaustion and depression. Eagleton'
s
qualifications for the vice presidency became the subject of nationwide debate. At first,
McGovem pledged to support his running mate. He believed that Eagleton' s past history
of emotional illness could not and would not be a political issue. Under political
pressure, however, the South Dakota senator persuaded Eagleton to withdraw his
candidacy. R. Sargent Shriver, who had been director of the Peace Corps under John F.
Kennedy and head of Lyndon B. Johnson's war on poverty program, replaced Eagleton.
Shriver's appointment as vice-presidential candidate won McGovem the endorsement of
some Democrat dissidents such as Chicago's Mayor Richard Daley. Republicans,
however, skillfully exploited the Democratic candidate's indecisiveness as well as his
last-mmute attempts to appease the conservative elements in his party.
The Committee to Re-elect the President also did not miss the opportunity to
exploit the weaknesses in McGovem's labor record. In October 1972, a newspaper
revealed that a pamphlet denouncing the Democratic presidential candidate supposedly
published by a labor organization -Labor For America Committee- had been paid for by
Nixon's campaign committee. The document, which was entitled "Why Labor Can't
Support McGovem," had originally been sent to delegates to the Democratic Convention
and then mailed to union members across the country. The Committee to Re-elect the
President had clearly violated the Corrupt Practices Act, which required that publications
58
Charles DeBenedetti, An American Ordeal: The Antiwar Movement ofthe Vietnam Era
(Syracuse. New York: Syracuse University Press, 1990), 338; Erwin Knoll, "Practical
Politics," The Progressive, September 1972, 13.
220
attacking or supporting a candidate must contain the name of the organizations and
individuals responsible for it. Kirby Jones, McGovem's press secretary, referred to the
publication as another act of sabotage by the Republicans, similar to the bugging of the
Democratic headquarters at the Watergate Hotel in Washington D.C. earlier that year/^
The document stated that although Senator McGovem had embraced a "new
populism as a key campaign slogan/" he had "repeatedly voted wrong on legislation
affecting working people and the trade union movement." McGovem had supposedly
distanced himself from the pro-labor liberal bloc on a number of civil rights issues, the
Landum-Griffin bill, the 1960 and 1966 minimum wage bills, the 1966 unemployment
compensation bill and health, education and welfare (HEW) appropriations, the 1968
Summer Jobs for Youth bill, and the repeal of 14(b) of the Taft-Hartley Act.
Furthermore, the document stated, the Democratic candidate advocated wholesale
resistance to the draft, had no comprehensive program to deal with crime and held an
ambiguous position on the legalization of marijuana.^^
The pamphlet also discussed McGovem's position on foreign policy issues. The
Democratic candidate, according to the document, saw communism as just "another
economic system," so he would cut the defense budget by $ 33 billion. As for the
Vietnam War, McGovem would immediately withdraw the U.S. from Indochina: he
believed that "begging was better than bombing," the pamphlet said. The document
pointed to the Democratic candidate's supposed radicalism by discussing his position on
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the three A's of amnesty, acid and abortion. McGovern, it was alleged, would extend
amnesty to all those who had gone to jail or left the country to avoid the draft, would
"regulate marijuana along the same lines as alcohol," and would legalize abortion."'
The Communications Workers oC America, which endorsed McGovern, became
so upset over the "inaccumte and misleading charges" against the Democratic candidate
that it published a pamphlet entitled "A Responsible Response to McGovern's Critics."
The "pamphlets war," however, did not end there. The authors of "Why Labor Can't
Support Mc(u)vern" issued "A Response to "A Responsible Response." The document
admitted that their Inst evaluation of the McGovern's record had been inaccurate in a few
instances. Yet " The Response to "the Responsible Response" insisted that the
Democratic candidate's supporters "deliberately distorted McGovern's own
Statements." In lact, the di (Terences in the appraisals of McGovern's congressional
record often depended on which votes were regarded as "key" votes. At limes the final
passage of a law was considered; at times a vote on an amendment was. The contending
groups obviously phrased the issues to suit their political purposes.
I'here were, however, a number of indisputable facts. McGovern's critics were
wrong in their evaluation of the candidate's votes on civil rights issues. As regards the
Landrun-Griffm bill and the repeal of 14(b) of the faft-l lartley Act, McGovern's
opponents were partly right. It was unfair to cite the Democratic senator's vote for the
dnal passage of the Landrum-Griffm Act because the key vote was on an amendment and
"'"Why Labor Can't Support George McGovern," folder 4, Box 6, Labor foday
Colleelion,WSUA.
"'"A Response to "A Responsible Response," Folder 27, Box ().'^2, Series .1, George
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222
McGovem had voted labor's way. In the case of 14(b) of the Taft-Hartley Act, the
Democratic candidate admitted that he had failed to vote for repeal. For almost twenty
years, labor leaders had tried to repeal the 14(b) provision of the Taft-Hartley Act that left
it to state legislatures to permit or forbid unions to demand a union-shop proviso in their
contracts. The AFL-CIO had several times intended to eliminate this restraint and leave
the union-shop proviso to free bargaining. In 1966, the House of Representatives had
already passed the repeal of 14(b). In the Senate, McGovem' s vote was crucial and he
had promised to vote labor's way. In the end, the Democratic senator did not honor his
commitment. This "wrong" vote was one of the issues that the AFL-CIO president held
63
against McGovem.
The UAW also came out in defense of the South Dakota Senator. In a detailed
discussion of McGovem' s pro-labor voting record during fourteen years in Congress.
UAW Solidarity contended that the Democratic candidate had supported UAW backed
issues 73 times out of 76 key votes. The debate over McGovem's labor voting record
became so intricate that it probably failed to go beyond the labor leadership circles and
reach the rank-and-file. His position on the "three A's," however, was more
controversial and better known as the opposition had picked on these issues in order to
woo the vote of moderate Democrats.
During a Detroit rally in October 1972 before thousands ofUAW members,
McGovem attempted to clarify his views on abortion, marijuana and amnesty. The
Democratic candidate considered abortion '*a state issue'' so a "McGovem
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administration," he insisted, "would take no action on it." As for the legaHzation of
marijuana, McGovem affirmed: "I don't believe in legalized marijuana, but neither do I
believe in sending teen-agers to a penitentiary for experimenting with this." He also
stressed his support for strict enforcement of laws against commercial sale of marijuana,
especially to minors. As regards his amnesty program, McGovern insisted that his
program would be similar to those ordered after other American wars and would apply to
persons who "on grounds of conscience [had] refused to take part in the [Vietnam]
war.
The split in the ranks of organized labor over the presidential election campaign
made it difficult for McGovern to capture the blue-collar vote. The formation of the
National Labor Committee for the Election of McGovem-Shriver, a fund-raising agency
parallel to the AFL-ClO's Committee on Political Education (COPE), further deepened
the rift within labor. The new Committee was headed by one of Meany's oldest and
closest collaborators, Joseph D. Keenan, secretary treasurer of the International
Brotherhood of Electrical Workers. The McGovem election committee also included
other members of the AFL-CIO Executive Council: Joseph A. Bicrne, the president of the
Communications Workers of America and Floyd E. Smith, the president of the
International Association of Machinists. The creation of this National Labor Committee
was a few labor leaders' desperate attempt to stop Nixon and a clear challenge to
Meany's political leadership.
In mid-August, Woodcock announced that the UAW had contributed $ 75,000 to
the McGovem-Shriver campaign committee and that the money came entirely from
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UAW members. Secret balloting by approximately 4,500 local UAW leaders indicated
that 83.8 percent supported the McGovem-Shriver ticket. By October, thirty-eight
international unions had endorsed the Democrats. With the exception of the UE, the
United Auto Workers, the Distributive Workers of America and the Longshoreman's and
Warehousemen's Union, all were affiliates of the AFL-CIO. The unions on the
committee represented over eight million working men and women.^^
After three years ofNixon policies, McGovem expected the persistent economic
concerns of the American people to play a crucial role in the voters' final decision.
Unemployment, inflation and tax inequities still seemed to exceed the worries expressed
over social issues such as crime, school busing, and abortion. McGovem' s economic and
tax program, however, was too liberal to capture the vote of the "Middle American." His
commitment to redistribute both income and the tax load had alienated the business
community as well as the upper echelons of organized labor.
After the nominating convention, McGovem aids started to revise some of his
most controversial programs. The Democratic candidate's tax proposals were the first to
be modified: instead of immediately increasing corporate taxes by about $17 billion, a
McGovem administration would postpone tax reforms until 1975 and would add "only"
$14 billion to corporate tax receipts. The defense budget would be slashed by $ 32
billion, but McGovem advisors stressed that these cuts would not leave displaced defense
workers unemployed. As far as income redistribution was concemed, the original
"Demogrant" plan that would have raised the tax bill for eveiyone with an income above
^^News From UAW, \S August 18 1972, Folder 4, Box 9. Rebhan Collection, UAW
Intemational Affairs Office, WSUA.
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$12,000 was modified. Instead of a $1,000 "Demogranf to families of four with an
annual income of up to $ 12,000, a tax credit would be given to families of four with
incomes up to $20,000, either by cash payment or tax reduction.^^
This modification attempted to dispel the fears of middle-class voters. The initial
proposal for income redistribution overlooked the fact that about forty percent of
American families had annual incomes of over $ 12,000 and McGovem's plan would
have increased their tax burden. In September, after additional changes, the income
redistribution plan metamorphosed into an "income insurance plan." Social Security
would be expanded to cover 3 million more aged, blind and disabled Americans who
would otherwise be on welfare, and the minimum monthly benefits would be raised to
$150. Families of four with no other income would receive an annual minimum of
$4,000. McGovem appeared to have dropped altogether the idea of supplementing
workers' incomes up to $ 20,00 for a family of four. "The senator's new plan," Business
Week accurately pointed out, "is difficult to distinguish from that of the Nixon
... . 67
Administration."
The Democratic Party strategy during the presidential campaign contained a
number of contradictions. While McGovem advisors tried hard to take the radical sting
out of the Democratic platform's economic proposals, their candidate continued to use
clearly anti-business rhetoric. "The cynical manipulative forces at the top of the
economic pyramid," McGovem said at a political rally in the South, "are guiding the
^^"McGovern revises his economics text," Business Week, 15 July 1972, 18-21.
^^"The latest edition of McGovem's economics," Business Week, 2 September 1972,14
15.
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destinies of those at the low end of the scale." In a similar vein, on Meet the Press,
McGovem described his proposals in the following way: he was "for the blue-collar
worker, for individual farmers as against corporate farmers, for small business as against
big corporations like ITT."^^
This kind of statements not only scared businessmen and high-income earners but
led McGovern's critics to compare him to a nineteenth-century populist. Fortune editor
A. James Reichley's appraisal was a clear example of such an accusation. "When
McGovem attacks the depredations of the corporations -the only subject besides the war
that really seems to excite him," Reichley contended, "he bums with the old evangelical
fire of tum-of-the-century populists, such as Jennings Bryan and Tom Watson of
Georgia." Although the Fortune editor's description was an over-simplification, there
was some truth to it. Moreover, McGovem supporters in the labor camp often echoed the
Democratic candidate's populist and anti-business rhetoric as they assailed the
administration's economic policies.^^
In order to rally support for the McGovem-Shriver ticket, the National Labor
Committee's strategy focused on the economic issues that concemed blue-collar workers
most and portrayed Nixon as the candidate of the corporations and the wealthy. The
various pamphlets that the Committee distributed among rank and filers presented a
laundry list of grievances against Nixon. Taxation was unfair because the administration
68
A. James Reichley, 'The McGovem Wave Is No Passing Ripple/' Fortune, September
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''McGovem revises his economics text/' Business Week, 15 July 1972, 20.
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had approved corporate tax cuts worth $ 80 billion. Wage-price controls had done little
to remedy the problem of soaring food prices. The cost oiTiving had increased 17.6
percent during the Nixon years. Moreover, unemployment continued to be a problem of
paramount importance among workers: in 1969, there were 2.8 million unemployed; in
1972, the number had reached 4.7 million. iMnally, the administration's new economic
policy had invalidated fairly negotiated contracts and put a 5 percent ceiling on wage
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mcreases.
McGovern, the National Labor Committee insi.sted, was a true supporter of the
American worker. The Democratic candidate was against compulsory arbitration and
wage controls which violated collective bargaining contracts and in favor of higher
minimum wages, higher employment compensation, Medicare and greater social security
benciils. Moreover, McGovern was aware of '"industrial carnage" in the nation's plants
and had an eight-point program to "guarantee the American worker's right to health and
safety on the job." His proposal included, for instance, the addition of 8,()()() industrial
safety in.spectors and 4,()()() hygienists to enforce rights under the Occupational Safety
and Health Act of 1970.'^
If McGovern was such a pro-labor candidate, why did he fmd it so dilficult to
woo the blue-collar vote during the presidential election campaign? McGovern hoped
that economic hardship would turn working-class voters away from Nixon. But by
November 1972, the business cycle was rising strongly, surveys indicated that consumer
7
1
Pamphlet, Ad I loc Dump Nixon Committee, The Tamiment Institute Library and
Robert Wagner Labor Archives (Hereafter RWLA).
^^George McGovern, "Let's Make the Health and Safety Law Work!" UAW Solidarity,
October 1972, 3.
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conlidcnce was increasing, and Ihc fourth quarter GN1> was expected to rise by 10 billion
dollars over that of the third quarter/' Moreover, in the second quarter of 1972, the
unemployment picture seemed to brighten: it had come down a half point from its
recession peak of over 6 percent and stayed at that level. For nonwhite workers the rate
was still a high 9.7 percent but it had decreased from the 10.6 percent of the tirst quarter.
For married men, the unemployment rate had dropped to 2.6 percent in August from an
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average ol 3.2 percent throughout 1971.
By the time of the balloting, not only had Nixon managed to reduce crilicisiu on
the economic front but he had also neutralized the Vietnam War as the most di\ isi\ e
issue in American politics. Nixon's proposal hail always been "peace with honor," a
slow disengagement from Indochina while a peace settlement was negotiated. Two days
before the presidential election, Henry Kissinger called a news conference and
announced: "Peace is at hand." Newspapers reported on a possible accord between the
United States and Vietnam. The following day, however, negotiations halted when
Nguyen Van Thieu, president of South Vietnam, denounced the settlement as a sell-out to
the communists. I here was no fmal agreement between the U.S. and Hanoi before the
election day, but the aiuiounccment of progress in negotiations amounted to a timely, if
cynical, diplomatic triumph (or Nixon.
Business Outlook, Business Week, 1 1 November 1972, 37.
Buisness Outlook, Business IVcek, 9 September 1972, 29.
"Peace is at hand." Newsweek, 6 November 1972, 33.
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In contrast, McGovem called for an immediate and complete withdrawal of
American forces from Indochina. Within 90 days of his inauguration, the Democratic
candidate promised, his administration would remove remaining U.S. troops, stop
bombing North Vietnam and providing military aid to South Vietnam. McGovem'
s
peace platform was based on a far-reaching critique of excessive defense spending and of
the Cold War in general. If Vietnam would not be an issue by the time the presidential
election approached, as many political observers claimed, the South Dakotan claimed that
"Vietnam thinking" would surely be an issue. McGovem explained:
By "Vietnam thinking" I mean wasting our strength on paranoic defense policies
while neglecting the needs of our own people [...] What 1 propose is that we spend
all that is necessary for a prudent national defense, and no more. I propose that
we conserve our limited resources [...] by repudiating the false world of old
discredited myths, made up of blocs, puppets, and dominoes, facing instead a real
world of today and the futures, with muUiple ideologies and interests.
This was too much for the devout cold warriors within organized labor's ranks.
By September 1972, The New York Times reported: ^The Nixon Administration
and the labor leaders who have formally adopted a neutral position in the presidential
race are developing an increasingly cordial relationship.'' There were two cases in point:
The International Brotherhood of Teamsters and the building and construction unions.
The Teamsters, who endorsed Nixon, were pleased by the administration's opposition to
anti-strike legislation in the transportation industry. The construction workers, for their
77
part, applauded the president for his opposition to racial quotas m hiring. A Democratic
George McGovem, Where I Stand,'' The Progressive, July 1972, 16.
^^"GOP and Neutral Labor More Cordial," The New York Times. 24 September 1972,
Folder 14, Box 031, COPE Research Files, GMMA.
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campaign official summarized Nixon's technique in seeking labor support in the
following way:
r
Nixon gnaws around the edges of a worker's life. He hasn't touched the central
trade union part. But he gnaws a little at the Catholic part, a little at the Polish
part, a little at the patriotic part and a little at the anti-hippie part. After a while,
he has an awful lot of that worker.
The 1972 election returns seemed to indicate that Nixon"s labor strategy had been
successfiil. The nation's blue-collar workers -who made up a third of the electorate and
represented since the 1930s the core vote of all Democratic presidential candidates- went
for Nixon over McGovem by the ratio of 57 to 43 percent. Moreover, for the first time
since the early 1930s a majority (54 percent) of members of labor union families voted
79
the Republican ticket. Political analysts concluded that, having captured 62 percent of
the votes, Nixon had finally succeeded in his quest to create a "New Republican
. .
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Majority." The Democratic coalition forged in the 1930s had finally collapsed. The
president could safely claim that America's "Silent Majority" had risen. As sociologist
Jonathan Rieder contends:
In part, [the silent majority] emerged out of the center's own efforts to name itself.
But it also emerged from the efforts of others to capture and beguile it, most
notably from the oratorical flourishes of Republicans, reactionaries, and
8
1
conservatives who had their own ideological projects in mind.
"Nixon Wooing of Labor Vote Dates to 1970," 12 October 12 1972, Folder 14, Box
031, COPE Research Files, GMMA.
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But, had America clearly swung toward conservatism? Despite the landslide, a
closer look at Nixon's presidential election campaign indicates that the incumbent rallied
the voters to a safe and solid middle ground. The 1972 Republican Party's platform
stated:
This year the choice is between moderate goals historically sought by both major
parties and far-out goals of the far left...We invite our troubled friends of other
political affiliations to join with us in a new coalition for progress.**^
It was not difficult for Nixon to picture McGovem as the candidate of a small minority.
Many citizens probably shared the Democratic candidate's criticism of the tax system,
the welfare system and economic policies, but his proposals did not seem workable.
McGovem could never counter the charges that his economic plan would not only cause
inflation but also a 50 percent increase in taxes. After the Miami convention, he was
caught in a bind. In order to build a truly national base, McGovem needed to move
towards the center. Yet the Democratic candidate could not jettison those positions that
had rallied his ideological partisans.
In his post-convention campaign, McGovem gradually tempered most of his
original proposals. The South Dakotan revised his tax reform and income distribution
schemes, but he seldom brought them up in his speeches. As for defense spending,
83
McGovem promised to keep local military facilities open almost everywhere he went.
In the course of the campaign, even his Vietnam policy underwent changes. During
convention week, McGovem issued a statement for Families for Immediate Release, an
82
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organization of relatives ofPOW's and servicemen missing in action. In order to
accommodate their demands, McGovem promised that, while he would order an
immediate cease-fire, end military aid to South Vietnam, and withdraw all U.S. military
forces from Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos, he would maintain forces in Thailand and on
the Gulf of Tonkin until POWs were returned. The Thailand-Tonkin proviso was a
departure from his previous position, which clearly stated that withdrawal of troops
• • 84
mcluded Thailand and Tonkin, with no preconditions. IfMcGovem could not be
trusted on Vietnam, what could he be trusted on? In spite of his good intentions, the
Democratic candidate did not come across as sufficiently "presidential." Although the
Republicans extensively exploited the three "A's", McGovem himself was largely
responsible for his political downfall. The result was a Nixon landslide.
The American electorate had not necessarily drifted to the right of the political
spectrum, but the Republican candidate had certainly moved to the center. In 1 947, on
his first day in Congress, Nixon had said: "I was elected to smash the labor bosses." In
August 1972. President Nixon's instmction to the Republican Platform Committee was:
'There will be no anti-labor plank in this platform/' Over a two-year period, Nixon had
in fact violated every single tenet of the conservative dogma, particularly deep deficits in
the federal budget, militant opposition to major communist powers and non-intervention
in the economy. In 1972, a well-known conservative won the re-election by presenting
his party as the as the party of reform While Nixon promised to bring the country
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lean
together under the banner of the "New Majority^, McGovem's
-new popuHsm" picked
up the rhetoric of class, which fostered division rather than unity and consensus.
"Nixon's overwhelming victory," an AFL-CIO American Federationist editor
pointed out, "was not a victory of party and only peripherally a victory of person.
Although Nixon carried an unprecedented total of 49 states for president, the Republi
Party lost two Senate seats and one governorship, and while the G.O.P. won 13 House
seats, the Democrats retained its majority in Congress. In view of the election results,
Meany argued that the AFL-CIO's decision to remain neutral in the presidential race and
concentrate its efforts on the Congressional and gubernatorial elections had paid off.
According to COPE, 57.5 percent of the candidates the federation supported won: in
House races, 218 of 362, in Senate contests, 16 of 29, and in gubernatorial elections, 1
1
of 1 7. The AFL-CIO's decision not to back McGovem had deepened the rift within the
labor leadership. It was impossible to predict that a year later organized labor would call
for the impeachment of the president. In 1972, only 53 percent of the voters were
familiar with the Watergate charges, and only 3 percent thought it important enough for
,. . ... 87
listmg among their major concerns.
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CHAPTER 7
THE COLLAPSE OF POSTWAR PROSPERITY, 1973-1974
The American and world economies began sliding into sustained crisis as the
1960s came to a close and decline reached its lowest point during the 1974-1975
economic recession, the deepest since the 1930s. By 1973, when about 4.7 million
workers were to negotiate new contracts, the post World War II accord between labor and
capital had collapsed. The accord rested on a number of premises. On the one hand,
organized labor accepted that pricing and production decisions were management
prerogatives. On the other hand, unions sought rising real wages, greater employment
security, and a safer work environment for their membership. At the same time, the
government - due in large part to the pressure of organized labor- developed social
welfare programs meant to improve the living standards of all workers, not only of
unionized workers. Economists David Gordon, Richard Edwards and Michael Reich
argue that "this accord effectively provided the framework, at least through the late
1960s, within which stable conditions of production fueled prosperity and production."'
Beginning in the late 1 960s, the long-term trend toward rising income, increasing
job security and improving working conditions began to reverse. As long as the terms of
the labor-capital accord held, the relationship between unions and corporations was
relatively peaceful. As the economy started to falter, the workers' expectations were not
met. In the second half of the 1 960s, strike activity of all kinds -legal walkouts and
'David Gordon, Richard Edwards, and Michael Reich, Segmented Work, Divided
Workers: The Historical Transformation ofLabor in the United States (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 1982), 216.
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wildcat strikes- increased dramatically, reaching their climax in 1970. In that year,
according to the Board of Labor Statistics, 66 million work days were lost due to strikes.
This figure far exceeded the level of strike activity of the 1930s and the 1940s, with the
2
exception of 1946.
The 1969 UE-IUE strike against GE as well as the 1970 UAW walkout against
GM were well under the control of the union leaders. Workers achieved important gains,
despite the declining economy. Wildcat activity, however, posed as serious challenge to
union officials, especially to the UAW leadership. In the early 1970s, wildcat strikes in
auto plants placed working conditions and the nature of industrial work at the center of
public debate. In 1973, the UAW faced the first round of bargaining after the 1970
strike. Union officials were under the pressure of rank-and-file militants who demanded
not only higher wages and improved benefits but also dramatic changes on the shopfioor.
UAW leaders, meanwhile, felt restrained by the government's call for '"moderation" in
collective bargaining during Phase III of Richard Nixon's economic program.
The economic stimulation of 1972 allowed Nixon to win re-election. In the long
run, it proved an absolute economic disaster. There was undoubtedly "political
calculation" in Nixon's economic measures. Nevertheless, as Robert M. Collins claims,
the president faced "the difficulty of framing policy at a volatile moment when the
business cycle intertwined with an elemental secular transformation of the national and
3
world economies in ways that were, at the time, ditficult to discern." Nixon's economic
^BLS, Handbook, 1980, 415, quoted in Kim Mood, An Injury to All: The Decline of
American Unionism (Verso: New York, 1988), 86.
3
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advisors miscalculated the inflationary dangers of economic stimulation and
overestimated the potential of economic growth. In postwar America, economic growth
had become widely accepted as the foremost objective of U.S. public policy. "Growth,"
Collins claims, "was pursued as a goal in its own right in a variety of theoretical and
practical ways...Postwar liberals saw growth as the vehicle for transformative social
change; Richard Nixon viewed growth as a way to overcome the ravages of liberal
decay."'
Buoyed by his landslide victory in the 1972 presidential election, Nixon told the
nation in his second inaugural address:
Above all else, the time has come for us to renew our faith in ourselves and in
America...At every turn, we have been beset by those who find everything wrong
with America and little is right. But I am confident that this will not be the
judgment of history on these remarkable times in which we are privileged to live.^
If Nixon's claims sounded hollow in January 1973, they lay in utter desolafion at the end
of the year. Just a few weeks after the president's speech, the Senate voted, 70 to 0, to
establish a committee to investigate the 1972 break-in of the Democratic National
Committee headquarters at the Watergate office complex in Washington, DC. A "third-
rate burglary" quickly turned into a national disaster that eventually caused the
president's resignation. In the course of 1973, moreover, a series of foreign policy crises
pushed the U.S. economy into its worst recession in three decades. The economic
Vollins, 235.
"^Richard Nixon's Second Inaugural Address, quoted in Robert N. Bellah, "American
Civil Religion in the 1970s," in Russell E. Richey and Donald G. Jones, eds., American
Civil Religion (New York: Haper and Row, Publishers, 1974), 259.
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disaster, in turn, ushered in an age of retrenchment that in time would shatter the labor-
management accord.
Nixon started his second term launching what some analysts called a
"counterrevolution" against the general trend of social policy of the previous thirty or
forty years. The president's rephrased the Kennedy inaugural slogan: 'In our own lives,"
Nixon said, "let each of us ask not just what will government do for me, but what can I
do for myself." At the onset of his second administration, the president reaffirmed the
Republican Party's conservative tenets. First, the federal government could do little to
advance social change. Second, revenue sharing returned power to the local governments
and avoided bureaucratic centralization in America. And third, full employment was not
the government's commitment; if the economy needed stimulation, the uplift would come
by enlarging capital's investing power.*'
To avoid an increase in inflation and taxes, Nixon argued, federal spending had to
be reduced in 1973 from $ 283 billion to $ 269 billion. By slashing the allegedly
inefficient Great Society programs of the 1960s, Nixon cut government expenditure and
7
furthered his conservative agenda. The cuts affected programs in housing, education,
employment, manpower training, health, pollution and poverty. The president proposed
to cut these programs by $ 6.5 billion in fiscal year 1973, $ 17 billion in 1974, and a $100
Edward C. Banfield, et. al., eds., "Nixon, the Great Society, and the Future of Social
Policy: A Symposium," Cowwew/ary 55, no. 5 (May 1973): 49, 54.
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billion over the following five years.^ In the view of most of his political opponents,
Nixon's claim that revenue sharing made social spending more efficient was not accurate.
Decisions made at the state, municipal and county levels did not necessarily favor the
poor, minorifies or the working class. In his evaluation of the president's economic plan
for FY 74, Michael Harrington said:
He [Nixon] pretends that he is simply attacking the inefficient and overly lavish
innovations of Lyndon Johnson, but he really assaults the aging, the poor, and, as
Meany understands the working people.
Harrington understood the AFL-CIO president's position. The friendly
relationship that Nixon enjoyed with George Meany during the Fall of 1972 soon
deteriorated. First, Nixon antagonized Meany by appointing as his new secretary of labor
Peter Brennan, the New York Building Trades leader and the nation's foremost hawkish
hard hat. Brennan's appointment was widely linked to the New York construction
workers' pro-war demonstrations of May 1970. The Progressive columnist Patrick
Owens claimed: "This may be said to constitute the first time anyone was rewarded with
a Cabinet job for perpetrating violence in the streets." Even AFL-CIO leaders criticized
Brennan' s appointment. Industrial unions were outraged not only because Brennan was a
building tradesman but because he was widely known for his mediocrity. Meany openly
chastised the new Secretary of Labor for proposing a minimum wage bill "worse than
that presented last year on behalt of the Admmistration."
8
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The fahering economy further strained Nixon's relationship with Meany. Despite
the rapid expansion of the economy towards the end of 1972, 5 percent of the labor force,
or 4.4 million workers, were still unemployed in January 1973. Moreover, an additional
2 million workers were employed on part-time bases because no full-time jobs were
available." According to a Bureau of Labor Statistics summary, consumer prices during
Phase II of the administration's economic plan increased at an annual rate of 3.4 percent,
compared to a 3.8 percent increase in the pre-freeze period. Food prices continued to rise
at an annual rate of 5.0 percent. The president's evaluation of the economy, however,
was much more optimistic:
In short [he said] 1972 was a very good year for the American economy. 1 expect
1 973 and 1 974 to be even better. They can, in fact, be the best year our economy
has ever experienced. I have established as the overall goal of this program a
further reduction in the inflation rate to 2 Vi percent or less by the end of 1973.'^
After seventeen months of tight regulation, the Nixon administration decided that
the economy needed more flexibility in pricing and wage bargaining. In January 1973,
the president launched Phase III of his economic plan, putting wage and price controls on
what analysts of his economic plan described as a "self-voluntary or self-policing
• ,.'3
basis." In an address to businessmen, treasury secretary George P. Shultz explained
voluntarism in the following way: '"We give you a reasonable standard and say to you,
"It's up to you. We will be watching. ..We can come out with our ball bat and swing it if
""Labor Views the Economy, 1913,'" AFL-CIO American Federationist, March 1973,
10.
'^Allen Y. Zack, "Nixon's Credibility-The Economic Record," American AFL-CIO
Federationist, February 1974, 8.
'^Editorial, "Making Phase III work,'' Business Week, 20 January 1973, 102.
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we have to." Shultz thus offered no strict guidehnes for employers and unions to
follow.
Phase Ill's complex enforcement machinery was different from that of Phase II.
There were two important changes. First, the Price Commission and the Pay Board were
abolished; secondly, labor leaders were added as members of the Cost of Living
Council's new Labor-Management Advisory Committee. AFL-CIO president George
Meany, Leonard Woodcock of the United Auto Workers, Frank Fitzsimmons of the
Teamsters and I. W. Abel of the Steelworkers agreed to cooperate with the government in
the implementation of Phase III, not as administrators but as advisors. Despite their
decision to serve on the CLC's Labor-Advisory Board, labor leaders warned that if food
prices spiraled out of control in a year of pattern-setting contract negotiations, they could
not guarantee labor's continued cooperation with Phase III.
During 1973, unions representing about 4.7 million workers in the transportation,
construction, electrical manufacturing, auto and farm equipment, apparel, food, and
rubber industries were to negotiate new contracts. The Phase II wage standard of 5.5
percent, plus another 0.7 percent for fringe benefits, was supposed to stay in effect during
Phase III. As a minimum, unions would try to settle for what the guideline figures
allowed and would press hardest to catch up with the cost of living increases. Corporate
profits and rising productivity were also important bargaining factors. There was,
however, widespread confusion as to whether or not the administration would "swing its
bat" at union settlements that exceeded the 5.5 percent guideline for raises. The UAW
International Executive Board opposed the proposed one-year extension of the Economic
'''"The Gamble that Phase III will vjorkr Business Week, 30 January 1973, 18.
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Stabilization Act that was to expire on April 30. This act, the UAW claimed, "placed
the hands of the Executive huge and largely unrestricted powers to impose controls on
15
Ifi
wages and prices." Many top AFL-CIO officers agreed.
By mid-June 1973, it was clear that the fragile fabric of confidence that the Nixon
administration had built when it imposed wage-price controls in 1971 was beginning to
unravel. A number of economic developments shook Nixon's hopes for a "great year."
First, food prices continued to rise. The increase became critical in January, reaching a
near-record 1
.9 percent increase that month (2.3 percent in grocery stores). Secondly, the
unexpected devaluation of the dollar put pressure on import prices. Finally, although
Treasury Secretary George P. Shultz claimed that the 5.5 percent wage guideline (6.2
percent with fringes) was still in effect, businessmen were "clearly uncomfortable with
the vagueness of the new approach." In fact, when the new Labor-Management Advisory
17
Committee issued its first policy statement, it did not specify a wage guideline number.
As the administration's Phase III failed to free the nation from the grip of
inflation, American citizens became increasingly skeptical of the president's ability to
govern. Public clamor and political pressure for further action against inflation grew
more intense each time a new retail or wholesale price report was issued. In mid- 1973,
consequently, Nixon opted for a supposedly bolder approach to controls. His new
"Memo, UAW Position on Phase III, 16 January 1973, Folder 17, Box 10, UAW
International Office Department, Waynes State University Archives of Labor and urban
Affairs (Hereafter WSUA).
'^"Phase III unsettles the truce with labor," Business Week, 10 March 1973, 39.
'^"A foggier Phase III threatens the out\ook:' Business Week, 3 March 1973, 15.
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economic policy, Phase IV, included a blanket 60-day freeze on retail prices but not on
wages, rents or dividends. Raw agricultural products escaped controls, but prices on food
and other farm items were frozen. Phase IV, government officials said, would
concentrate on industries that showed major inflationary measures. For labor, the
standards remained essentially the same as under Phase III. Nixon's major economic
advisors stressed the flexibility of the sector by sector approach, promised an active
exception policy and pledged to free the economy from controls by 1974. The aim of
Phase IV, the White House announced, was "to moderate the rate of inflation existing
during the first six months of 1973 with minimum adverse effect on supply."'^
In his television announcement of the new economic program, Nixon highlighted
what was "right" with the economy: higher wages and an increasing growth rate. Only
after mentioning the successes did the president refer to the runaway prices which,
according to the administration, were largely caused by increased demand at home and
abroad and by crop failures abroad and in various parts of the country. "But whatever the
reasons," Nixon added, "every American family is confronted with a real and pressing
problem of higher prices. And I have decided that the time has come to take strong and
. . .
20
ettective action to deal with that problem." Economic observers regarded the UAW
talks as the "tesf of Nixon's Phase IV. The UAW strategists intended to negotiate wage
and benefit gains totaling 6. 1 percent to 7.2 percent a year, a clear violation of the
1
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administration's 5.5 percent guideline. Nevertheless, a week before the negotiations
started Business Week said: "There appears to be less emotion over big issues this year,
and the UAW and management have shown a willingness to engage in give-and-take
bargaining on these [issues] in the interest of peace."^'
United Auto Workers contract negotiations were expected to be among the
toughest. "If we can't get it in the paycheck because of wage controls," a UAW official
22
stated, "we'll get it in some other way." The UAW International Executive Board
regarded Phase III as "a step in the right direction," but insisted that the measures did
"not go nearly far enough." The union's main objection to controls was that they had
increased economic inequities. In the second half of 1972, UAW president Woodcock
pointed out, productivity in American industry increased at a rate of 5.6 percent, while
23
the purchasing power of the country's hourly workers rose by only 2.2 percent. The
UAW leaders underscored the tremendous profits that the major auto manufacturers had
made under the administration's game plan. In the first nine months of 1972, General
Motors' profits rose 14.2 percent, Ford's 39.2 percent and Chrysler's 180.5 percent. In
view of this, the union's leadership expected the Big Three to stabilize prices and lower
their profit targets. Woodcock insisted, ''...should Phase III permit the auto corporations
to continue their past irresponsible and inflationary conduct with respect to prices, there
'''UAW talks will test Phase IV," Business Week, 14 July 1973, 25.
2
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would be no sound or equitable basis for the Administration to restrict the gains of auto
24
workers."
In March 1973, the UAW held a Production Workers Conference in Atlanta,
preceding the Special Convention in Detroit that was to outline bargaining goals for the
upcoming contract negotiations. "We've got to make a strong impact at the bargaining
table this year on things that are non-economic," Woodcock declared. Conference
delegates presented a long list of grievances. Most expressed their dissatisfaction with
the Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA). It was not uncommon for OSHA
inspections to follow immediately upon the companies' clean-ups of violations. Health
and safety hazards were undoubtedly some of the worst problems that the union
membership faced. During the Vietnam War years, union officials claimed, more
25
Americans had died in factories than fighting in Indochina.
Conference participants also stressed the need to shorten the time on the job and
to make overtime voluntary. Production workers also w^anted improved retirement
benefits, cleaner production to combat speed-ups, better dental insurance and anti-
discrimination provisions to protect ethnic and racial minorities and women. Delegates
also touched on the issue of ''morale": ''We're losing this union at the bottom...Young
people in the shops are dissatisfied, they are concerned about working conditions and
26
safety.'' A year earlier, the 7,800 UAW Local 1112 had made the national newspaper
"ibid.
^^'Troduction Workers '-Sound Off," UAW Solidary, March 1973, 8,
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headlines during a strike against the General Motors Assembly Division (GMAD) in
Lordstown, Ohio. Gary Bryner, the union president, received extensive publicity during
the stoppage by describing not only the mind-dulling character of the work, but the ear-
damaging noise levels, the heat, the archaic shop rules, and the petty discipline. The
young union president called Lordstown 'Ihe Woodstock of the working man:" the
average age of the rank and file in the plant was twenty-five.^^
The 1972 stoppage over GM's speed-ups at Lordstown became a symbol of the
young autoworker's alienation. This 24-day strike, however, was just one ofmany
walkouts that had occurred since 1968, when GM's management decided to push for a
rise in production standards. The corporation's Lordstown "super planf " was designed to
meet the challenge of low-priced imported cars. The plant was equipped with the most
sophisticated machinery in order to increase the production of the Chevrolet Vega, GM's
answer to the imported compacts of Volkswagen, Toyota and Datsun. The Lordstown
facility was expected to turn out 101 Vegas an hour as compared with sixty an hour in
conventional plants. To the rank and file, this meant thirty-six seconds to do a job
operation up to 800 times a day. By 1972, the GMAD ran eighteen plants, employing
91,000 workers. The division was responsible for about 75 percent of the corporation's
production. "The division's policies," the New York Times reported, "have brought labor
28
unrest to almost every plant it has taken over." In 1971 , the GMAD not only assumed
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control of the Lordstown facility, but also plants in Norwood, Ohio, Willow Run,
Michigan, and St. Louis, Missouri. Walkouts occurred at three of the four locations; only
Willow Run avoided a strike.
Joseph E. Godfrey, the general manager of the GMAD, claimed that the
corporation had to "compete with the foreigner" and to do so the division would have to
continue to cut costs in all its plants. In order to measure efficiency, GM continually
ranked its plants, with improvement in one factory pushing another down the scale.
Bryner explained the process:
They [GMAD] have an audit of their eighteen assembly plants to determine how
they stand on a scale of one to eighteen in efficiency, cost wise. The eighteenth
plant is then paid a visit and instructed as to why they shouldn't be number
eighteen on the list. Local management then explains to the Supervisor in the
Plant why they canT be eighteenth on the list and then the pressure is applied to
the worker. This system is repeated each time the audit comes out and in turn,
perpetuates the alienation of the workers, profits before people.'^
During the Lordstown walkout, the UAW International supported the rank and filers.
This widely publicized strike revealed that management was launching a new assault on
organized labor and that the UAW could still fight back when corporations unilaterally
30
changed work rules. The Lordstown strike cost GM about $ 150 million in lost sales.
Following the stoppages over speed-ups in auto plants, UAW officials thoroughly
debated the "blue-collar blues."* In April 1973, during a symposium held at the Walter
and May Reuther UAW Family Education Center, vice-president Irving Bluestone
Local 1112 Memo, Polifical Materials, 1969-1977, Guthridge Collection, WSUA.
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assailed the corporations for not caring about their workers' job satisfaction. The head of
the UAW GM Department explained the rank and file's situation:
or
e
One very serious problem is created by the fact that the worker has no control
voice over the workplace. As a free citizen in society, he can make things chang
democratically, but the moment he enters the workplace, the democracy that he
enjoys as a free citizen, no longer exists.
Bluestone's words seemed to echo those of the radicals. There was a key difference,
however, Bluestone wanted to humanize the workplace, whereas the dissidents sought to
transform it. Radicals usually referred to assembly line work as the epitome of
tediousness. Yet only about 1 5 percent of the UAW membership worked on assembly
lines. Work in stamping plants, in forges and in foundries was no less routine or
alienating than on the assembly line. Some union officials were troubled by the way
"boredom on the assembly line" received extensive media coverage, while equally
important issues were largely ignored.
In the early 1970s, there was a flurry of research papers and mainstream
publications examining workers" changed attitudes towards their jobs. Most studies
indicated that blue collars were more dissatisfied with their jobs than past generations of
workers had been and were less willing to accept the authoritarian rule of the work place.
Newsweek reported:
They[American workers] are bored, rebellious, frustrated; sometimes they are
drunk on the job or spaced out on drugs. And though they are the newest darlings
of the sociologists and industrial psychologists, they're still a mystery to many of
the people who should understand them best: their bosses and their labor
32
leaders.
^'"Do the "Blue Collar Blues" Really Exist?," UAW Solidarity, April 1973, 2
^^"The Job Blahs: Who Wants to Work?" Newsweek, March 26, 1973, 79.
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In November 1973, the Monthly Labor Review also addressed the issue ofjob
satisfaction, comparing data from two national surveys of workers taken in 1969 and
1973. The research had been designed to measure working conditions and workers'
attitudes toward their jobs. In 1973, the authors pointed out, the two major variables in
determining the quality of working conditions were occupational group and collar color,
followed in decreasing order of association by education, age and race. The poorest
working conditions were reported by wage earners under 21 years old, with a grade
school education or less, by African-American operatives, and non-farm laborers. These
findings confirmed that, as the wildcat strikes on various auto plants seemed to indicate,
young workers tended to have more grievances than older employees and that race
33
remamed an important variable.
Over the three-year period of the study, rank and filers had become less satisfied
with their unions. In 1969, 1 8 percent of union members reported problems with how
democratically their unions were run, and 1 7 percent reported dissatisfaction with how
well their unions were managed. In 1973 these figures had increased to 29 and 23
percent, respectively. In sum, the percentage of union members reporting a problem
either with union democracy or union management was 35 percent in 1973, representing
34
an mcrease ot 9 percentage from 1 969.
"Job Satisfaction: A New Survey -No More, No less,"" AFL-CIO American
Federationist, January 1974, 22. Article excerpted from "Evaluating Working Conditions
in America," in the November issue of the Monthly Labor Review. Written by Robert P.
Quinn, Martha S. Baldi de Mandilovitch and Thomas W. Mangione.
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A 1 973 Gallup survey indicated that the downward trend in job satisfaction
paralleled the downtrend in workers' satisfaction in other areas, such as income, housing
and education. According to a nationwide poll, 34 percent of American workers were
dissatisfied with their jobs because the wages were poor. Twenty percent of those
interviewed considered their job boring and 17 percent said that they were not doing what
they wanted to. Ten percent claimed to be working too hard; 8 percent complained that
the hours were too long and 5 percent regarded their fringe benefits as insufficient. As
regards labor unions, the Oallup findings coincided with the trend identified by the
Monthly Review: labor unions had declined in public esteem to the lowest point in four
decades. While a majority of U.S. citizens continued to approve of labor unions, the
approval figure in 1 973 -sixty-percent- was down ten points since 1 965
A widely publicized study entitled "Where IIavc All the Robots Gone?,"
condueted by Harold Sheppard of the Upjohn Institute and Neal llerrick, dramatized the
problem of Job dissatisfaelion. After an in-depth analysis of 400 male union workers,
Sheppard and Herrick eoncluded that one third of them -partieularly the young wage
earners- were alienated from their jobs and dissatisfied with the typical rewards of higher
pay, shorter hours or longer vacations. I lerrick's study confirmed that, above all else,
blue collars were concerned with the nature of their work. Rank and filers, 1 lerrick
claimed, expected their work to be interesting and called for enough equipment and help
to get the job done, enough information about and enough authority over the labor
process. Other aspects of work that blue collars regarded as important were the
^*\lec Gallup and George H. Gallup, The Gallup Poll Cumulative Index: Public Opinion,
1935-1975. \)ob Satisfaction and Productivity,^^ Report No. 94, April 1973, 1-16.
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opportiinily to develop speeial abilities aiul see the result of their work as well as to
reeeive good pay and job seeurity.'' More importantlyJ lerriek aeeiised unions oIlKuing
Ignored work itsell as a soiiree of workers" iVustralion by havini^ loensed exelusivelv on
problems ol job seeurity and wage inereases. l o the unit>n leadership, however, these
eonehisions betrayeil a snperlieial know ledge of the nature ol et>lleetive bargaining.
A number oC union oflleials and labor relations seholars took issue with Sheppard
and 1 lerriek, Hluestone among them. In a series of papers. Bluestone diseussed the
nature offaelory work and the role that unions |>layeil in improving the ipiality of work
lile. rhe 1 lAW viee-president admitted that belter edueated workers were probably less
likely to bow to the authoritarianism ol the slu)p lloor than were their |iarents. Ulueslone
pointed out that this was "a healthy sign i\o{ a |>hent>menon to be ile|)lored." sinee the
workers" demands were eonsistent with the prineiples ol ilemoeraey. Althouj'ii Bluestone
ei>neeileil that there was unrest among younj-ei woikeis, his interpretation dilleied iVom
the one presented by Sheppard and I lerriek. ^ BIuestiMie useil the l.ordstown walkout lo
present his view of the relationship belween workers" disgust over Iheir jobs antl their
sjieeil'ie grievanees. In the mid-l'>(>()s. Bluestone e\|ilained, (IM's management deeided
U) eonsoli(.lale its assembly work in the Cleneral Motors Assembly Division. Obviously,
sueh eousolidation aehieveil manpower savings, but (he et)mpany went beyonil the
''V'onunents by Neil I lerriek of the U.S. Department oi l abor on a l*)7() stutly published
by the Survey Researeh Center ol the I Inixersity olMiehigan, in Wiliam ( ioKlberg"s ".lob
Satisl'aetion: Sorting Out the Nonsense,"" , I /'7,-( , l/;/(77V</;/ luu/cnifionist, .lune 1^)7.^,
14.
'^Irving Bluesti)ue, "The System ol Wtxk ,\ New 1 ook Needed.'" I'almer I louse,
("hieagt) Illinois, 10 1.' Deeember 1972, 7, I'older l, \ >h, Irving Bluestone I'iles.
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expected cut backs and reduced manpower on the assembly lines and off-line operations
as well. Management also drastically cut down on the number of workers without
changing the line speed. After the consolidation, fewer employees were expected to turn
out the same number of units as had been produced under GM's previous system.
This strike wave, Bluestone admitted, was related to the rank and filers" attitude
towards their jobs; strikers vividly expressed their concerns about the drudgery of
assembly line work. Nevertheless, the UAW vice-president claimed:
The workers did not go on strike, saying to themselves, "I'm alienated, Fm
striking to make our jobs more meaningful and satisfying. They went on strike
over particular complaints and abuses which they wanted corrected, such as
3 8
speedup or working conditions or the denial of negotiated rights and privileges.
There were basically two arguments that angered Bluestone and other UAW union
leaders. First, they rejected the social scientists' suggestion that the unions^ collective
bargaining would never provide solutions to the blue collars^ alienation. And secondly,
they disagreed that the younger workers' rebelliousness was radically different from that
which had taken place in the American auto plants in the past.
William W. Winpisinger, vice-president of the International Association of
Machinists, also assailed those government officials, intellectuals and academics who had
not only discovered "an interesting new malady' -i.e. the blue-collar blues- but had also
''provided it with a name, a diagnosis, and even a cure." Winpisinger shared
Bluestone' s assessment of the Lordstown strike: young workers were reacting against the
same kind of grievances, in the same way, as had generations of workers before them.
38
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They were rebelling against speed-ups; protesting safety violations; and resisting working
conditions that had been unilaterally imposed by management in the name of increased
efficiency. Winpsinger concluded: "Anyone who thinks wildcats or slowdowns or even
sabotage started at Lordstown doesn't know much about the history of the American
I 1
40
labor movement."
Union officials insisted that they did not oppose efforts by management or
industrial psychologists to make assembly line less monotonous and more fulfilling.
Labor leaders contended that unions had addressed job dissatisfaction in the past and
could do so again in the 1970s. To the defenders of trade unionism, higher pay, leisure
and fringe benefits, on which union bargainers concentrated, were not peripheral to the
quality of work. In sum, union officials argued, collective bargaining had always sought
maximum benefits and the best conditions for workers. The 1973 contract negotiations
would be a difficult test for unions facing the demands of their membership in the midst
of a downward economic spiral.
Although the UAW expected the upcoming bargaining sessions to be "peaceful,"
Detroit was not as calm as it appeared. As talks with the Big Three approached, rank and
file militancy at several Chrysler plants worried the UAW leaders. "The 1973 wildcats,"
Kim Moody argues, "symbolized the whole unresolved problem of the shopfloor
41
regime." The grievances of the Detroit wildcatters were not that ditferent from the
Lordstown militants'. Yet the UAW leadership did not support the Chrysler workers.
40
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Indeed, they broke one of their strikes. The Lordstown strikers articulated their demands
in a language familiar to the UAW leaders and sought solutions within the existing
framework of labor-capital relations. The Detroit militants, in contrast, spoke the
language of black power, which union officials regarded as destabilizing and even
dangerous. In a memo to union officers and board members. Secretary Treasurer Emil
Mazey requested "any informadon on the activities of these groups ...as it relates to
publications, literature, press releases, or other types of activities." Among the most
militant dissidents were the Workers Action Movement (WAM), the National Caucus of
Labor Committees, and the Progressive Labor Party (PLP). They all charged the UAW
with following '^sellout policies" with the Big Three and using strong-arm tactics to block
the radicals" efforts to organize autoworkers.
Racism and safety hazards remained largely unresolved issues in Detroit auto
plants. These grievances undoubtedly radicalized large numbers of workers in the late
1960s and early 1970s. On July 24, 1973, a wildcat strike at the Chrysler Jefferson plant
made local newspaper headlines. Two African-American workers, Larry Carter and
Isaac Shorter, took over an electrical control booth, shut down the lines and won the
ouster of a superintendent who had made repeated racist threats. The workers had
apparently filed grievances against the supervisor but management had refused to listen.
After thirteen hours and a half of negotiations, the corporation agreed to fire the
superintendent and promised that no worker would suffer reprisals from the sit-down.
Carter and Shorter resented the fact that UAW officials had tried to persuade them to
Memo on Radical Groups, 1973, Folder 14, Box 7, UAW Washington Office, Steve
Scholossberg Collection, WSUA.
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come out before their demands had been met, arguing that the strikers had already made a
.
43
pomt.
On August 14, less than a month after the sit-down at the Chrysler Jefferson plant,
a small group of dissidents held the corporation's Mack Avenue Stamping Plant for 30
hours: Bill Gilbreth, a WAM leader, started the wildcat strike by sitting on an assembly
line conveyor belt. Gilbreth had been fired a week before and had returned to the plant to
demand reinstatement. The shut down started when a company guard tried to remove
Gilbreth from the plant. He sat down and refused to leave. The approximately two
hundred workers who supported the WAM leader demanded the re-hiring of all fired
workers, improved safety conditions, and amnesty for the people involved in the sit-
down. Over a thirty-hour period, the number of wildcatters dwindled to around forty.
The strike ended after two days when riot-equipped Detroit police ousted thirty-six
strikers from the plant. Moreover, about 1,000 officials from twenty UAW locals
mobilized at the plant gates to assure that dissidents did not prevent workers from
entering the facility when it reopened. Local newscaster Bill Bonds captured the irony of
the situation: "For the first time in the history ofUAW, the union mobilized to keep a
plant open." This was not true, but the statement presented the union officials in the
worst possible light.
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Union officials' actions during the Mack Avenue wildcat strike ignited a
controversy over the extent to which the UAW defended its members. The UA
W
leadership argued that the shut down had been planned by WAM, a communist splinter
group that intended to take over the union and the companies. In a leaflet handed to
members ofUAW Local 140, union officials urged workers not to be "misled by outside
agitators or dissident groups forming inside the plant." Radicals, for their part, said of the
supposedly "tiny cells of communists:"
They are the autoworkers, both black and white, the 20-30 year old Vietnam
veterans who learned class oppression in the military and who realized they are
stuck in the plants until they retire. These workers are serious about changing the
conditions in the plants.
Radical dissidents such as the Workers Action Movement or the New Unionists
claimed that, besides the basic quesfions of wages and working conditions, workers were
especially concerned about the boredom and drudgery of factory work. In their first
Newsletter, the Ann Arbor New Unionists stated that workers' ultimate goal should be
"democratic management of production" and called on the rank and file to "provide ideas
on how things could be different." Their program proposed the creation of one industrial
union for all workers of each industry, including the unemployed; company management
by elected workers instead of bosses; and replacement of "high-paid bureaucrats" with
moderately paid union delegates. The New Unionists chastised Leonard Woodcock and
the UAW for not discussing the workers' job dissatisfaction or for simply regarding them
46
as "solutionless."
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The UAW leaders thus had to confront the issue ofjob satisfaction during the
1973 contract negotiations. By late September, after a week long strike, the UAW
completed contract negotiations with the Chrysler Corporation. As Leonard Woodcock
viewed it, the UAW had made a number of breakthroughs on old problems:
When those plants go back into operation, they'll be just like they were last
Friday, except that we have now created the mechanism for the union and its
members to begin to change those health and safety conditions, to begin to
humanize the workplace, to tackle the question of compulsory overtime and give
the individual worker the right to have a greater control over his own life.^^
The UAW leadership considered restrictions on the corporation's right to demand
overtime as one of the most substantial gains. Workers could only be scheduled nine
hours a day, six days a week. Moreover, no employee could be forced to work Sundays
or more than two consecutive Saturdays. To radical critics, however, this provision
became "virtually meaningless" because it did not go into effect until January 1, 1974.
This meant that between October and Christmas of 1973, when production rates were
highest and workers were required to work longer hours, the voluntary overtime
.48
provision would not be in effect. The UAW also won changes in retirement provisions.
Under the new contract, a worker with 30 years of service could retire before the age of
62 with a pension of $ 550 a month. The full pension of $ 700 did not go into effect until
October 1978. Critics responded that, with continuing inflation, in five years' time the
increase in pension might become meaningless. In a similar vein, the radicals argued that
''^"From Slogans to Reality: Victory at Chrysler," UAW Solidarity, October 1973, 3.
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the Cost of Living Allowance (COLA) tbrnuila had not been improved, as the UAW
claimed. Under the new contract, COLA would pay 1 cent tor every .35 increase in the
consumer price index, instead of the .4 of the previous agreement. UAW leaders
admitted, however, that one penny of the COLA payable each quarter between March
1974 and June 1976 would be diverted "to help pay for the very costly new fringe
benefits, such as 30 and out at any age, the dental plan, the additional holidays and so
49
on."
To tackle the problem of working conditions, the new contract established healtii
and safety joint union-management committees in the plants, but (he new committees
would not have enforcement powers, fhe new contract also formally sanctioned section
502 of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 that permitted workers to strike
over safety issues. Lven the harshest critics of the 1973 agreement regarded this as "an
advance from previous contracts." finally, the wage increase of 3 percent each >ear o\er
a three-year contract, which the union considered "the highest ever negotiated in the auto
industry," was well within the Nixon administration's Phase IV wage control
guidelmes.
fhe increasing moderation of organized labor's demands over the 1968-1974
period might account for the decline in the unions" approval among rank and fders. An
analysis of the unions' behavior in the Nixon years indicates that organized labor was
tougher during the 1969-70 recession than during (he inllation of 1973-1974. Contrary to
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the conventional wisdom that unions were tough in times of prosperity but moderate in
times of recession, during the 1969-70 economic downturn, as Fortune reporter Irwin
Ross claimed, "unions seemed to bargain more aggressively than ever.""^' During the
1969-70 recession, consumer prices rose by 5.5 percent and unions were determined to
keep abreast or stay ahead of inflation. Strike activity also increased dramatically in the
late 1960s, reaching its climax in 1970.
In 1973, unions were relatively restrained, perhaps because of the savage
inflation. Even though the wage-control apparatus was much weaker under Phases III
and IV, labor" s wage gains fell behind the inflation rate. Moreover, as unemployment
rose and employer resistance stiffened, the number of both wildcat and legal strikes
declined. Unauthorized walkouts staged by radical workers virtually disappeared after
the summer of 1973, as did the rank-and-file organizations of that period. Unions, for
their part, became more concerned with retaining members than with increasing their pay.
The high spirits that accompanied the settlement of the major auto contracts in September
1973 soon disappeared. In a few months, UAW president Leonard Woodcock gloomily
admitted that the contracts had been dampened by the recession in the auto industry and
52
in the economy at large.
Watergate would have finished Nixon sooner or later, but the oil crisis
undoubtedly accelerated the president's political demise. The United States had suffered
energy problems for several months but, as historian Alan Matusow explains, it was the
Arab oil boycott of October 1 973 that "turned energy into a full-fledged crisis, featuring
^' Irwin Ross, "How to tell when unions will be tough," Fortune, July 1975, 100.
^^"The State of Our Union," UAW Solidarity, June 1 974, 1
.
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panic, pessimism, gas lines, a plethora of conspiracy theories, accelerating inflation, and
,.53
a recession." The United States was passing from a long period of cheap energy that
had made it the world's leading industrial nation into an era in which it could not meet its
energy demands. Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, the country had become increasingly
dependent on foreign sources and foreign-flag shipping of crude oil and petroleum
products. Furthermore, the U.S. had lagged in the development of alternative energy
sources and oil companies, with the help of lavish U.S. tax breaks, had emphasized crude
oil and refinery investments abroad. In 1973, 35 percent of U.S. oil came from foreign
sources, 1 8 percent from the Middle East. Between 1950 and 1973, the price of a barrel
of Saudi Arabian oil cost less than $ 2; in this "golden age," as historian Eric Hobsbawm
points out. ''energy was ridiculously cheap and getting cheaper all the time."^^
During the Nixon years, the ownership of world's oil shifted from companies to a
relatively few producer government. This change allowed the Organization of Petroleum
Exporting Countries (OPEC) to restrict exports in the 1970s. Oil undoubtedly affected
not only the economic but also the political relations among nations. To the Arab states
the paramount political issue was Israel, the United States" closest ally in the Middle
East. On October 6, 1973, Egyptian President Anwar el Sadat sent troops into the Israeli-
occupied Sinai Peninsula while Syria, Egypt's ally, captured the Golan Heights. Sadat"
s
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aim was to recover territory that his country had lost during the six-day war of 1967. The
Soviet Union suppHed the forces of Egypt and Syria, while a hard-pressed Israel, short of
planes and ammunition, appealed to the U.S. to rush supplies. The Arab countries
countered that they would use oil as a weapon against any country that aided Israel.
Nixon paid scant attention to the threat, sending to Congress a $ 2.2 billion emergency
aid package to re-supply Israel. On October 20, Saudi Arabia placed a total embargo on
oil exports to the United States.
As the crisis in the Middle East escalated, the Watergate scandal reached its
climax. "Watergate," journalist Jonathan Schell noted, "that uncontrollably spreading
thing, had become entangled with the apocalypse."^^ On October 24, the crisis in the
Middle East took a dramatic turn. Soviet General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev urged the
United States to join the Soviet Union in sending peacekeeping forces to the Middle East
to enforce the cease-tire agreed upon a few days earlier. Brezhnev also stated that if the
United States did not reply, the Soviet Union would consider acting alone. Taking the
statement as a threat of unilateral intervention in the Middle East, Secretary of State
Henry Kissinger and Defense Secretary James Schlesinger placed American forces on
worldwide alert, the first time American officials had done so since the Cuban Missile
crisis of 1962. The Soviets, who apparently had never intended to act unilaterally, did
not respond. On October 27, after intense negotiations, a UN cease-fire went into effect
and the war was over. The oil embargo, however, continued until March 1 974, when
57
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The Middle East crisis electrified the 1 973 AFL-CIO Convention and offered
George Meany a golden opportunity to revive his Cold War rhetoric and urge American
politicians not to confuse detente with "unilateral concessions." The AFL-CIO
leadership called on the U.S. government to ship Israel all the war materiel necessary to
maintain the balance of power in the Middle East. Secretary of Defense James R.
Schelinger, who spoke at the Convention, reassured union officials by stating that the
United States would guarantee continuing security for the State of Israel and equity for its
neighbors. For his part, the AFL-CIO president contended:
We are determined to speak out because we have a real stake in foreign policy. It
is our members who must pay the taxes to sustain our government's programs in
the international field. It is the sons of workers who are called upon to fight the
58
wars that result from failure to contain aggression and subversion.
Meany was right in claiming that it was the "sons of workers'' who did the fighting when
an international crisis erupted, but it was evident that the lessons of the Vietnam War
were oblivious to the AFL-CIO's quintessential Cold Warrior.
The oil crisis that the Yom Kippur War unleashed had a tremendous impact on the
living standards of low and middle-income families. In the twelve months between
December 1972 and December 1973, retail prices of fuel oil and gasoline skyrocketed
46.8 percent and 19.7 percent respectively. Shortages resulted in widespread plant
shutdowns, production cutbacks, layoffs, shorter working hours and economic
dislocation. The rate of unemployment jumped from 4.6 percent in October 1973 to 5.2
in January 1974. An AFL-CIO Executive Council Report stated that ^^most Americans
AFL-CIO American Federatiomst. November 1973, 28.
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slunikl lu.l Ih- lt)ival to saciilko, while a few |vvcro| allowal lo piollt liom (he
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riic slaggciing increases in oil prices aiUled alH)ii( $ .M) hilhoii lo ci>nsnnK-rs'
energy hill in 1971. In Ihe same periinl, I I.S. oil companies inailc lalMilons piofils.
Despite the emharj-.o ai'anisl ihc I linlcd Slalcs, llic r;ill m crmlc oil puHliiclii>n ami Ihe
increase ol price per harrel ol crnile oil, Ihc ci>nihineil allcr lax prollls of Iwenly-lwo
lari'c oil companies inereaseil S.\7 percent Irom l')7.\ Ofllu- li\ c larrcsl oil companies,
Fxxon rcpoiiecl lhal ils afler-tax profits in l')7^ had inereaseil 50.2 percent; MohiPs
prollls increased 16. H percent; Texaco's, 45.4 percent; Standard Oil of Caliloinia's, 54.2
percent; and ( inlTs, 70 percent. More i>utraget)ns than the cxi>rhilanl oU imlnstry's
prollls was the ic\ elation in .lannary 1074 that $ > nnlhon ol lhc $ (>() nnlhon that Nixon
raised lor his 107.' cainpaij-n was oil mt>ncy.
I he economic situation was hicak indeed In Ihe eiul 1 07 ^, || did not impro\ e
in 1074. In the twelve months period from .lannary to l)eeeinher 107 ^ inllation
increased S.S percent -Ihe highest one-year rate since I0.|7- whereas Nixon's goal had
been 2.5 percent or less, i'ood |>rices, one of Ihe major concerns ol vvoi king peo|4e, had
soareil al a rate 0121.1 percent dnring IMiase IV. I he hnying power of ihe average wage
(.1
earnei had declined ^ percent in Ihc conisc ol Ihe \cai. The oil crisis soon iook ils h)ll
(lary M. link, ed., , l/'7. CIO. I'wciifivc ( 'oiimil Sdilcnicnfsmul Rtporls. /'> > /<>75,
((ireenwood IMcss: West|iorl, ( onnedicnt, 10/7), Vol. 5, 2452-245J.
""l ink, 2452-245^; ll nsliiiii^fon PoM, 2 .lannary 1074, I.
'
'Allen /ack, "Nixon's ( icdihility I he l'et>nomic Kcconl," .I/-/. ( .l/m'/7(<//;
lu'dcralionisf, IVhiiiary 1074, 10.
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on the auto industry and, consequently, on autoworkers. The shock of gasoHne shortages
and skyrocketing prices caused a decHne in consumer demand and triggered a shift to
more fuel-efficient imported small cars. The changes threw the industry into a near
depression. Industry employment that had peaked at 750,000 in September 1973
declined to 684,000 by January 1974.^^
Nixon insisted in his 1974 State of the Union address that "there will be no
recession in the United States." In fact, what followed was not a recession, but the Greal
Recession, in Matusow's phrase: "the low point on the roller coaster ride of booms and
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busts that began in 1969 and lasted into the 1980s;' The inflationary spiral could be
traced back to the American military intervention in Indochina. The Vietnam War
machine used vast quantities of material and caused massive increases in demand for
goods and services, thus setting an inflationary boom in motion. If the war had been
financed with higher taxes -something unlikely considering its unpopularity- it would
have reduced private demand to offset increasing govemment demand.
The initial boom ended in the 1969-1970 recession, but the govemment started to
pump up the economy before the deflationary forces made a lasting impact on prices.
Then came 1972 and 1973 -both boom years-with the accompanying increase in prices.
In 1972, Phase II price and wage controls dampened the nation's inflation to an
artificially low level. The relaxed Phase III program that began in January 1973 proved a
disaster: the administration never used the "stick in the closet'' that Treasury Secretary
George Shultz had proclaimed as the administration's back-up weapon. In the view of
62
"Economic Conditions in the Auto Industry," UAW Solidarity, June 1974, 12
^^Matusow, 302.
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the UAW leadership, "war, 'engineered slump', profit-gouging, and wasted energy" had
started the inflationary spiral. Moreover, the government economists were "deeply
confused" and proposed "strategies for fighting only inflation while ignoring
64
recession."
By late October 1973 collective bargaining became less of an issue and the Nixon
crisis dominated organized labor's policy discussions. In his opening address to the
AFL-CIO's Tenth Convention, George Meany listed the key political developments of
the preceding months. Vice-President Spiro Agnew, "the strong law and order man," had
resigned and had been convicted of a felony. Former Attorney General John Mitchell
and former Secretary of Commerce Maurice Stans were under indictment for conspiracy,
perjury and obstruction ofjustice. Four members of the White House staff had been
indicted, among them the president's chief domestic affairs advisor, John D. Ehrlichman.
A dozen more officials had either resigned or been fired in connection with the White
House scandal. Finally, the president of the United States had been accused of tax
avoidance, shady real estate deals and criminal abuse of presidential power.
During the biennial convention of the AFL-CIO, about 1 ,000 labor leaders
supported the federation's call for Nixon's resignation or impeachment. The unionists
found Nixon responsible for the problems that affected organized labor most: the
possibility of a serious recession in 1974, the deepening energy crisis, the continuing
inflation and the loss of U.S. jobs to imports. The president did not even receive the
traditional invitation to speak at the convention in 1973, nor did his Labor Secretary
Peter, J. Brennan. Although the economy continued to worsen, union leaders did not
64
Inflation! How did we get into this mess?" UAW Solidarity, December 1974, 4.
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discuss whether or not organized labor should continue to support the administration's
economic program. Organized labor participation in Nixon's Phase IV was taken as a
given. "There is a realization on the part of some people," stated the Steelworkers
president I. W. Abel, "that we have to bring a bit of order into the economy ."^^
After adopting a strongly worded resolution calling for Nixon's resignation or
immediate impeachment, the AFL-CIO launched what the Washington Star News called
"the biggest and potentially most influential informational campaign" in the federation's
history. The AFL-CIO News published a nineteen-point bill of particulars outlining
grounds for Nixon's impeachment and editorials by Meany appeared in the publications
of affiliated unions. On the same day that Meany launched his attack upon the president.
Woodcock, with the unanimous approval of the UAW International Executive Board,
also called for Nixon's impeachment. The UAW president stated:
In calling upon the Congress to act, I am fully cognizant of the gravity of
impeachment. We need unity and leadership, but we can afford neither unity won
through cowardice and immorality, nor leadership stained by perfidy and
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tyranny.
The economic downturn exacerbated Nixon's problems in office, but it was the
Watergate affair that destroyed his administration. As early as June 1973, about three
quarters of the American public believed Nixon was involved in the Watergate cover-up.
Sentiment for his impeachment grew slowly, from 19 percent in mid- 1973 to 35 percent
at year's end. With the revelations of early 1974, support for impeachment increased.
Business Week, October 27, 1973, 35-36.
'^Impeachment of the President," Folder 27, Box 12, UAW Washington Office, WSUA.
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reaching 65 percent at the time of his resignation in August 1974. A smaller majority, 57
percent, favored his removal from office.^^
On July 24, 1974, the Supreme Court, ruling 8-0 that Nixon had no right to
withhold evidence in criminal proceedings, ordered the president to turn over sixty-four
White House tapes of Watergate discussions. Three days later, the House Judiciary
Committee recommended that Nixon be impeached because his actions constituted a
"course of conduct or plan'" to obstruct the investigation of the Watergate break-in and to
cover up other unlawful activities. On August 5, three new transcripts of White House
tapes revealed that Nixon personally had ordered a cover-up of the investigation of
Watergate six days after the illegal entry into the Democrats' national headquarters. The
tapes, argues historian Michael Genovese, "showed a dark side of Nixon never before
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seen by the public." Few now believed the president's assertion that he was "not a
crook." Facing sure impeachment, the president resigned on August 8, 1974.
In the months that followed, the recession deepened and public confidence in the
government's ability to manage the economy collapsed. President Gerald Ford,
furthering Nixon's conservative agenda, offered no measures to halt the recession. Faced
with economic disaster, both the UAW and the AFL-CIO leadership directed their efforts
towards the 1974 congressional elections. UAW advertisements encouraged its members
to vote: "Congress is only as able as the people you vote for," the union officials claimed.
The Gallup Poll Cumulative Index, Report N° 1 1 1, September 1974, 7.
^Vichael A. Genovese, The Watergate Crisis (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press,
1999), 46-55, 50.
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Organi/cd labor,
-now decidedly in retreat- saw in the o(T-year elections an opportunity
"to make the system work/^ One 1 1AW pamphlet entiuisiastically staled:
We can j^el tax reform, we can get a strong plant-closing bilk we can put a iialt to
unemployment and rising prices, and we can get national health security. We can
do this on lUeclion Day 1974.'
It is unlikely that many rank and lilers believed (\>ngress could do so much.
Nevertheless, union leaders viewed the 1974 electoral returns as encouraging. The
1 )emocrats made si/.able gains, picking up 4.^ I louse seats, four Senate seats and four
governorships. The disastrous state of the economy and the widespread job insecurity
explain why Republicans lost so many votes. "The liberal victories in 1974/^ said the
AFL-CK) American FcderaHofiisf^ ^culminated the trend started in 1970 when Nixon's
"southern strategy'' was in l\ill bloom and predictions of a conservative era were
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widespread.''
The AI'I,-(M() was probably too optimistic, but surveys indicated that Nixon's
Middle America had not turned as conservative as Republicans had hoped. \\y 1974, the
deteriorating economy and the Watergate scandal had almost totally submerged the
Social Issue. As the 1974-olf year election campaign came to a close, (ki11u|) carried a
public opinion referendum on a numlxM* of issues. According to the survey's fmdings,
there was conservative support on questions such as unconditional amnesty for dralt
resisters, the death penalty, busing and marijuana legalization. The majority of those
interviewed, however, called for wage-price controls and defense budget cuts and
UAlVS(>li(/arif}\ October 1974, 3.
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opposed limiting federal spending for social programs. 'The public's mandate," Gallup
added, "includes a call for stronger economic measures to deal with inflation, the
problem uppermost in the minds of voters when they cast their ballots in the recent
congressional elections."^'
The 1973-1975 recession signaled the end of the postwar golden era of economic
prosperity. In April 1975, Fortune announced that "ever increasing affluence" was "less
of a sure thing." Between 1945 and 1974. labor-capital relations rested on the
assumption of economic growth. Unions were successful in gaining higher real wages,
increased job security and better working conditions for their members. At the same
time, the more progressive union leaders pushed for a broader social agenda that resulted
both in the expansion of social welfare programs and the reduction of labor-capital
72
conflict. "Work," Fortune pointed out, "became more rewarding, but the bonanza
[was] smaller that [was] commonly supposed." In the late 1960s and early 1970s,
inflation and taxes canceled out workers' gains in nominal pay. In the 1963-1973 period,
amid generally favorable economic conditions, blue collars' spendable earnings climbed
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only 1 2 percent, an annual rate of 1 . 1 percent.
The widely discussed "blue-collar blues" -often trivialized by the mass media-
was a clear indication of the downward trend in economic gains. During the 1969-1970
recession, large numbers of industrial workers still channeled their protest through their
^Whe Gallup Poll Comulative Index, Report No. 113, November 1974, 1-2.
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Gordon, et. al., 216.
^^Edmund Faltermayer, "Ever Increasing Affluence Is Less of a Sure Thing," For/wwe,
April 1975,92, 96.
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unions. Cases in point were the electrical workers strike against GE in 1%9 and the auto
workers walkout against General Motors in 1070. Two years later, the l.ordstown strike
of 1972 became the epitome of the young workers' rebellion against technology and the
rank and file's rising concern over working conditions. There were wildcat strikes in
Detroit auto plants in 1973 at the time of the UAW negotiations with the Big Three. Yet
they did not signal permanent escalation in rank-and-file militance. On the contrary, alter
the summer of 1973, the leaders and the rank and filers both went into retreat. From
1974 onvvarcK the number of strikes diminished considerably: higher iineniploynient rates
and the growing threat ofhiyolTs and plant shutdowns had a strong "disciplinary^^ elTect.
hi 1974, Irving Rluestone was still optimistic about the future of labor-capital
relations. The UAW vice-president contended that the 1973 auto contract negotiations
had been an important step towards improving the quality of worklile. Chrysler, lord
and General Motors had responded positively to the union's proposal to jointly develop
and implement programs directed toward '"job enrichment." Auto was the tlrst industry
in the United States to engage in such an endeavor. Rluestone concluded:
I he first steps may be halting and careful; considerable trying and testing may be
necessaiy, tor no one has all the answers and no two industrial situations are
identical. If it is successluK however, it could alter intrinsically the decades old
shop worn system of management-worker relations and the philosophy spawned
,74
by the concept ot ''scientific management/'
By the mid-197()s, as Kim Moody says, 'nhe contours of the U.S. economy began
to change at an accelerating rate'' as it became ''part of an internationally integrated
Irving Bluestone, "Decision Making By Workers," 20 June 1974, 8-9, holder Quality of
Worklile, Box 156, Irving Bluestone Files, UAW-CJM Department, WSUA.
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economy." Drastic changes in the structure of industry as well as the workforce soon
followed. Rather than improve the quality of worklife, as Bluestone expected,
management adopted a more aggressive attitude towards their workers. In 1974, the ratio
of supervisory to non-supervisory workers began to increase. Corporations started to
move their fixed capital in manufacturing to regions where wages were lower and unions
less influential. Anti-union activity also intensified and organized labor's bargaining
76
leverage began to decline. The future of blue-collar workers depended largely on the
vision and initiative of their unions to negotiate the terms of labor-capital relations in
America in a new economic era.
Kim Moody, An Injury to All: The Decline ofAmerican Unionism (Verso: New York,
1988), 95.
^^Gordon, et. al., 216-219.
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Nineteen sixty-eight has gone down in history as "the year oftiie barrieailes;" the
year in whieh "denioeraey" was "in the streets;" the year in whieh the presidential
eleetion beeame an "Aineriean melodrama." Those who lived through the sensatii)nal
events of 1968 pereeived that Ameriean society was undergoing profound changes, i-rom
the vantage point ol the twenty-first century, there is no doubt that l%8 was a turning
point in U.S. history. Although then probably not obvious, that year's swift
developments ushered in a new era for Americans, and especially for those at the lower
end of the economic spectrum, fhc labor-liberal coalition was seriously weakened. As a
result of the widely reported Tet offensive, anti-war .sentiment grew significantly and
opposition to the conllict, reaching its highest point in 1%9, during the October 15
Moratorium Day demonstrations. The rift that the Vietnam War provoked within the
ranks of labor would never be bridged. At the .same time, an increasing number ol
Americans no longer took the economic prosperity of the immediate postwar period for
granted, fhc American blue-collar worker was not so afllueni after all and long strikes
against major U.S. industries were not a thing of the past. Yet rank-and filers and leaders
alike hardly imagined that the political and economic ground that they were losing would
never be recovered.
I'hirty years later, blue- and white-collar workers live under the constant threat of
layoffs and plant shut-downs. Since the late 196()s, unions' power to protect their
members has dramatically declined and their numbers have been reduced to almost half
what they had been three decades ago. In 1968, unions represented 23 percent of the
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work force. In 1998, organized labor represented only 13.9 percent, leaving six out of
seven workers without union representation.' Gregory Mantsios, director of worker
education at Queens College, observes:
Why [...] has the working class, which is working more and making less in the
richest and most powerful nation in history, failed to use its collective force, either
in the workplace, the voting booth, or the streets, to demand fundamental changes
in the way this country distributes its weahh and resources?
There is abundant evidence to prove that the American working class has failed to use its
collective force, but the explanations for such failure in the last thirty years have tended
to be simplistic.
Most historical accounts of the late 1960s portray blue-collar workers as
considerably affluent, generally supportive of the president's Vietnam policy and
increasingly concerned about the Social Issue. Union leaders fare even worse. They are
accused of failing to oppose the Vietnam War, organize the unorganized, capitalize on
rank-and-file militancy, confront corporate power and develop effective political
strategies. These accusations are well grounded. Yet scholars who place the blame for
labor's failure squarely on the shoulders of the workers, the union leaders, or both fail to
acknowledge the impact that domestic and world economic changes had on the American
work force in the manufacturing sector. As the present study shows, the relationship
between a Republican administration, a traditionally Democratic labor leadership, a
radicalized student movement and a volatile rank and file was highly complex.
'Todd Gitlin, ^Trom Chicago to Seattle," Newsweek, 13 December 1999, 2.
Gregory Mantsios, ed.. The New Labor Movement for the New Century (New York:
Monthly Review Press, 1998), xiii.
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In the Nixon years, unionized workers attempted to use their "collective force...in
the workplace, the voting booth, and the streets,'' though certainly not "to demand
fundamental changes in the way [the U.S.] distributes its wealth and resources," as
Mantios points out. In the second half of the 1960s, the sharp increase in strike activity -
both legal and illegal- revealed that the labor-capital relations were not as friendly as
many analysts described them. On the shopfloor, there were a number of unresolved
problems, such as safety hazards, poor working conditions, and racial and gender
discrimination. Outside the workplace, blue-collar workers found it increasingly difficult
to make ends meet. Despite the rise in the number of wildcat strikes, most workers still
supported union sanctioned strikes as well as their leaders' collective bargaining efforts.
The 1 969 strike against General Electric was significant for several reasons. The
walkout, the first against the corporation since 1946, put an end to the rivalry between the
independent UE and the AFL-CIO affiliated lUE and resulted in the first negotiated
settlement for GE workers in twenty years. Beyond wage increases, cost-of-living
adjustments and health insurance gains, many viewed the strike itself as a good omen for
organized labor. A year later, the autoworkers' strike against General Motors put the
"blue-collar blues" back on the national agenda. The UAW's decision to take on the
largest and most profitable corporation in the world had important economic and political
implications. After a nine-week stoppage, the union won back cost of living protection
without a ceiling, obtained decent wage increases and established the "30-and-ouf
'
principle. The walkout also significantly reduced Nixon's ability to capture the blue-
collar vote during the 1970 congressional election, as it proved that economic issues were
not old fashioned.
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In the early 1 970s, speed-ups at a number ofGM plants also ignited the debate on
the quality of industrial work life. The 1972 Lordstown strike came to epitomize the
resistance of a younger generation of workers to the company's arbitrary production
standards and work rules. Yet after the summer of 1973, strike activity began to subside.
The deepening economic recession took its toll on the rank and tile and their unions. The
decline in blue-collar militancy shattered the new leftists' hopes for a worker-student
alliance that, in the activists' view, could radically alter labor-capital relations. The 1973
round of auto negotiations resulted in moderate wage increases and in the creation of
health and safety committees. Inflation soon ate away the autoworkers' economic gains,
however, and the committees failed to improve working conditions on the plants. The
blue-collar blues would soon disappear from public discourse.
Unions also resorted to the voting booth to protect and advance their members'
interests. In 1968, the AFL-ClO's Committee on Political Education (COPE) as well as
the UAW's Community Action Program (CAP) flooded industrial districts with flyers
that revealed both Wallace's and Nixon's anti-labor records. Organized labor eventually
failed to take Hubert Humphrey to the White House, but the Democratic candidate owed
his miraculous comeback to the unions' campaign, which focused largely on bread and
butter concerns. In the 1970-off year elections, labor leaders also revived the economy as
a campaign issue and thus disrupted Nixon's blue-collar strategy and his attempts to play
up the Social Issue. The Democratic Party gained nine seats in the House of
Representatives, a majority of state governorships and kept control of the Senate. The
weakened labor-liberal coalition, however, did not survive the 1972 presidential election.
George McGovem, the Democratic candidate, was enthusiastically supported by the left
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liberal wing of the party but lacked the endorsement of the "old" labor bosses. Although
a number of progressive unions campaigned for McGovem, George Meany's decision to
steer the AFL-CIO into neutral ground deprived the Democratic candidate of crucial
organizational support. While the country seemed to be on the path of economic
recovery, Nixon neutralized the Vietnam War as a campaign issue and presented himself
as a reformer, a candidate of the political center. Though short-lived, the 1972
presidential election was an unprecedented political triumph for Nixon.
In the postwar period, blue-collars did not abandon their struggles either in the
workplace or in the voting booth. Yet workers seldom took to the streets. In the late
1960s and early 1970s, streets belonged to the peace activists and college radicals. Rank
and filers certainly were not as outspoken on foreign policy issues as the students were
but organized labor's opposition to the Vietnam War has often been underestimated.
Left-leaning unions joined anti-war protests as early as in 1965. The National Assembly
for Peace was fonned months before the Tet Offensive, which would make many
Americans change their minds about U.S. intervention in Southeast Asia. The alignment
of a large number of unions with the Moratorium played a significant role in the success
of the October 15, 1969, anti-war demonstrations. Nevertheless, the workers who
captured the media's attention were the New York "hard hats" that attacked peace
demonstrators in May 1970. The construction worker soon became the symbol of
American labor: affluent, conservative, and hawkish. In 1973, the biggest economic
downturn since the Great Depression as well as the Watergate scandal undermined such
image. Blue collars were neither complacent middle-class citizens nor unwavering
members of the so-called new Republican majority.
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The voting behavior theory that Benjamin Wattenberg and Richard Scammon
presented in The Real Majority has been extremely influential in the scholarly work that
deals with American politics in the postwar era. A large number of analysts agree that
cultural and social issues have driven politics in the United States since the late 1960s.
Robert Collins, however, has recently reassessed the importance of political economy.
Collins observes:
One wonders ...whether [Wattenberg's and Scammon"s] insight has not been
embraced too fervently, leaving us with a one-dimensional way of thinking about
public affairs that now overemphasizes the cultural determinants of political life
and loses sight of the enduring, albeit never exclusive, significance of such
"traditional concerns as political economy.
"Traditional" economic problems have continued to afflict American blue-and white-
collar workers in the last three decades. A wave of plant closings followed the recession
of 1973 as foreign competition and inflation eroded workers" wages. For the American
blue-and white-collar, the 1980s turned out to be worse than the 1970s. President Ronald
Reagan introduced aggressive anti-labor policies and accused workers of making selfish
wage demands. The administration endorsed anti-union methods that included
"replacing" strikers, firing those who favored unionization, closing unionized plants,
transferring work to other locations and obstructing union elections. The assault on the
unions was successful. In the first two years of the Reagan administration, organized
4
labor lost three million members.
Robert M. Collins, More: The Politics ofEconomic Growth in Postwar America (New
York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 235.
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In 1 995, the winds of change reached the AFL-CIO top echelons. John Sweeny,
head of the Service Employees International Union (SEIU), was elected president of the
federation. Sweeny's campaign slogan was "A New Voice for American Labor." His
ticket included Richard Trumka of the United Mineworkers, a well-known militant
unionist, and Linda Chavez-Thompson, a staunch representative ofwomen and racial and
ethnic minorities. "No George Meany-style-bread and butter unionist," Joel Kotkin
claims, "Sweeny is an advocate of European-style Democratic Socialism." The SEUI
leader's ascendancy marked an important power shift within organized labor. In the early
1970s, the traditional industrial unions -which rose as the vanguard of the labor
movement in the 1930s- began to decline. At the same time, the public sector unions
representing government workers and teachers increased their numbers dramatically.
Since 1975, the American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees
(AFSCME) has grown from a quarter million to 1.2 million members. Forty-two percent
of union members nowadays are public employees. The economic crisis of 1973
signaled the beginning of "de-unionization" of the American work force as well as the
replacement of industrial jobs with service and information-based jobs.
At the onset of the twenty-first century, wage earners' grievances have not
diminished. In fact, many working-class Americans are worse off than thirty years ago.
In the Internet era, the AFL-CIO" s website echoes the workers' complaints that labor
publications such as the AFL-CIO American Federationist, the UAW Solidarity or the UE
News voiced three decades ago. ""Real earnings," the AFL-CIO webpage states, "have
^Joel Kotkin, "The New Left Takes Over American Unions," The American Enterprise
On Line. Politics, Business, and Culture, 4 August 1999. Online. Available:
http://www.theamericanenterprise.org/taemj97b.htm
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been declining steadily since the early 1970s;' Unionists fear the loss of hard won
gains, such as the 40-hour week, prevailing wages. Medicare and Medicaid, social
security, student grants and loans, job safety, and the right to organize. Despite the
similarities between past and present worker grievances, the domestic and world
environments have radically changed. The global economy has altered the rules of the
economic game. "More and more unionized companies in the US," AFL-CIO leaders
claim, "are based in Europe and Asia and move capital and resources across political
boundaries, seeking the highest profits, the lowest labor costs and the fewest
environmental restrictions." How can labor get back into the game?
In November 1999, organized labor seemed to find a way. In Seattle, union
members joined anti-sweatshop activists, environmentalists, indigenous groups, farmers,
small business people and anarchists, among others, in their demonstrations against the
World Trade Organization (WTO). Tens of thousands ofmen and women filled the
streets of the city and halted the normal fiow of business. The overwhelming majority of
the demonstrators were peaceful. Yet, the media focused on the violent fringe that
destroyed private property. Reporters immediately drew parallels between the 1968
Battle of Chicago and the 1999 Battle of Seattle. Todd Gittlin observes, "To those old
enough, the images on TV -marauding street types, brutal cops, surreal chaos in clouds
6
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of gas -were reminiscent of footage from Chicago and Paris in 1968."^ There are,
however, important differences between the two movements. In Chicago, there was a
single and unifying issue: immediate withdrawal of American troops from Vietnam. In
Seattle, the concerns were varied and numerous: demonstrators protested against
corporate power and consumerism, against sweatshops, against unfair trade accords,
against the destruction of the environment, against genetically modified food. The
difference between Chicago '68 and Seattle '99, however, does not stop there. In 1968,
the AFL-CIO leaders sided with the Chicago police. In Seattle 1999, organized labor
marched side by side with students and intellectuals.
On November 30, an estimated 30,000 to 50,000 participants overflowed
Memorial Stadium in Seattle for the labor rally. Workers from more than 50 unions, 25
states and 144 countries gathered to protest against global injustice. The list of
participating unions included the Machinists, the Steelworkers, the United Autoworkers
(UAW), the American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees
(AFSCME), the International Union of Electrical Workers (lUE), the Transport Workers,
the Airline Pilots, the International Ladies Garments Workers Union (ILGWU) and the
9
International Longshore and Warehouse union. Journalist and activist Janet Thomas
vividly described the marchers:
The people who grow stuff, make stuff, move stuff, fix stuff, teach us, and take us
places. The people who rely on a union to preserve the values of daily life -time
for the kids, for leisure, health benefits. Values that fly in the face of "virtual"
g
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reality with its fifteen-hour high-tech, high-paying workdays, and easy dismissal
of the deep core issues of social justice.
The AFL-CIO's rallying slogan for the march was: "WTO. If it doesn't work for
working families, it doesn't work."'
'
Blue-and white-collar workers who marched in the
streets of Seattle demanded that the rules of the global economy protect people rather
than property.
Reformers and progressives regarded Seattle as a milestone for a new kind of
politics and became excited about the "Sweeny-Greenie'" alliance. The 1960s divide
between student activists and union people seemed to be closing. '1 used to say the most
beautiful thing in the world was a redwood deck,'" said Cory McKinley, a streelworker
from Spokane who walked at the front of the Seattle labor march. "Now," McKinley
added, "Fm hanging out with these green kids, 1 know there's another way to do this.
We can preserve the old-growth trees. We can have sustainability. I guess I'm an
12
environmentalist now." Icons of the sixties such as Tom Hayden and Todd Gitlin
praised organized labor's participation in the WTO demonstrations. Gitlin highlighted
the "unions' centrality" in the Seattle protest and pointed out that "the U.S. labor
13
movement [was] at a make-or-break point." For his part, Hayden stated, "It is pretty
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amazing to see the AFL-CIO head up there on the podium talking with a bunch of
SDSers and people from the gay and lesbian community. I never thought Fd see
something like that.""* Yet it is premature to predict whether or not this brand new
coalition will fare better than the short-lived student-worker collaboration of the late
1960s and early 1970s.
There is no doubt that the American unions' abrupt loss of power in the last thirty
years has been "an injury to all." For unionized workers to recover their role as agents
for social change, the AFL-CIO will have to revise the meaning of collective bargaining
in a global economy, the effectiveness of its tactics and strategies, its definition of
workers' needs and interests, and the unconditional faith in economic growth that
characterized unions in the postwar period. At onset of the twenty-first century, many
American workers are still discontented and organized labor is once again at cross roads.
It is up to the workers themselves and to their leaders to decide which way they are
willing to go.
Joel Kotkin, "The New Left Takes Over American Unions," The American Enterprise
On Line. Politics, Business, and Culture, 4 August 1999. Online. Available:
http://www.theamericanenterprise.org/taemj97b.htm
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